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Abstract 
 Using the case studies of Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia, this dissertation 
interrogates the applicability of the developmental state paradigm to mining developmentalism in 
Southern Africa. Since the advent of neoliberal Washington Consensus policies and the rise of 
the “resource curse” theory beginning in the 1980s, African states have been discouraged from 
pursuing interventionist policies in their mining sectors. Instead, through the methods of 
conditionality and transnational norm-creation, many African states were pressured to adopt 
“good governance” principles that limited their role, and the role for law, in expanding 
opportunities for mining-led development across the region. 
 As growing consensus challenged the efficacy of neoliberal approaches to mining 
governance, all three case studies (along with other mining-dependent African countries) 
introduced measures that increased state intervention in mining. These initiatives fall under three 
general categories: enhancing local content and participation, developing cross-sectoral linkages, 
and broader resource nationalism. To investigate the potential conflict that arises between 
implementing these measures and adhering to good governance norms, this dissertation asks 
whether the developmental state paradigm—popularized by East Asian states—offers an 
alternative framework to effectively govern mining-led development. 
 This dissertation is rooted in critical law and development scholarship and seeks to 
expand disciplinary and methodological boundaries of the developmental state (or “new” 
developmental state) beyond its current focus on economic growth indicators. Moreover, this 
dissertation inherently relies on interdisciplinary scholarship to examine its research question, 
including literature from African studies, political science, development studies and economics. 
ii
By using mining developmentalism in Southern Africa to interrogate orthodox law and 
development approaches to the developmental state, this dissertation concludes that a rights-
based approach to conceptualizing the developmental state—and more specifically, the mining 
developmental state—could better account for the needs of local populations when states 
embrace this development model. Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to address these gaps in 
the mining developmental state framework by evaluating recent state practice in Botswana, 
South Africa and Zambia, and considering the deleterious effects of extractivism in each country 
and the ways in which they could be ameliorated using a rights-based approach. 
iii
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1  Introduction 
“Africa has made the world rich with our minerals, our gemstones adorn crowns and homes 
around the world; it is time to make Africa prosperous, and enable her people to attain a 
dignified standard of living.” 
-President Nana Akufo-Addo, The Republic of Ghana  1
1.1. New directions in Southern Africa’s mining developmentalism 
 At the 2019 African Mining Indaba,  President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana stood before 2
hundreds of mining investors and executives to declare that African  countries deserved more 3
benefits from mining —it was no longer acceptable that foreign mining companies profited from 4
the continent’s vast mineral wealth while so many of its inhabitants remained poor.  President 5
Akufo-Addo’s comments reflected a longstanding belief held by many Southern African  6
governments since the end of colonial rule: mining could promote economic and social 
 “Africa: ‘Mining must make Africa prosperous not poor’ – President Akufo-Addo” (5 February 2019), online: 1
allAfrica News <https://allafrica.com/stories/201902060323.html> [President Akufo-Addo].
 The African Mining Indaba is an international mining investment conference held annually in Cape Town, South 2
Africa. The conference brings together African governments and investors to discuss business opportunities across 
the continent (see African Mining Indaba, online: <https://www.miningindaba.com/Page/about>).
 Where appropriate, this dissertation refers to the histories, theories, and current events that are relevant to all 3
African countries where large-scale mining operates. This is not intended to detract from this dissertation’s focus on 
Southern Africa—and three case studies from that region—to examine the research question and arrive at its 
conclusions. Nor does this method or use of this terminology intend to homogenize the diverse political, economic 
and legal traditions among African mining countries. Instead, its use acknowledges shared experiences of 
colonialism, neoliberalism, and foreign investment in various mining regimes across Africa.
 “Mining” is used in this dissertation to refer to the large-scale, industrial extraction of valuable, non-renewable 4
minerals, metals and other geographical materials from the earth The extracted mineral or metal product is 
inherently of economic value due to its use in other sectors, including technology, construction, and manufacturing 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The 
International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
2011) at 11 [“UNECA/AU”]).
 President Akufo-Addo, supra note 1.5
 For the purposes of this dissertation, “Southern Africa” refers to the member states of the Southern African 6
Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC is a regional economic community that is committed to regional 
integration and eradicating poverty through economic development and ensuring peace and security (https://
www.sadc.int/about-sadc).
1
development  across the region.  Mining’s vast wealth and developmental potential  has been 7 8 9
pivotal to state formation in Southern African from colonialism through post-colonial neoliberal 
interventions and more recent foreign investment. Due to its economic importance, this 
dissertation limits its analysis to large-scale mining operations carried out by private, often 
foreign, corporations or state-owned enterprises. Artisanal and small-scale mining—forms of 
mining conducted with less financing, employees, and technology —are not examined here 10
because their limited regulation has made it difficult to verify their contribution to national 
socioeconomic development across Southern Africa.  11
 How mining developmentalism (or mining-led development)  was conceptualized has 12
varied since independence swept across the region in the mid-twentieth century. The early post-
colonial period marked the rise of nationalist politics in many Southern African countries, 
resulting in interventionist domestic policies aimed at expanding the scope of public sector 
engagement in mining operations.  These interventions waned during the debt crisis of the 13
 “Development” is not a settled concept—there are various definitions that comprise different considerations, 7
including economic, social, environmental, capabilities, and human rights. This dissertation adopts an understanding 
of development that comprises economic and social factors under the umbrella of a nuanced rights-based approach 
to development. This definition is explained further in section 1.2.1 and Chapter Three.
 African Union, Africa Mining Vision (February 2009), online: Africa Mining Vision <http://8
www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf> at 10 [AMV].
 Africa Progress Panel, Africa Progress Report 2013: Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources 9
for all, online: <http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/> at 43.
 UNECA/AU, supra note 4 at 11.10
 Gavin Hilson, “Small-scale mining, poverty and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa: An 11
overview” (2009) 34:1–2 Resources Policy 1 at 2.
 “Developmentalism” is a method of structuring economic activity that relies on enhanced state intervention and 12
regulation of the market. It differs from economic liberalism and neoliberalism, which seeks to limit the role of the 
state in market activity (Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, “Two forms of capitalism: developmentalism and economic 
liberalism” (2017) 37:4 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 680). Accordingly, “mining developmentalism” and 
“mining-led development” are used interchangeably to refer to state reliance on mining—through a combination of 
regulation and direct intervention—as a way to promote socioeconomic development.
 Hany Besada & Phillippe Martin, “Mining codes in Africa: emergence of a fourth generation?” (2015) 28:2 13
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 263 at 266.
2
1980s, as governments seeking financial aid from the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)  were 14
forced to adopt neoliberal policy reforms that limited their involvement to regulating industry to 
create a conducive investment climate.  The failure of Southern African states to capitalize on 15
their mineral wealth was also attributed to the “resource curse,” a political economy theory put 
forth by economic geography professor Richard Auty,  which quickly became synonymous with 16
a state’s inability to transform its mineral wealth into sustainable socioeconomic development. 
Armed with Auty’s description of the problem,  development practitioners and the BWIs 17
attributed poor economic performance in the region to weak governance and ineffective 
institutions. To combat the curse, a set of political and economic policies—packaged as “good 
governance”—were proposed for states to achieve their socioeconomic development goals,  18
including measures framing the state as the regulator of mining and not an active participant in 
the industry.  
 The Bretton Woods Institutions comprise the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They were 14
created near the end of World War Two at a meeting of 44 allied countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Their 
aim was to assist with post-war reconstruction and development. Over time, as post-war reconstruction dissipated, 
their mission evolved to respond to the financing needs of developing countries—first on a project-scale, then 
eventually large-scale “structural adjustment loans.” It was through these loans that the BWIs implemented a 
neoliberal economic policy agenda—the “Washington Consensus”—that favoured privatization, trade liberalization, 
and government austerity (Joseph E Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: WW Norton & Company 
Inc, 2002) at 11-17).
 Besada & Martin, supra note 13 at 266.15
 Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: Routledge, 16
1993). 
 Subsequent academic studies supported Auty’s conclusion; see Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, “Natural 17
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth” (1995) NBER Working Paper No. 5398; Paul Collier & Benedikt 
Goderis, “Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum” (2007) 
University of Oxford, Department of Economics Working Paper No. WPS/2007-15; William Easterly & Ross 
Levine, “Tropics, germs, and crops: how endowments influence economic development” (2003) 50:1 Journal of 
Monetary Economics 3; Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource 
Curse” (2006) 116:508 The Economic Journal 1. 
 Anthony Anghie, “Universality and the Concept of Governance in International Law” in Edward Kofi Quashigah 18
& Obiora Chinedu Okafor, eds, Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 21 at 21.
3
 While good governance norms dominated neoliberal policy interventions throughout the 
1990s, several mining-dependent  Southern African states—including Angola, Botswana, the 19
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia—
have slowly shifted away from conforming to these norms over the course of the last 
commodities super cycle. ,  Instead, they have embraced mining law reforms reintroducing 20 21
direct state intervention in the industry. These reforms, driven in large part by the new wealth 
generated by the commodities boom, have been adopted by several states as a catalyst for the 
promotion of their stalled development agendas.   22
 Despite the significant wealth that mining presents, much of Southern Africa exhibits the 
“paradox of plenty” —the abundance of mineral resources has not yet produced meaningful 23
improvements in quality of life across the region. The use of mining to promote sustainable 24
economic growth and community development across Southern Africa hinges on a state’s ability 
to effectively govern the industry for that purpose. Developmental legal mechanisms are a 
necessary component of these efforts, which is an issue with which the field of law and 
 Use of the term “mining-dependent” in this dissertation is akin to the “resource-rich” descriptor used by the 19
International Monetary Fund to describe countries that are economically dependent on mining, particularly as a 
source of government revenue and export earnings (International Monetary Fund, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Sustaining 
Growth amid Global Uncertainty” (2012), World Economic and Financial Surveys, online: <www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf> at 61). 
 A “commodities super cycle” is an extended period during which commodity prices (for such products as oil, gas, 20
metals and minerals) are above average. From 2000-2014, the prices of several minerals (including gold, platinum, 
iron, zinc and copper) surged due to increased demand from emerging countries, most notably China  (UNECA/AU, 
supra note 4 at 24-25).
 Besada & Martin, supra note 13 at 266; Jack Jacobs, “An Overview of Revenue Flows from the Mining Sector: 21
Impacts, Debates, and Policy Recommendations” in Bonnie Campbell (ed), Modes of Governance and Revenue 
Flows in African Mining (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 16 at 17.
 Aniket Bhushan, Yiagadeesen Samy & Kemi Medu, Financing the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Domestic 22
Revenue Mobilization in Africa (September 2013), online: The North-South Institute <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Financing-the-Post-2015-Africa-Report-September-2013.pdf> at 3.
 Francis B Nyamnjoh & IM Jimu, “Success or Failure of Developmental States in Africa: Exploration of the 23
Development Experiences in a Global Context”, in Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of 
‘Developmental States’ in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005) 16 at 18.
 Ibid .24
4
development has yet to meaningfully engage. Likewise, the discipline has not turned its attention 
to the conflict between the “resource curse-good governance” nexus and the recent law reforms 
undertaken by mining-dependent Southern African states. Instead, over much of the post-colonial 
period, law and development scholarship has been concerned with understanding the relationship 
between law and economic development—particularly the legal mechanisms that successfully 
promoted growth and other economic indicators—while also proposing regulatory measures that 
could sustain those outcomes.  Today, although there is no consensus of the role of law in 25
development,  law and development theories like the “developmental state” may be useful tools 26
in conceptualizing legal interventions in mining that may mitigate the resource curse and 
governance deficit in Southern African states. 
The “developmental state”—or the “new developmental state”  as law and development 27
scholar David Trubek describes it today—is a paradigm that describes how developing countries 
prioritize economic development and design effective polices to promote this goal.  It traces its 28
theoretical origins to the interventions made by post-World War Two governments in East Asia 
(notably Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) to promote industrialization and achieve 
high rates of economic growth.  Although development has featured prominently in the 29
governance agenda of several post-colonial Southern African states, none—with the possible 
 Celine Tan, “Beyond the ‘Moments’ of Law and Development: Critical Reflections on Law and Development 25
Scholarship in a Globalized Economy” (2019) 12:2 Law and Development Review 285 at 288; Ada Ordor, 
“Tracking the Law and Development Continuum through Multiple Intersections” (2015) 8:2 Law and Development 
Review 333 at 335.
 David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, “Introduction: the Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the 26
Emergence of a New Critical Practice” in David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1 at 3.
 David Trubek, “Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of Development 27
and Law” (2009) University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1075 at 35. 
 Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez, “Mapping Law and Development” (2017) 4 Indonesian Journal of International and 28
Comparative Law 761 at 774.
 Esteban Pérez Caldentey, “The Concept and Evolution of the Developmental State” (2008) 37:3 International 29
Journal of Political Economy 27 at 27. 
5
exception of Botswana—have elevated themselves to the standard set by East Asia.  Today, as 30
many mining-dependent Southern African states remain mired in the paradox of abundant natural 
resource wealth and extreme poverty,  the developmental state may help explain the 31
interventions states are taking to extract greater benefits from mining, which differentiates this 
approach from the neoliberal tenets of the good governance paradigm that seeks to limit state 
involvement in the sector. 
Over the past twenty years, Southern African states have reclaimed policy space in their 
mining industries by redesigning their regulatory and governance regimes in favour of 
socioeconomic development. This development is contrary to the recommendations that had 
emerged from the logic of the resource curse thesis and subsequent contemporary neoliberal 
good governance discourse, which suggests that states should, in fact, minimize their reliance on 
mining and limit state interventions in the sector unless “proper” institutions are in place. Using 
Botswana, South Africa and Zambia as case studies, this dissertation seeks to explore this 
conflict by interrogating the resource curse thesis and good governance discourse. It not only 
critiques this paradigm—it goes further and hypothesizes if the developmental state framework 
offers an alternative means to govern mining-led development across Southern Africa. This 
research question is undoubtedly normative in nature.  Wherever possible, this dissertation 32
seeks to assess the prescriptive potential of the developmental state while also problematizing its 
underlying suppositions, in addition to those of traditional good governance discourse. 
 Peter Meyns & Charity Musumba, The Developmental State in Africa: Problems and Prospects (INEF Report, 30
101/2010) (Duisburg, Germany: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2010) at 45.
 Nyamnjoh & Jimu, supra note 23 at 18.31
 Sundhya Pahuja, “Practical Methodology: Writing about How We Do Research” in Nicholas Tsagourias, ed, 32
Handbook on Methodologies in International Law (fortchoming, Edward Elgar, 2020).
6
1.2. Situating the study: mining developmentalism in post-colonial 
development 
 Central to this dissertation’s analysis is the assertion that large-scale mining can promote 
development across Southern Africa if managed effectively. Mining is an economic activity that 
can potentially contribute to national economic development, broadly defined as growth, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), employment and other related criteria. However, the development 
agenda that mining supports and the beneficiaries of that agenda continue to be a contested site 
of policy-making across Southern Africa. While economic components of development are a 
critical focus of this dissertation, it also adopts a broader perspective that looks beyond the 
economic sphere. Accordingly, this dissertation adopts a rights-based approach to mining-led 
development that accounts for several economic and social impacts.  While using mining to 33
promote national and local development is not without its critics (some of which are summarized 
below in section 1.2.2), this dissertation presumes that mining is a desirable economic activity 
that can potentially be designed to promote socioeconomic development across Southern Africa. 
1.2.1. Defining and problematizing “development” 
 Mainstream conceptions of development—at least as it is understood in the Global North
—emerged after the end of World War Two when politico-economic ideology divided the world 
between the United States and its allies in the West and the former Soviet Union and its Eastern 
Bloc allies.  Despite its prominence in post-World War Two international relations, notions of 34
“developed” and “undeveloped” civilizations predate the twentieth century. Colonial conquest 
was premised on the idea that certain peoples were “savages” and lacked the advanced attributes 
 Mining also has a significant environmental impact, which this dissertation does not address.33
 Kerry Rittich, “Theorizing International Law and Development” in Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman, eds, The 34
Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 820 at 820 [Rittich, “Theorizing”].
7
of “civilized” populations.  After World War Two, this dichotomy evolved into a graduated scale 35
that dominated development discourse:  “developing,” or “Third World” populations were 36
situated at one end, and “developed” or “First World” states at the other.  Differences in wealth 37
(calculated using economic statistics like GDP or Gross National Income) catalogued states 
along the scale as “low”, “middle”, or “high” income countries.  The methodology of measuring 38
income has been critiqued by several authors, including Kerry Rittich, Sundhya Pahuja, Sally 
Engle Merry and Ruth Buchanan (along with collaborators Kimberley Byers and Kristina 
Mansveld). These scholars not only contend that this mechanism is flawed but that these 
measures further entrench income hierarchies.  39
  Contemporary understandings of the world are shaped by Northern framings of 
development and classifications such as those described above. Although it has helped 
conceptualize income differences between states,  development has also concealed the historical 40
 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of 35
Universality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 46 [Pahuja, Decolonising].
 Ibid.36
 “Global North” and “Global South” are two additional monikers that are often used to identify this seeming 37
economic and political divide between states. “Global South” is often used as an alternative to “Third World” that 
represents economically-disadvantaged states, many of which were former colonies. This distinction is not perfect, 
especially as several states in the Global South exert significant economic and political influence internationally, 
such as China, India and Brazil. Nonetheless, this conceptual divide is a useful way to map the economic, political 
and ideological differences that shaped the world in the post-colonial era (Anne Garland Mahler, “Global South” in 
Eugene O’Brien, ed, Oxford Bibliographies in Literary and Critical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
 Espen Beer Prydz & Divyanshi Wadhwa, “Classifying countries by income” (September 9, 2019), online: The 38
World Bank <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/the-classification-of-countries-
by-income.html>.
 See, for example, Kerry Rittich, “The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the 39
Incorporation of the Social” in David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and Economic Development: A 
Critical Appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 203; Sundhya Pahuja, “Global Poverty and Good 
Intentions” in Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen, eds, Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and 
Transitional Justice (London: Hart Publishing, 2014) 31; Sally Engle Merry, “Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights and Global Governance” (2011) 52:3 Current Anthropolgy S83; Ruth Buchanan, Kimberley Byers & 
Kristina Mansveld, “‘What gets measured gets done’: exploring the social construction of globalized knowledge for 
development” in Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang, eds, Research handbook on the sociology of international law 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 101.
 Pahuja, Decolonising, supra note 35 at 65.40
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inequities that have contributed to contemporary global inequalities. Instead, “development” has 
become a convenient means for wealthier nations and international organizations to direct and 
coordinate nation building in the Global South through such mechanisms as rule of law reform, 
foreign investment, structural adjustment conditionalities, and development assistance.  41
Contrasting understandings of development have become a point of international contestation for 
Northern and Southern states,  as disputes between the preeminence of political and civil rights 42
versus economic and social priorities dominated international debate in the early post-colonial 
era.  Newly independent states also galvanized around collective action to reimagine the 43
international legal and economic order, including at conferences such as that in Bandung, 
Indonesia in 1955,  and in international bodies such as the United Nations General Assembly 44
where the call for a New International Economic Order was advanced in the 1970s.  More 45
recently, expansive  definitions of development have become prevalent, including the capabilities 
approach popularized by Amartya Sen, as well as notions of “human development” proffered by 
the United Nations Human Development Index. Additionally, concerns about balancing 
consumption and production with environmental and social factors have entered the conversation 
as development discourse has adopted the mantra of sustainability over the past 30 years. 
Embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030, poor and wealthy states 
 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 41
Resistance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 26.
 Pahuja, Decolonising, supra note 35 at 66.42
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 34 at 823.43
 Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri & Vasuki Nesiah, “The Spirit of Bandung” in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri & Vasuki 44
Nesiah, eds, Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) 3 at 3.
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 34 at 823.45
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have, to some extent, coalesced around an idea of development that promotes prosperity while 
protecting the environment, advancing gender equality, and combatting climate change.  46
 Although mining is an activity that affects different components of the sustainable 
development agenda, this dissertation does not adopt that definition of development due to its 
breadth in addressing three separate dimensions (the economic, social and environmental).  47
Instead, this dissertation embraces a rights-based  approach to development (RBAD) that 48
considers national economic interests—such as growth, enhanced employment and income-
generating opportunities—alongside community empowerment, which in the mining context 
necessitates adopting the right of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). As will be discussed 
further in Chapter Three, this dissertation uses this definition in an attempt to entrench the 
socioeconomic interests of local mining-affected communities in national development agendas. 
This approach is not regarded as a panacea. Rather, as explained further in Chapter Three, this 
definition seeks to incorporate a measure of state accountability that could otherwise be absent in 
the new wave of mining developmentalism taking shape across Southern Africa.  To narrow this 49
analysis, considerations related to gender and the environment are not examined in this 
dissertation. 
 Sustainable Development Goals, online: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org>.46
 Ibid.47
 Human rights are also contested in critical development scholarship. This dissertation adopts a conception of a 48
“rights-based approach” to development as its been enunciated in the agreements and jurisprudence of the African 
Commission and Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights and various scholars in the field (see Chapter Three). It is a 
definition that adopts economic and social components in an accountability framework that expands the function of 
the developmental state.
 BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto” in Anthony Anghie et al, eds, The Third 49
World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 
2003) 47 at 70.
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1.2.2. Mining developmentalism versus extractivism 
 Mining has supported economic life in Southern Africa for centuries, even before the 
arrival of European colonialists. As colonialism took hold across the region in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, mining became entrenched in the economic fabric of the colonial 
state, making it a vital part of its survival and a mechanism of oppression, dispossession and 
displacement. In the post-colonial era, mining has remained vital to several Southern African 
economies. A recent analysis of mining by the International Council on Mining and Metals 
concluded that in both Zambia and the DRC, mineral rents  comprised more than five percent of 50
GDP.  Minerals, metals and coal products also comprised at least 25 percent of exports in nine 51
Southern African states,  and upwards of 50 percent of exports in four of these countries (both 52
Botswana and Zambia fall within this group).  The production value of mining was also at least 53
10 percent of GDP in seven countries, including all three case studies.  This data suggests that 54
mining remains critical to the economic survival of several Southern African states, including the 
three case studies. 
 It is possible, therefore, for states to maximize the developmental potential of mining 
through revenue generated from taxation, establishing cross-sectoral linkages that combat the 
enclave nature of mining and ensure it contributes to other sectors of the economy (both local 
procurement requirements and production linkages support this approach). Of course, a positive 
 “Mineral rents” are the profits generated from mining (the difference between the price the product can be sold 50
minus the costs of production).
 International Council on Mining and Metals, Role of Mining in National Economies: Mining Contribution Index 51
2018 (September 2018), online: <https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/social-and-economic-
development/181002_mci_4th-edition.pdf> [ICMM].
 The states are: Botswana, the DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and 52
Zimbabwe (Ibid).
 These countries are: Botswana, the DRC, Namibia, and Zambia (Ibid).53
 These states are: Botswana, the DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Ibid).  54
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correlation between mining and socioeconomic development is not guaranteed, and inherently 
depends on the functionality of institutions in place. Increased dependence on mining can also 
limit the long-term developmental prospects of states because it creates a dependency that is 
easily affected by the global political economy. This dissertation adopts the position that mining 
developmentalism is not a panacea for Southern Africa’s development challenges;  it should be 55
considered as  one possible method that could be utilized concurrently with others. 
 Conversely, critics of mining developmentalism contend that it is not a new form of 
economic development in the post-neoliberal state.  Like extractivist forms of development in 56
the neoliberal era, mining developmentalism continues to operate within a global capitalist 
system that elevates the economic interests of transnational corporations over those of local 
communities that are forced to contend with corporatist mining activity. Rather than alleviate or 
eliminate these harmful conditions, critics argue that states are merely undertaking new measures 
meant to reform their relationships with global capital and ensure a greater share of the benefits 
derived from mining.  Like many of their counterparts across Southern Africa, Botswana, South 57
Africa, and Zambia have attempted these undertakings with mixed results for the state and local 
communities. This dissertation aims to evaluate these outcomes and assess their progress, as well 
as their implications, for current mining developmentalist efforts taking shape in Africa. The 
extractivist critique offers a lens to do so. Although this dissertation situates its analysis in law 
 Chris WJ Roberts, “The other resource curse: Extractives as development panacea” in Hany Gamil Besada, ed, 55
Governing Natural Resources for Africa’s Development (New York: Routledge, 2017) 64 at 87.
 Henry Veltmeyer & James Petras, “A new model or extractive imperialism?” in Henry Veltmeyer & James Petras, 56
eds, The New Extractivism: A Post-Neoliberal Development Model or Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century? 
(London: Zed Books, 2014) 21 at 28. 
 Ibid at 39.57
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and development and developmental state frameworks, it also discusses the limitations of these 
two paradigms  while still acknowledging the role mining can play to catalyze development.  58
1.3. Framing the study: the developmental state in law and development 
 This dissertation frames its study of mining developmentalism within law and 
development scholarship for three reasons. First, neoliberal policies have constrained state action 
in the mining sector for several decades. The recent pivot away from this neoliberal policy 
agenda has been led by developing countries opposed to its poor outcomes despite the continued 
influence of the BWIs, other international organizations, and transnational “good governance” 
norms in shaping mining governance. To entrench mining developmentalism as the new 
economic order, states have been introducing new laws and legal institutions designed to reform 
public-private partnerships, reduce inequality, and empower citizens.  These actions are in line 59
with the developmental state, which was first conceived by political economist Chalmers 
Johnson when he studied economic development in Japan.  Second, law and development 60
scholarship—through the work of David Trubek, Diogo Coutinho, Mariana Prado, and Mario 
Schapiro in Brazil—has adopted this framework to analyze its challenges for law. Few other 
legal disciplines offer relevant theoretical paradigms rooted in examining the economic activities 
of states, its impact on development, and its affect on the changing roles for law. Lastly, by 
adapting this framework to the Southern African context, this dissertation wishes to contribute to 
the burgeoning and evolving field of law and development, which has yet to grapple with the 
 See Chapter Seven. 58
 David M Trubek, Diogo R Coutinho & Mario G Schapiro, “New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for 59
Law” in David Trubek et al, eds,  Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin 
American Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 28 at 28.
 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: 60
Stanford University Press, 1982).
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significance of mining developmentalism to evolving understandings of law and development in 
Southern Africa.  61
 Adopting this framework necessarily inclines this dissertation towards an 
interdisciplinary examination of the topic. The developmental state has been thoroughly 
analyzed, debated, and critiqued in political science, economics, development, and African 
studies literature. This dissertation relies extensively on that scholarship to inform conceptions of 
the developmental state in the field of law and development. It blends terminology and theories 
from these disciplines with ideas and emerging trends in law and development to define the 
developmental state and its constitutive institutions: development-oriented political leadership, 
an autonomous and effective bureaucracy, performance-oriented governance, and production 
coordination and conflict management.  These institutions are examined alongside emerging 62
mining developmental state institutions uniquely identified for this dissertation—local content 
and participation requirements, expanding cross-sectoral linkages, and broader resource 
nationalism—to partly conceptualize the mining developmental state,  a developmental state 63
that is largely reliant on mineral wealth to advance its development agenda.  
 Critical scholarship from law and development and international law are used to assess 
the developmental state’s efficacy to govern mining developmentalism. One of the critical 
 The contours of law and development scholarship have yet to be clearly defined. Recent academic gatherings 61
convened under the law and development theme (for example, those organized by the Law and Development 
Research Network and the Law and Development Institute) included presentations on theoretical conceptualizations 
of law and development, global economic governance, human rights, women’s rights, institutions, natural resource 
conflicts, the environment, legal pluralism, intellectual property, LGBTQ+ rights, and rule of law interventions. The 
only dedicated publication in the field, the Law and Development Review, has also published articles covering a 
wide range of topics.
 Meyns & Musamba, supra note 30 at 21.62
 My phrasing “mining developmental state” is a variation of Devin Joshi’s “resource developmental state” first 63
used in his article “Varieties of Developmental States: Three Non-Western Pathways to the Millennium 
Development Goals” (2012) 28:3 Journal of Developing Societies 355. Using “mining” rather than “resource” is 
meant to emphasize the developmental state’s reliance on mineral wealth.
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international law disciplines this dissertation relies on is Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL). Although this study is not squarely rooted in TWAIL methodology for the 
reasons discussed above, its scholarship informs the critical lens used to evaluate transnational 
good governance norms,  and the limitations of the developmental state within the field of law 64
and development. By partly framing its critical lens in TWAIL, this dissertation aims to integrate 
that scholarship into broadening conceptualizations of the mining developmental state: it rejects 
the hegemony of transnational norms and institutions, attempts to incorporate and use rights-
language effectively, and reinforces an accountability mechanism that centres local interests.  65
This approach is similar to that of law and development scholars like Ruth Buchanan, Sundhya 
Pahuja, and Kerry Rittich, whose scholarship consistently dialogues with TWAIL scholars such 
as Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Luis Esclava, James Gathii, Karin Mickelson, Obiora 
Okafor, and Balakrishnan Rajagopal. 
  Despite framing its analysis using the developmental state, this dissertation also 
acknowledges critiques of the paradigm. Some scholars contend developmental state scholarship 
is inductive—its paradigm emerged from a description of “successful” states rather than offering 
an explanation of their success.  Others have criticized the minimization of democratic values in 66
the discourse,  particularly the contention that they are not essential to its function.  Successful 67 68
 See, for example, James Gathii, “Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political 64
Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States” (2000) 45:5 Vill L 
Rev 971.
 Chimni, supra note 49 at 72.65
 Ben Fine, “Beyond the Developmental State: An Introduction” in Ben Fine, Jyoti Saraswati & Daniela Tavasci, 66
eds, Beyond the Developmental State: Industrial Policy into the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2013) 1 
at 9.
 Omano Edigheji, A Democratic Developmental State in Africa? A concept paper (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy 67
Studies, 2005) at 14.
 Mariana Mota Prado, Mario Schapiro & Diogo R Coutinho, “The Dilemmas of the Developmental State: 68
Democracy and Economic Development in Brazil” (2016) 9:2 Law and Development Review 369.
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developmental states (with the possible exception of Botswana) have also not relied on natural 
resources—industrial and trade policy were essential to the East Asian models that are 
foundational to this paradigm—leading some to question whether the developmental state can 
successfully base its policy agenda in resource extraction.  Notwithstanding the relevance of 69
these critiques, this dissertation positions itself in developmental state orthodoxy to allow for a 
thorough analysis of its application to mining developmentalism. 
 Before moving to an explanation of the methodology, some important terms must first be 
explained and defined. First, this dissertation takes a “fundamentally optimistic perspective on 
the role of law…in development.”  As explained further in Chapter Three, the view taken in this 70
dissertation is distinguishable from that of orthodox law and development scholars who have 
been criticized for naively promulgating the benefits of law reform efforts in developing 
countries. Like these proponents, however, the normative nature of this dissertation’s research 
question asserts the premise that “law matters,”  and that the laws and legal institutions of the 71
mining developmental state can significantly affect development. The “law” and “legal 
institutions” this dissertation examines are confined to formal, state-sanctioned examples given 
its focus on the developmental state, a method of organizing state infrastructure that is governed 
by a national government and constituted by various legal, political, and economic institutions. 
Accordingly, the laws and legal institutions analyzed in this study include legislation, 
government policy, jurisprudence, and international agreements. Informal and customary laws 
 Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa” (2008) 25 Cambridge Journal of 69
Economics 289 at 305.
 Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, “The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus 70
Skeptics” (2008) 56 Am J Comp J 895 at 896.
 Ibid.71
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and institutions, which also shape law and development across Southern Africa,  are not 72
included in this dissertation’s analysis. 
 Defining “governance” is more complex given its various definitions in the literature. A 
frequently-used definition conceived by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-
Lobatón, the authors of the World Bank’s 1999 Governance Matters report, defines 
“governance” broadly as  
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.  73
In its 2017 World Development Report, Governance and the Law, the World Bank altered this 
definition slightly and defined “governance” as “the process through which state and non-state 
actors interact to design and implement policies with a given set of formal and informal rules that 
shape and are shaped by power.”  Central to both definitions is the state, which carries out its 74
authority over markets and citizens through some form of central government. A key difference 
between the two definitions is the view of what governance should entail—“formulate and 
implement sound policies” in the first definition versus no such qualification in the second. 
 Defining and conceptualizing governance remains contentious. The paradigm has often 
been deployed as part of the global politico-economic hegemony of the BWIs and like-minded 
states. Thus, “the problem of development…transformed into a question of governance.”  Some 75
scholars have gone so far as to contend that the term “risks becoming an empty catch-all 
 Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen, "Introduction: Approximating Law and Development, Human Rights and 72
Transitional Justice” in Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen, eds, Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development 
and Transitional Justice (London: Hart Publishing, 2014) 1 at 8.
 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 73
1999) at 1.
 World Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017) at 74
3.
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 34 at 823.75
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phrase.”  In light of its disciplinary focus, this dissertation adopts a state-centric definition of 76
governance that encompasses governmental execution of coordinative functions aimed at 
directing, commanding or controlling public and private actors via institutions, norms, laws and 
regulations.  By extension, “mining governance” refers to the exercise of coordinative 77
governmental authority as it relates to the mining industry. 
1.4. Nature of the study: qualitative case studies of Botswana, South Africa, 
and Zambia 
 This dissertation uses a multi-case study methodology that facilitates both the exploration 
of developmental state institutions in various countries and a comparative analysis of the effects 
of the developmental state apparatus on mining governance. Specifically, multi-case study 
methodology is fundamental to answering the research question because it supports a 
comparative exploration of the historical context and current conditions at the state level, the 
dynamics of the specific developmental state institutions to be studied, and the specific mining 
sectors in which they operate. This exploration is particularly important due to the differing 
levels of developmental state institution integration into government apparatuses across Southern 
Africa, as well as the varying effects of the resource curse–governance poor nexus.  
1.4.1. Why study Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia? 
Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia were selected for the comparative value they offer. 
First, mining dominates the economies of all three countries and has been, to varying degrees, 
 Mari-Lise du Preez, “Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’: Rethinking Natural Resource Governance 76
Theory and Practice in Africa” in J Andrew Grant, WR Nadège Compaoré, and Matthew I Mitchell, eds, New 
Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 25 at 25.
 Ibid.77
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instrumental to each state’s developmental agenda.  All three countries have also implemented 78
significant reforms in their mining industries over the last twenty years. In Botswana, the state 
has attempted to diversify its economy away from mining and into more downstream activities 
such as diamond cutting and polishing, while the respective governments in South Africa and 
Zambia have endeavoured to better harness the developmental potential of their mining 
industries.  
Second, each country has been differently affected by the resource curse and poor 
governance. As will be discussed further in Chapter Four, Botswana is often considered an 
exception to the resource curse and the benchmark for good governance across Africa.  On the 79
other hand, South Africa and Zambia are regarded as weak governance states in various metrics. 
For example, according to the 2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI), which is a highly-
regarded metric of natural resource governance, both Zambia and South Africa were ranked as 
“weak” (the third lowest rank after “good” and “satisfactory”) which respective composite scores 
of 50 and 57 out of 100 points.  80
Third, all three states have variably adopted institutional elements of the developmental 
state, with higher level of adoption evident in Botswana, less in South Africa, and very little in 
Zambia.  Lastly, neither Botswana nor South Africa have joined the Extractive Industries 81
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the world’s foremost governance standard for resource extraction. 
 All three countries have small oil and gas sectors (relative to mining) that will not be studied so that the research 78
project remains sufficiently narrow.
 Meyns and Musamba, supra note 30.79
 Resource Governance Index, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute: <https://80
resourcegovernanceindex.org>. Botswana’s RGI score was 61, which further cements its reputation as a good 
governance model in Southern Africa. The RGI scoring categories (out of 100) were: good (>74), satisfactory 
(60-74), weak (45-59), poor (30-44), and failing (<30).
 Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, “Botswana and Uganda as Developmental States(?)” in Pamela Mbabazi & Ian 81
Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of ‘Developmental States’ in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: 
CODESIRA, 2005) 1.
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Only Zambia is a member,  which raises questions about why certain mining-dependent 82
Southern African states choose not to join the governance initiative. 
1.4.2. Empirical research using the qualitative case study  
 The qualitative case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context.”  This approach is beneficial to answering 83
the research question because of how it operationalizes the investigation. First, the qualitative 
case study is concerned with addressing a particular phenomenon, whether it be a specific event, 
occurrence, range of programs, or activities.  Case studies can be used to research a broad range 84
of inquiries that are focused on a diversity of topics, such as individuals, social groups, and 
institutions.  As such, specific country case studies lends itself well to the examination of 85
evolving economic, social and political mining developmental state institutions. 
Second, the qualitative case study examines the phenomenon being studied in its “natural 
context, bounded by space and time,”  thus making the analysis very specific, and easier to 86
understand that which is the central focus of the inquiry. For example, using the qualitative case 
study to examine developmental state institutions in Southern Africa restricts the analysis to 
those that are operationalized in each state over a specific period of time (primarily over the past 
twenty years). Third, the qualitative case study allows for extensive use of data from varied 
sources; the information collected is not restricted to observations, but can include other 
 Zambia is deemed EITI compliant, and last filed a country report stating the payments it received in 2014 82
(Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, online: <https://eiti.org/zambia>).
 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Designs and Methods, 4th ed, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009) 83
at 18.
 Dawson R Hancock & Bob Algozzine, Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning Researchers 84




secondary sources critical to the investigation. Data collection in qualitative case studies also 
benefits from prior research that helps orient and guide the data that will be collected and 
analyzed.   87
Using a qualitative multi-case study is best suited to answering the research question for 
three reasons. First, determining whether developmental state institutions can effectively govern 
new directions in Southern African mining requires that this dissertation examine the history, 
context, and current conditions within the state, the specific developmental state institutions to be 
studied, and the extractive sector in which they operate. Second, drawing any conclusions from a 
single case study confines the applicability of the results to a single case; examining 
developmental state institutions in multiple cases can help draw both case-specific and cross-case 
conclusions,  which can thus help inform theoretical understandings of legal institutions and 88
mining governance in the developmental state. Since the developmental state experience varies 
across mining-dependent Africa, multiple-case studies can illuminate the various ways in which 
Southern African states are adapting developmental state institutions to their specific context, 
and their impact on mining governance. Lastly, by using a qualitative case study, this dissertation 
adopts a multi-faceted approach to data collection that is informed by sufficient prior research, 
and the proper theoretical orientation. 
 Yin, supra note 83 at 18.87
 Ibid at 20.88
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Various studies from law and development  have used the same methodological 89
approach as this dissertation. In “New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Law,”  90
David Trubek, Diogo Coutinho, and Mario Schapiro undertook a qualitative case study of Brazil 
to propose the “new” developmental state theory, and offer insights into emerging issues in law 
and development. Using Brazil as a case study, Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro showcased shifts 
in development policy and practice, from the period of neo-liberal hegemony to contemporary 
forms of state activism. Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro studied recent reforms to Brazilian 
industrial policy, including a recent government initiative aimed at increasing public-private 
partnerships to promote economic efficiency.  
 Another study that examined analogous questions using the case study approach is the 
Bonnie Campbell edited volume Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development.  In the book, 91
the various authors evaluated recent mining reforms to better understand their impact on 
development goals. Each author adopted a case study to respond to the research question in their 
respective chapter. Case studies included Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Madagascar, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Like Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro, the use of case studies in Campbell’s 
edited volume offered a unique method for analyzing contemporary legislative and policy shifts, 
and determining their impacts on evolving understandings of mining regulation and governance. 
 Although not from law and development, two recently completed PhD dissertations in political science also used 89
the qualitative case study methodology to answer similar research questions. In Local Content and the Emergence of 
the Petro-Developmental State in the Gulf of Guinea (supra note 264), Jesse Salah Ovadia used Angola and Nigeria 
as country case studies to investigate the evolving policy shift that promoted local content and offered the states a 
way of potentially avoiding the resource curse. WR Nadège Compaoré similarly utilized country case studies in her 
investigation of why some African states choose to join the EITI, while others do not (Re-politicizing State 
Sovereignty in Global Governance: A Political Economy of Transparency in the Oil Sectors of Gabon and Ghana 
(PhD Thesis, Queen’s University, 2015) [unpublished]). 
 Trubek, Coutinho & Schapiro, supra note 59 at 28.90
 Bonnie Campbell, ed, Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development (Ottawa: International Development 91
Research Centre, 2009).
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This dissertation takes a similar approach to the aforementioned authors by using three country 
case studies to understand the emergence of comparable circumstances in mining-dependent 
Southern Africa.  
1.5. Conclusion 
 The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter Two will discuss the historical 
material conditions of mining in Southern Africa to illustrate how the changing dynamic of state 
intervention in the sector contributed to the emergence, and later dominance, of the resource 
curse theory and its “good governance” solution. Chapter Two will also consider shortcomings of 
this discourse to conceptions of the role of law in mining governance. Chapter Three will 
describe law and development scholarship in more detail, and explain the developmental state 
framework this dissertation adopts for its analysis of the case studies in Chapters Four 
(Botswana), Five (South Africa), and Six (Zambia). Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by 
synthesizing the concepts discussed in the previous chapters and considers whether the 
developmental state can effectively govern new directions in Southern African mining 
developmentalism. 
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2  The “Good Governance” Panacea in Mining 
2.1. Introduction 
 The juxtaposition between Southern Africa’s abundant mineral resources  and enduring 1
poverty  has led to the near consensus  that there is a problem with the way mining is governed 2 3
in the region.  Political economist Richard Auty first used the term “resource curse” in 1993 to 4
describe the counterintuitive nature of persistent underdevelopment in mineral-rich states.  5
According to Auty, the over-reliance on wealth generated from resource extraction in resource-
rich countries would likely result in detrimental economic and political outcomes.  To combat 6
the curse, international development scholars  and Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)—most 7
notably the World Bank —soon began calling for the reform of what they described as weak and 8
 Africa Progress Panel, Africa Progress Report 2013: Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s natural resources 1
for all, online: <http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/> at 43.
 Ibid at 19.2
 While almost universal agreement blames Southern African governments for the failures in mining governance, 3
many critical development scholars argue that exogenous factors, such as neoliberal structural adjustment 
programmes, unequal bargaining power between mining multinationals and Southern African states, and the boom-
bust nature of commodity prices may also detrimentally affect mining governance. See, for example, Bonnie 
Campbell, “Factoring in Governance is Not Enough. Mining Codes in Africa, Policy Reform and Corporate 
Responsibility” (2003) 18:1 Minerals and Energy 2 [Campbell, “Factoring”]; Paula Butler, Colonial extractions: 
race and Canadian mining in contemporary Africa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); and Pablo Idahosa, 
“Good Governance, Corruption and the Resource Boom: Africa and Canada in the Global Order” in David 
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malfunctioning institutions that were symptomatic of poor governance. As a result, development 
efforts in mining-dependent Southern African states continue to be shaped by the now 
inseparable link between the problem defined as the “resource curse” and its “good governance” 
solution.  This dynamic, which dominates the way mainstream scholars have understood the 9
problem, is succinctly captured by the formula: “resource wealth + governance deficit = resource 
curse.”  10
This chapter will explore the emergence of the good governance panacea  as a response 11
to concerns with mining across Africa and the way law has been used in the sector. Given that 
much of the discourse has stemmed from an assessment of mining governance across Africa that 
disregards national or regional conditions, the analysis in this chapter will adopt a continental 
lens with the understanding that it will not adequately account for some country-specific 
histories. Nonetheless, the analysis is undertaken in this way to illustrate how governance 
discourses emerged from particular colonial and post-colonial narratives about mining in Africa. 
This chapter will also demonstrate how two separate governance metrics—the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Resource Governance Index (RGI)—preserve 
the traditional approach to mining governance and obscure the role for law in governing mining 
for development. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the historical material conditions of 
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African mining, from colonization to the rise of neoliberal  policy interventions (often referred 12
to as the “Washington Consensus”) in the 1980s and early 1990s. The section will pay particular 
attention to the role of states and the legal mechanisms used to govern mining. The resource 
curse, including its various components, is explained in section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines the 
historical genesis of “good” governance in African mining and its theoretical origins in the 
resource curse thesis and Douglass North’s New Institutional Economics theory.  It considers 13
the direct correlation between the increasing popularity of good governance norms and the 
shrinking role of the African state in mining, and the emphasis on legal measures aimed at 
achieving this objective. The chapter then shifts its analysis to the RGI and the EITI in section 
2.5, examining how each metric constructs and evaluates the role of law in mining governance. 
Critiques of this approach, which are grounded in neoliberal understandings of the role for law in 
mining governance, are interrogated in section 2.6. Finally, the chapter concludes by contending 
that there is a need to reframe governance to support mining-led development by rethinking both 
the role of the state and the role for law. This endeavour is then taken up in Chapter Three.  
 Neoliberalism refers to an ideology and policy model that favours free market capitalism and competition. It 12
gained prominence in the 1980s and comprised a series of policy interventions commonly promulgated by the World 
Bank, International Monetary and conservative donor governments. These policies included “fiscal discipline, tax 
reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, opening up to foreign 
direct investment, privatization of state enterprises, deregulation and legal security of property rights.” Due to the 
prominence of Washington, D.C. based financial institutions in promoting these policies abroad, the phrase 
“Washington Consensus” is used interchangeably with “neoliberalism” to describe these policies (Ann Stewart, 
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2.2. The historical material conditions of mining in Africa 
Legal frameworks that governed African mining since the end of colonial rule have 
facilitated varied state interventions in the industry. Nationalistic policies that saw many African 
governments participate directly in natural resource production dominated the early post-colonial 
period.  Beginning in the 1980s, mining governance in Africa underwent significant reform as 14
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund pushed for wholesale privatization of the 
sector and a redefinition of the role of the state.  Using the mechanisms of conditionality, the 15
BWIs were able to oversee the implementation of these reforms, which shifted the role of law to 
protect private sector interests from state intervention and confined the role of the state to a 
“nightwatchman.”  This section provides an overview of the evolving role of the state in African 16
mining. It is divided into three distinct periods: the colonial period, the early postcolonial period 
and the rise and dominance of the Washington Consensus during the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
By doing so, this section aims to illustrate how the historical material conditions of African 
mining gave rise to the “resource-rich and governance-poor”  view of the state. 17
2.2.1. Colonialism 
 European competition to locate and control natural resources is a well-documented 
economic motive for the “Scramble for Africa” and colonization of the continent. In the years 
following the decline of the slave trade, European merchants turned their attention to the 
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legitimate commercial interests Africa presented.  Mining was an established practice in Africa 18
by the time European colonialists sought to monopolize the industry in the late nineteenth 
century. Early evidence of copper mining, for example, can be traced to 4000 BCE.  In the 19
millennia before European contact, the mining of copper, gold, tin, and lead occurred in many 
parts of the continent, and these commodities were commonly traded with European merchants 
before colonization.  As European colonists sought further control over African territory, the 20
search for untapped mineral reserves led to further encroachment in the African interior and the 
gradual destruction of local institutions.   21
 Following the 1884 Berlin Conference that regulated and institutionalized Europe’s 
colonization of Africa, the exploitative efforts by colonial governments that favoured  European 
ownership created dominant mining industries across Africa and relegated Africans to 
labourers.  In West Africa, gold production in the (aptly named) Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra 22
Leone sustained the British colonial state in that region beginning in the early 1900s.  While in 23
Southern Africa, British control was entrenched through commercial interests led by Cecil 
Rhodes and his company De Beers after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870.  24
Copper mining in Northern Rhodesia and gold mining in Transvaal, South Africa further 
consolidated British authority in the region. Not to be outdone, Belgian copper mining in the 
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Congo helped finance King Leopold’s expansive colony.  By the early part of the twentieth 25
century, mining accounted for more than 40 percent of the exports from five colonies: the 
Belgian Congo, the Gold Coast, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.  Not 26
far behind were Angola, Sierra Leone, and South-West Africa.  27
 Mining as a colonial tool entrenched exploitative institutions and created enclave sectors 
such that economies and livelihoods across the region depended on this one industry.  Colonial 28
regimes reinforced the export-oriented nature of extractive industries by extinguishing local 
mining practices, diverting African labour to resource extraction, and directing investment to  the 
infrastructure necessary to move minerals from the interior to coastal areas for shipment to 
external markets.  Since natural resource extraction was an economic priority for the colonial 29
state, specific measures were introduced in order to ensure the primacy of the sector remained 
intact. These included introducing and implementing political safeguards, legal protections, 
infrastructure financing, and securing much-needed labour from the local population.  
2.2.2. Early post-colonial period 
 After the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s, African states inherited 
enclave mining institutions that were ill-equipped to respond to their immediate developmental 
needs. This was primarily due to the export-oriented nature of the industry and the few sectoral 
linkages in place connecting mining to other parts of the domestic economy.  In a 2011 report 30
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commissioned for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, 
authors from the International Study Group described six features of the “externally-oriented 
enclave” industries inherited by African states, which can be summarized as follows: 
1. Mines were controlled and operated by foreign firms; 
2. Minerals were exported as raw materials with little processing, resulting in weak 
sectoral linkages to the rest of the economy; 
3. Mining profits were repatriated to home states where foreign firms were based, while 
material inputs were imported rather than sourced from local businesses; 
4. Minerals remained a top export, yet offered few other benefits to the economy; mines 
were dependent on imports, profits were repatriated, and expatriates dominated the 
ranks of senior employees and executives;  
5. Mining was a significant source of public revenue; and 
6. High-skilled and high-paid mining positions remained reserved for expatriate 
employees due to the legacy of “the racist division of labour under colonialism that 
kept Africans in low-skill, low-wage jobs.”  31
Reversing the enclave nature of mining and ensuring it could contribute to development 
goals and the broader state-building project was a key policy objective in several newly 
independent African states. To support this goal, many African governments moved to vest 
mineral ownership with the state rather than customary rights holders.  Under the colonial state, 32
local communities were dispossessed of their rights over natural resources.  Restoring 33
 UNECA/AU, supra note 22 at 14.31




customary mineral rights at independence was possible; however, several former colonies 
(including Botswana and Zambia) opted instead to restore traditional access to land while 
retaining state ownership over minerals.  This approach was aligned with emerging international 34
law, advanced mainly by newly independent states, that sought to assert state control over natural 
resources as an integral component of self-determination.  United Nations General Assembly 35
Resolutions 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, 532 (VI) of January 12, 1952, and 626 (VVI) of 
December 21, 1952, were three resolutions that expounded on this principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.  The principle entrenched “the right of peoples and nations 36
to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the 
interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned”  in international law. Fundamentally, the principle supports state control over natural 37
resources, including: “(1) the right to freely dispose of natural resources; (2) the right to explore 
and exploit natural resources freely; (3) the right to use natural resources for development; (4) 
the right to regulate foreign investment; and (5) the right to settle disputes based on national 
law.”  This right was often entrenched in the post-colonial constitutions of many African states, 38
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as was the case in Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia.  In other countries, legislation governing 39
extraction included state ownership over mineral resources. For example, section 3(1) of South 
Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act declared the country’s mineral 
resources as the “common heritage of all the people” and embedded custodianship in the state.  40
Along with vesting mineral wealth in the state, African governments initiated several 
different policies aimed at further enhancing the benefits of resource extraction. These included 
the creation of state-owned extractive enterprises to explore mineral deposits and establish 
production, and securing interest in already existing mining operations.  Botswana is one 41
example of an African state that sought the dual role of investor and owner in resource 
extraction. Soon after its independence in 1966, the Botswana government encouraged the 
exploration of its resources by foreign mining companies, which led to the discovery of 
diamonds in several locations across the country.  To promote this investment in the diamonds 42
sector, Botswana entered into an agreement with De Beers, the world’s leading diamond mining 
company, to establish a joint venture in which the state held a 50 percent stake.  43
In the decades after independence, the development efforts of African states yielded 
mixed results as mining’s potential was not fully realized across the continent. This sentiment 
was acknowledged in the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted in 1980 by the Organization of African 
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Unity, the predecessor of the African Union. Under the mandate of conducting a “strategic 
review of Africa’s development challenges and potential paths for economic growth and 
development”,  the Plan stated that: 44
The major problems confronting Africa in the field of natural resource development 
include: lack of information on natural resource endowment of large and unexplored 
areas and the activities of transnational corporations dealing with natural resource 
assessments; lack of adequate capacity (capital, skills and technology) for the 
development of these resources; a considerable dependence on foreign transnational 
corporations for the development of a narrow range of African natural resources selected 
by these corporations to supply new material needs of the developed countries; the 
inadequate share in the value added generated by the exploitation of natural resources of 
Member States due to imperfect pricing and marketing practices; non-integration of the 
raw materials exporting industries into the national economics of the Member States thus 
impeding backward and forward linkages; extremely low level of development and 
utilisation of those natural resources of no interest to foreign transnational corporations; 
and disappointingly low general contribution of natural resources endowment to 
socioeconomic development.  45
Immediately following this acknowledgement, the Plan went on to identify strategic 
measures that could transform mining’s impact on development. First, Member States were 
encouraged to conduct a full assessment of their mineral endowments.  A holistic understanding 46
of available resources was regarded as the first step in mapping mining’s potential contribution to 
socioeconomic development projects. Second, Member States were advised to integrate mining 
into socioeconomic development planning as a way to “encourage complementarity”  and 47
“promote backward and forward linkages”  within their economies. Strengthening national 48
mining institutions concerned with “training, research, production, processing, fabrication, 
marketing, [and] finance”  was an additional recommendation. 49
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Underperformance in the global mining market continued to mar African states in the 
decade following the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action. During this time, approximately 45 
percent of mineral production in Africa was under state control, and 35 percent was controlled 
through public-private joint ventures.  However, as state intervention increased across Africa, 50
the region’s share of global mineral production decreased from 31.5 percent in 1970 to 10 
percent in 1987,  while the region received only 4 percent of global investment in mineral 51
exploitation by the late 1980s.  The acknowledgement of Africa’s poor performance in mining 52
was not only clear to African states; it soon garnered the attention of the BWIs, most notably the 
World Bank, as states sought donor assistance to offset budget shortfalls. 
2.2.3. The rise of the Washington Consensus hegemony 
 Africa’s bleak economic fortunes at the start of the 1980s were the focus of the World 
Bank’s 1981 report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action 
(commonly referred to as the “Berg Report” for its principal author, American economist Elliot 
Berg).  Launched on the heels of the Lagos Plan of Action by a special request from African 53
Members of the Bank, the Berg Report sought to investigate Africa’s “economic development 
problems” and propose “an appropriate program” for resolving them.  Its findings were not 54
optimistic: more than any other region, Africa was hit hardest by the inflation and recession that 
stemmed from the 1970s global economic crisis. Despite some signs of progress—infrastructure 
and industrial development, longer life expectancies, and increased school attendance—growth 
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in per capita income remained below 1 percent for 19 countries between 1960 and 1979 and 
declined in 15 others.  A combination of internal “structural” factors and external facets of the 55
international economy at the time were blamed for Africa’s poor economic performance.  56
Internally, the report stressed that the growth of African governments contributed to economic 
mismanagement by diverting resources away from sectors such as private agriculture and 
industry that could have supported growth, and instead investing them in state-operated 
commercial activities and basic social services that were undergoing transformation from 
colonial rule.   57
 To reverse the economic misfortunes of African states, the Berg Report outlined the 
Bank’s recommendations for structural adjustment, which became a condition of Bank loans.  58
Two related elements of structural adjustment had significant bearings on the mining sector: 
downsizing public sector bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises while simultaneously 
increasing reliance on the private sector.  Decades later, these reforms proved detrimental to 59
African economies as privatization did not yield the expected results,  a point which will be 60
discussed later in greater detail. The Report also proposed three mining-specific 
recommendations that aimed to reduce state involvement in mining. First, the Report called for 
the rehabilitation of mining facilities already in place, many of which were owned and operated 
by state-owned mining companies.  Many African countries found state investment difficult, 61
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especially as they were facing low profits, civil unrest, or an uncooperative foreign investor. The 
Report advised African governments to tap into a USD $365 million aid fund created by 
European donors under the 1981 Lomé Convention specifically tailored to support mining 
facility rehabilitation.  Next, the Report encouraged African states to seek additional foreign 62
investment with the assistance of the World Bank through its lending program, which earmarked 
USD $700-800 million for new mines.  Lastly, the Bank advised African governments to seek 63
further donor aid to fund private sector exploration and mineral discovery.  By the late 1980s, 64
mining institutions across Africa were substantially altered as states became regulators and 
creators of favourable investment environments rather than active participants and proponents of 
effective mining-led development, in contrast to the principles agreed to in the Lagos Plan of 
Action. Through the politics of conditionality, structural adjustment displaced African solutions 
from policy-making frameworks.   65
 The structural transformation of African mining institutions culminated in the World 
Bank’s 1992 report Strategy for African Mining.  The report represented the first time the Bank 66
shared its explanation for the demise of Africa’s mining performance and its rationale for reform 
in a systematic way.  The Bank made it clear that African governments were expected to create 67
a favourable environment for foreign investment, which at its core required “[a] clearly 
articulated mining sector policy that emphasizes the role of the private sector as owner and 
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operator and of the government as regulator and promoter.”  According to the Bank, this regime 68
required African governments to:  
• Implement fiscal terms and incentives that were comparable to other developing 
countries and would sufficiently attract investment;  
• Pass domestic legislation that ensured secure access to mining sites and tradable 
exploration and mining rights; 
• End all forms of institutional involvement in the operation and marketing of state-owned 
mining companies; and 
• Privatize state mining operations, either totally or in part. Early adoption of this strategy 
was recommended as a signal to foreign firms that the government was committed to 
privatization.  69
 In the words of Bonnie Campbell, a Canadian expert on African mining governance, the Report 
at its core argued “that to adapt to modern conditions of mining, the primary objective of African 
countries should be to avoid state ownership and attract private investors.”  70
 Through these recommendations, the Bank was clearly stating that the African state was 
not equipped to fully realize mining’s potential. Interestingly, the Bank did not ground its 
assessment in the “resource curse” theory.  Instead, the rationale was rooted in the 71
underperformance of African mining sectors up until the late 1980s. In the Bank’s view, mining 
could provide significant economic benefits to African states, including foreign exchange 
earnings and tax revenue.  African mining was also important to the rest of the world, as it 72
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accounted for 8 percent of world mine production at the time of publication, with significant 
untapped reserves unavailable to support the global economy.   73
 The Report succinctly stated that to successfully attract foreign investment, the following 
institutional reforms were required immediately: “stable and transparent regulations, which 
clearly spelt out the rights and obligations of the investor and government; a competitive and 
well-structured fiscal regime which provided an adequate return to investors and a fair share to 
the government;…and effective support and monitoring of private mining investment by well-
organized government institutions.”  Chapters Four and Five outlined the Bank’s specific 74
strategy for reforming the legal institutional framework governing mining in Africa. 
 Structuring a country’s Mining Code to “meet the requirements of most investors while 
safeguarding the national interest”  was a critical reform identified by the Bank. A Mining Code 75
was defined as the “combination of statute law, regulations and agreements which governs the 
allocation, tenure and operation of mining rights.”  The Bank acknowledged that for many 76
African countries, the legacy of colonialism still influenced the structure of a country’s Code. For 
example, the Bank noted that many African countries adopted the mining laws put in place 
during colonialism, and only a few undertook reforms since independence. However, these 
reforms did not satisfy the Bank’s standard for accommodating private investment. Instead, a 
country’s Mining Code was expected to adopt two guiding principles if it were to support large-
scale private investment: secure long-term title to mining rights; and the rights to explore and 
extract minerals in return for specific commitments.  77
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 In addition to a Mining Code, the Report recommended that African countries adopt a 
Model Agreement that would “formalize the details of arrangements between state and company, 
fill any blanks or ambiguities in…legislation, and provide safeguards for both the investor and 
the government which may not be adequately set forth in the law.”  Some of the important 78
clauses the Bank recommended included: clarification of mineral rights in the mining law; 
obligations of the mineral rights holder, including expenditure obligations, employment, and 
infrastructure obligations; state participation in the mining project; fiscal provisions, such as 
license fees, royalties, and stabilization clauses;  and legal safeguards that identified potential 79
dispute settlement procedures like international arbitration through the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes.  80
 In the decades after the World Bank’s structural adjustment reforms were implemented, 
the results were optimistically described as mixed at best  by the 2007 Policy Big Table 81
comprised of African governments, the African Union, the African Development Bank, and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.  Although the reforms did promote higher 82
levels of foreign investment by creating a more favourable investment environment, the Big 
Table concluded that “African efforts to attract [foreign investment] to their natural resources 
sector, which led to the formulation of overly generous investment laws and regulations”  failed 83
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to generate meaningful benefits for local populations in several countries. Rather than promote 
widespread economic growth, reduce unemployment, and respond to sustainable development 
concerns, the push for neoliberal policy reforms created competition among host states that 
resulted in a “race to the bottom.”  African countries had reformed mining codes, fiscal regimes 84
and environmental regulations to attract foreign investment, to the detriment of local 
development goals.  85
2.3. Africa’s mineral wealth: a curse for development, rather than a blessing 
Around the time the Washington Consensus became entrenched in IFI decision-making, 
economic geography professor Richard Auty developed the resource curse theory to explain the 
seemingly negative relationship between natural resource wealth and economic growth.  86
Designed initially to explain why resource-rich states were unable to exploit their mineral wealth 
to generate sustainable economic growth effectively, the theory has become synonymous with a 
combination of deleterious economic and political effects in resource-abundant states.  In the 87
years since Auty first proposed the theory, it has become a widely-used explanation for the slow 
economic growth coupled with political distress experienced by many resource-rich states 
compared to their resource-scarce counterparts. Other prominent academics—including Jeffrey 
Sachs, Paul Collier, Macarten Humphreys, Halvor Mehlum and Joseph Stiglitz—promulgated 
 Antonio MA Pedro, “The Africa Mining Vision as a model for natural resource governance in Africa” in Hany 84
Gamil Besada, ed, Governing Natural Resources for Africa’s Development (New York: Routledge, 2017) 13 at 20.
 Thomas Akabzaa, “Mining in Ghana: Implications for National Economic Development and Poverty Reduction” 85
in Bonnie Campbell, ed, Mining in Africa (New York: Pluto Press, 2009) 25 at 28.
 Although Auty’s development and application of the “resource curse” theory stemmed from his analysis of “hard 86
mineral exporters” (notably copper, bauxite and tin producers), his theory contemplated the effects of oil, gas and 
mineral extraction as well (Auty, supra note 5 at 5).
 See Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.87
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the theory through independent studies.  Further evidence of the theory’s widespread adoption 88
was the World Bank’s position that natural resource exports posed a structural risk to governance 
and legal institutions by undermining incentives to reform and instigating conflicts over the 
management and control of resource rents (or returns in excess of profits).   89
Critiques of the resource curse eventually emerged after over a decade of the theory’s 
dominance in development scholarship and practice. However, the theory remains the dominant 
explanation for why resource-rich countries underperform economically and politically. Instead, 
the critiques offered a nuanced view of the curse that found it was not uniform across 
jurisdictions and natural resources—the type of resource mattered.  The strongest critiques of 90
the theory went so far as to contend that “there is a latent imperialism in the use of the term 
‘resource curse’” and that “[p]erhaps the Global South is the victim of the fossil fuel-fed 
capitalism of the Global North.”  Critiques like this address the power imbalances that maintain 91
the global economic order and permeate the relations between resource-exporting states in the 
Global South and resource-importing nations in the Global North (plus China). However, these 
 Sachs & Warner, supra note 7 at 2; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik supra note 7; Collier & Goderis, supra note 7; 88
Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs & Joseph Stiglitz, eds, Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007).
 Christa Brunnschweiler & Erwin H Bulte, “The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red 89
herrings” (2008) 55 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248 at 249. The impact of the Bank’s 
reliance on the resource curse theory for reforming mining governance in Africa is examined further in Section 2.4.  
 Elissaios Papyrakis, “The Resource Curse - What Have We Learned from Two Decades of Intensive Research: 90
Introduction to the Special Issue” (2017) 53:2 The Journal of Development Studies 175 at 178.
 Timothy DiMuzio, “The real resource curse and the imperialism of development” (2010) 35:1 Suomen 91
Antropologi 94. DiMuzio emphasized capitalism’s need for fossil fuels in his article. Arguably, his position could be 
expanded to include capitalism’s need for mineral resources as well, particularly those used in modern electronics 
and other technologies. Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholarship has noted the 
inequity in natural resource exploitation in the Global South (see, for example Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
“International Law and Its Discontents: Rethinking the Global South” (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (ASIL) 176; and Luis Esclava & Sundhya Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday 
Life of International Law” (2012) 45:2 Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 195), yet there is none 
that conceptualizes the resource curse like DiMuzio.
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critiques have yet to gain traction in development scholarship and practice, nor do they inform 
policy about combatting the curse. 
Since Auty’s theory first emerged, resource curse scholarship has concerned itself with 
both the economic and political symptoms of the theory. The following sections briefly discuss 
both groups of symptoms. 
2.3.1. Economic symptoms of the resource curse 
Auty’s reasoning behind the resource curse focused on four economic symptoms that 
stunted growth in resource-rich countries: Dutch disease, commodity price volatility, declining 
terms of trade, and the enclave nature of the resource sector.  He posited that all four symptoms 92
could be present in a resource-rich economy and that the confluence of all four would produce 
more devastating results than the presence of one or two.  Studies that were conducted after 93
Auty developed his initial hypothesis, including one in 1995 by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew 
Warner, confirmed the negative relationship between these symptoms and economic growth.  94
Dutch disease is a term first used in the 1970s to describe the negative effects of the 
boom in natural gas exploitation on the Netherlands economy.  The growth in Dutch natural gas 95
exports contributed to declines in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors as a result of the 
appreciation of the Dutch currency, which led to these industries being less competitive 
internationally.  The higher exchange rate that resulted from the higher flow of natural gas 96
 Auty, supra note 5 at 3.92
 Ibid.93
 Sachs and Warner, supra note 7 at 4-7. Following the isolation of these four economic symptoms by Auty, other 94
socioeconomic indicators of the resource-curse that were identified included greater income inequality between rich 
and poor populations (Ferreira, supra note 10 at 29). Since this indicator does not account for a structural deficit in 
the economy of a resource-rich state, it is not considered here as part of the economic symptoms of the curse.
 Ferreira, supra note 10 at 29.95
 Collier & Goderis, supra note 7 at 19.96
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revenue almost obliterated other sectors of the Dutch economy.  The same patterns were 97
identified in other countries that relied extensively on natural resource exports in the 1970s and 
1980s, including Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria, thus making it one of the more identifiable 
symptoms of the resource curse.  To combat the negative effects of Dutch disease, economists 98
have recommended that countries create stabilization funds comprised almost exclusively of 
foreign currency, and that revenue generated from resource extraction be used to diversify the 
economy away from an over-dependence on natural resources.  99
Like Dutch disease, the three other economic symptoms of the resource curse arise when 
a resource-rich country is overly dependent on resource exports and can not sustain the shocks 
these factors will impart on its economy. Commodity price volatility, which has historically 
dominated the minerals market, creates economic havoc by making the management of national 
budgets more difficult. Revenue forecasting becomes unpredictable as the price of a commodity 
can change drastically from year to year.  This is evident today as volatile mineral prices have 100
drastically affected the budgets of mining-dependent countries like South Africa and Zambia, 
which have weathered declines in the prices of copper and iron ore.  Along with commodity 101
price volatility, resource-dependent states are detrimentally affected by declining terms of trade 
in the long-term as mineral exports accrue less value while the price of manufactured imports 
increases.  Additionally, Auty observed that the “enclave nature” of resource extraction offered 102
 Auty, supra note 5 at 3.97
 Sachs & Warner, supra note 7 at 398
 Ferreira, supra note 10 at 29.99
 Auty, supra note 5 at 23.100
 Kingsley Ighobor, “Commodity prices crash hits Africa” (December 2016-March 2017), online: Africa Renewal 101
<https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/commodity-prices-crash-hits-africa>.
 Ferreira, supra note 10 at 31.102
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minimal economic benefits due to the small number of production linkages created to local 
industries, and the low employment rates in the sector.  103
2.3.2. Political symptoms of the resource curse 
 Along with explaining the economic phenomena discussed above, the resource curse has 
also been used to account for the following political outcomes: weakened political institutions 
and rule of law;  corruption and rent-seeking behaviour  among the ruling class;  and a 104 105 106
higher prevalence of civil conflict.  Despite the persistent link between the resource curse and 107
these political results, the literature on the topic lacks consensus about a direct correlation 
between the two.  108
The political deficiencies affiliated with the resource curse are evident in many resource-
abundant African states. Oftentimes, multiple symptoms operate in tandem in a given 
jurisdiction. Indeed, corruption, rent-seeking and civil conflict typically occur when political 
institutions and the rule of law are weakened.  Conversely, a combination of corruption, rent-109
seeking and civil conflict can further weaken political institutions and the rule of law. Rent-
seeking and corruption may arise when higher levels of mineral revenue accrue in states where 
the allocation of resources and decision-making authority is centralized amongst a small group of 
political elites. Contemporary rent-seeking and corruption theories posit this behaviour is more 
 Auty, supra note 5 at 3.103
 Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, supra note 7 at 2; Mushtaq H Khan, “Governance and Growth Challenges in Africa” 104
in Akbar Noman et al, eds, Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 114 at 115.
 “Rent-seeking behaviour” is a form of corruption where individuals, typically in government or the civil service, 105
seek to increase their wealth without creating wealth (Martin, supra note 43 at 44).
 Martin, supra note 43 at 38.106
 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, “On economic causes of war” (1998) 50:4 Oxford Economic Papers 563; Collier 107
and Hoeffler, 2005, supra note 6 at 625.
 Ferreira, supra note 10 at 27.108
 Due to the significance of institutions and the rule of law to combating the resource curse, both are discussed in 109
greater detail in Section 2.5.
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prevalent in states with weak political institutions and the rule of law, while also asserting that 
reduced bargaining between private actors and the state’s limited reliance on individual income 
taxes pose a further threat to a country’s political and economic stability.   110
Compounding the threat of corruption and rent-seeking is the risk of civil conflict. Paul 
Collier’s and Anke Hoeffler’s research in the late 1990s and early 2000s asserted that resource-
rich countries were more prone to violent domestic conflict than their resource-poor 
counterparts.  Collier and Hoeffler theorized that the link between resource abundance and 111
conflict was a direct cause of weak institutions that could not respond to an elite ruling class or 
opportunistic rebel groups seeking to retain or obtain power by financing conflict through looted 
resource rents or plundered natural resources.  In Africa, there are many post-colonial instances 112
of civil conflict fuelled and funded by natural resources: Angola, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan.  Each country experienced the lasting 113
economic, political and social toll of conflict to various degrees, including significant loss of life 
and disruption to the economic and political order. Remnants of conflict are still present today in 
some countries, like the DRC and South Sudan, further supporting the narrative that resource 
abundance and civil conflict are inextricably linked. 
Together, the preceding economic and political symptoms of the resource curse 
characterize the negative growth evidenced in mining-dependent states and support the theory 
 Jonathan Di John, “Is there really a resource curse? A critical survey of theory and evidence” (2011) 17 Global 110
Governance 167 at 171; Nathan Jensen & Leonard Wantchekon, “Resource wealth and political regimes in 
Africa” (2004) 37:7 Comparative Political Studies 816 at 817.
 Collier & Hoeffler, 2005 supra note 6 at 625.111
 Ibid at 626 and 631112
 Ernest Harsch, “Conflict resources: from ‘curse’ to blessing” (January 2007), online: Africa Renewal <https://113
www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2007/conflict-resources-‘curse’-blessing>.
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that mineral wealth can be a curse rather than a blessing. When it comes to explaining the 
relationship between mining and development in Africa, it is easy to contend that “the lack of 
democratic accountability and the presence of patron-client politics, extensive corruption, and a 
weak rule of law”  contribute to mining’s mismanagement across the region. This “paradox of 114
plenty”  has perplexed development scholars and practitioners for decades, and has produced 115
numerous academic studies and policy papers. Isolating the cause of the curse in a given country, 
explaining why it remains impactful and identifying feasible solutions to reverse the curse are 
common objectives of most of this scholarship. More often than not, investigations focus on 
domestic conditions, while a much smaller number considered external factors such as the state 
of the global political economy. One explanation that is frequently relied on to explain the 
domestic economic and political realities of Africa’s resource curse is the absence of “good 
governance.” 
2.4. “Good governance”: the solution to Africa’s resource curse 
In the years following the widespread adoption of the resource curse theory, development 
scholars and practitioners (especially adherents of the Washington Consensus approach to 
development)  turned their attention to conceiving strategies necessary to mitigate and combat 116
its adverse effects. This interest yielded a plethora of studies that quickly adopted and espoused 
“good governance” as the answer to solving the resource curse.  Borrowing from Douglass 117
 Khan, supra note 104 at 115.114
 Brunnschweiler & Bule, supra note 89 at 248.115
 Andrés Mejía Acosta, “The Impact and Effectiveness of Accountability and Transparency Initiatives: The 116
Governance of Natural Resources” (2013) 31 Development Policy Review S89 at S91.
 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & John Alan Robinson, “The colonial origins of comparative development: an 117
empirical investigation” (2001) 91:5 American Economic Review 1369; Easterly & Levine, supra note 7; Mehlum, 
Moene & Torvik, supra note 7; Collier & Goderis, supra note 7.
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North’s theory of “new institutional economics” that defined institutions as “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction,”  good governance was equated to sound “rules of 118
the game” (both formal and informal) that would effectively structure state regulation of resource 
extraction and hamper exploitative and rent-seeking behaviour.  Leading reports from the 119
World Bank include Governance Matters (released in 1999), and Striking a Better Balance 
(published in 2004 by the Bank’s Extractive Industries Review) seemingly confirmed the 
positive relationship between good governance and the quality of a country’s institutions. 
 As the negative correlation between the resource curse and a country’s political 
institutions became indisputable in development policy circles,  “good” governance, by 120
extension, became vital to the contention that “institutions matter for development.”  Armed 121
with the persuasiveness of North’s theory, development scholars and practitioners credited sound 
institutions for the economic success of resource-abundant states that avoided the pitfalls of the 
resource curse, including Canada, Australia and Norway, and Botswana, the lone  example from 
Africa.  Therefore, mineral-rich African states that sought to promote mining-based 122
socioeconomic development were encouraged to reform the political and legal institutions that 
governed the sector. Indications of this approach were first made with the World Bank’s 1992 
Strategy for African Mining report (discussed above in section 2.2.3). However, it was the Bank’s 
 North, supra note 13 at 23.118
 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A Robinson “An African Success Story: Botswana” (2001) MIT 119
Department of Economics Working Paper No. 01-37; Easterly & Levine, supra note 7; Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 
supra note 7; World Bank, Striking, supra note 8.
 The potential economic effects of the resource curse—Dutch disease; commodity price volatility; declining terms 120
of trade; and the enclave nature of the curse—are direct results of political decisions made by governments; 
therefore, it is presumed “good governance” responses would alter these economic symptoms as a result of any 
changes made to the political ones (weakened political institutions; corruption and rent-seeking; and civil conflict).
 Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, “Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional 121
Reform” (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 341 at 342.
 Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, supra note 7 at 1; Paul Collier, “Law and Codes for the Resource Curse” (2008) 11 122
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2004 Striking a Better Balance report that firmly placed “good governance” at the centre of the 
reforms sought by the BWIs as a means to attract foreign investment and promote 
development.   123
Not only did good governance and institutions matter for development, but years of 
research on the resource curse-good governance nexus pinpointed two factors that were deemed 
critical to a government’s ability to promote socioeconomic growth. First, the quality of 
governance and a state’s institutions were important considerations.  The mere existence of 124
relevant institutions was not enough—these institutions were expected to meet and surpass a 
certain threshold if the resource curse was to be avoided.  Second, particular types of 125
institutions became synonymous with the good governance necessary to channel resource-based 
socioeconomic development. These can be broadly defined as democratic institutions.   126
 Despite evidence from other regions pointing to the incongruity between democracy and 
development, democratic institutions became central components of good governance reforms 
driven by the BWIs and other donor agencies in the 1990s and early-2000s, especially in 
Africa.  In his article Democracy and Development: Is there Institutional Incompatibility?,  127 128
development scholar Adrian Leftwich examines the conflict between democracy and 
development. He argues that democracy and development are not compatible because the 
 Christiane Arndt & Charles Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators (Paris: Development Centre of the 123
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006) at 15.
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“institutional characteristics and requirements for development and for democracy pull in 
opposite directions.”  Using Joseph Stiglitz’s definition of development as “transformation of 129
society” that occurs across social, economic, political and legal spheres,  Leftwich argues it 130
occurs through a process of change that required institutions to facilitate and manage its success. 
For Leftwich, formal democratic institutions included: “(1) a competitive (and multiparty) 
political system; (2) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; (3) regularly contested, free and fair 
elections with secret ballots; and (4) effective public access by political parties to the electorate 
through the media and through generally open political campaigning.”  Leftwich further argues 131
that these formal electoral institutions are supplemented by institutionalized civil rights, such as 
“freedom of expression, association and religion; the rule of law; individual rights and 
autonomy.”   132
 After providing his definitions of democratic institutions, Leftwich posits that  
economic growth and development is a turbulent and transformative process, challenging (and 
often defeating) old interests and creating new ones. The institutional changes which it requires 
and generates, both in the economic and political spheres (especially where attempts are made to 
make growth into development) have commonly been radical and far-reaching, bringing with them 
cognate changes in social, cultural and ideological institutions (notably in the class structures and 
in the general trend to secularism). These changes, at their inception, have seldom been achieved 
…, and have most commonly been associated with opposition, conflict and violence which may 
take religious, regional, ethnic or class-based forms.  133
The development process, according to Leftwich, greatly contrasts the democratic one. Although 
both require “strong states” to ensure their effectiveness, Leftwich argues the effective 
democratic state differs from the state required for development because it 
presupposes a particular kind of consensual competitive politics that generates and sustains the 
legitimacy of the state. It must allow and encourage the fullest possible range of interests and 
 Ibid at 689.129
 Ibid at 692.130
 Ibid at 695.131
 Ibid at 695.132
 Ibid at 694.133
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preferences…to jostle and argue for advantage, to strike deals, form coalitions and accept 
compromises, within the formal rules of the game and in relation to the state. 
Similarly, law and development scholars Mariana Prado, Mario Schapiro and Diogo 
Coutinho argue that the conflict between democracy and socioeconomic development lies in the 
incongruity between the processes necessary to achieve either apparatus.  Democratic 134
processes, they assert, are slower due to the accountability mechanisms such as checks and 
balances, electoral competition, and attending to competing interests. Development policies, on 
the other hand, are most effective when they can quickly adapt to changing circumstances, and 
are not hindered by competing or divergent interests.  Prado, Schapiro, and Coutinho argue 135
further that the form of legitimacy sought in a democratic regime is fundamentally different from 
the developmental state and may potentially conflict. Legitimacy in democratic regimes is 
procedural and seeks to ensure fairness and equity in its processes. Alternatively, the 
developmental state’s legitimacy is acquired from the developmental objectives it achieves, 
whether they be economic (in the form of higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), or social 
(such as increased access to education and health).   136
To assess democratic institutions within a state, Prado, Schapiro and Coutinho offer their 
“thick” versus “thin” definitions of democracy: 
…a thin concept is one that equates democracy with competitive and fair elections. A thick 
definition would also include other features, such as individual freedoms, a system of checks and 
balances, protection of the rights of minorities, an independent judiciary, and rule of law… most 
definitions of democracy will go beyond the requirement of free and fair elections, encompassing 
also mechanisms of checks and balances (the executive branch is controlled by the legislature) and 
expectations of transparency and accountability (which takes place through the judiciary and other 
accountability institutions), as well as forms of social participation and control.  137
 Prado, Schapiro, & Coutinho, supra note 126 at 372.134
 Ibid.135
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In making his case for the need for democratic institutions to promote development in 
Africa, prominent development scholar Omano Edigheji asserts that democracy is crucial for 
development to occur. If a positive correlation truly existed between authoritarianism and 
development, Edigheji argues that African countries would not be as underdeveloped as they 
are.  Therefore, Edigheji insists that effective African democratic developmental states must 138
embody citizen participation and cannot simply be characterized by thin, electoral conceptions of 
democracy. 
The debate about whether democracy is a prerequisite for development makes it clear that 
different systems of governance can achieve similar economic results, regardless of where a 
country may fall on the thick-thin democratic spectrum. However, mainstream development 
scholarship and policy in the 1990s and early 2000s insisted development would not take place 
with the requisite democratic institutions. As a result of this position, neoliberal constructions of 
the role for law continued to be emphasized in mining governance. Policymakers were more 
concerned with ensuring the right institutions and laws were in place, and little consideration was 
given to their functions. This conflict between legal form versus function is considered in greater 
detail in section 2.5. The emphasis on legal form in good governance discourse is also 
considered, with particular focus on its interpretation in African mining. Two metrics—the RGI 
and EITI—that reinforce this preference are also examined.   139
 Omano Edigheji, A Democratic Developmental State in Africa? A concept paper (Johannesburg: Centre for 138
Policy Studies, 2005) at 14.
 Principles of good mining governance are described as “transnational” because they were developed by 139
international institutions who attempted to see these norms transplanted into domestic law. David Szablowski 
conceptualized the World Bank’s involvement in community mining conflicts in Peru as a “transnational legal 
system”. This notion is adopted here to describe the transnational nature of norms that shape understandings of the 
role for law in mining governance (David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, 
Communities and the World Bank (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 2).
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2.5. Law and “good governance” in African mining 
Law and legal institutions are critical to shaping how mining governance can promote 
socioeconomic development. Law, as a component of the formal “rules of the game,” informs 
mining’s policy-making arena and helps structure the various ways in which the sector could 
contribute to socioeconomic development.  However, understandings of the role of law in 140
mining governance, and its related impact on development, has changed little since neoliberal 
Washington Consensus policies were promulgated in the 1980s and 1990s. Even as mineral-rich 
African states have attempted to reverse this “nightwatchman” model of minerals management 
and engaged in new forms of state activism over the past 15 years,  “good governance” 141
principles have yet to evolve. Today, the lens that monitors and evaluates African state 
involvement in mining—through indicators and qualitative standards like the RGI and the EITI
—remains grounded in neoliberal conceptions of law and legal institutions in “good” natural 
resource governance. Laws that permit direct state involvement in mining and can contribute to 
socioeconomic development are discounted in favour of the state’s role as  the facilitator of 
private investment and “producer friendly” institutions.  Despite new laws that have facilitated 142
greater state activism in African resource extraction, how good mining governance is evaluated 
obscures an understanding of the functions of law in favour of its form. Section 2.5.1 identifies 
and discusses orthodox transnational legal norms that constituted mining governance over the 
past thirty years. The metrics that promulgate and reinforce these norms are explored in section 
 Katharina Pistor & Curtis J Milhaupt, Law and capitalism: what corporate crises reveal about legal systems and 140
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2.5.2. Finally, section 2.6 examines how the traditional approach to mining governance 
constrains the potential role for law in promoting socioeconomic development. 
2.5.1. Transnational legal norms in mining governance 
 Once good governance and sound institutions triumphed as the antidote to the resource 
curse, attention turned to the legal norms necessitated to actualize sound mineral management. 
Since African governments were criticized as poor managers of their mineral wealth, a 
combination of transnational legal norms evolved from a group of influential external 
stakeholders—including foreign donor governments, the BWIs, transnational civil society groups 
and multinational corporations—to assess mining governance on the continent.  The objectives 143
of this transnational movement were threefold: first, to improve governance by empowering 
domestic stakeholders (notably citizens and civil society) to hold governments accountable; 
second, to track government progress using “multi-stakeholder monitoring bodies;”  and third, 144
to actively promote these norms in transnational policy circles. Ultimately, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law  were viewed as necessary preconditions for mining to 145
support socioeconomic development in any way.  146
a. Transparency and accountability  
 Transparency and accountability are fundamental objectives of this specific conception of 
mining governance: if transparency is appropriately done, accountability would naturally 
 Bonnie Campbell, “Regulation of the Extractive Sector: Issues Raised by the Revision of Mining Regimes in 143
Africa” presented at the “Rethinking Extractive Industry: Regulation, Dispossession, and Emerging Claims” 
Conference, York University (March 2009) at 21 [Campbell, “Regulation”].
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follow.  Transparency is a simple term that encompasses a complex range of obligations. It is 147
the “most broadly recommended policy response”  to the resource rich-governance poor curse. 148
In this context, transparency refers to the public disclosure of payments made to national 
governments by extractives corporations.  To be most effective, data disclosure should be 149
relevant, timely, accessible, and accurate. While the source can vary (either governments or 
corporations), its purpose is the same in every instance: to enable accountability.  Within the 150
mining governance context, accountability is the process, or processes, through which citizens 
and civil society assess the decisions made by governments.  Accountability may be enacted 151
both socially and politically through a combination of formal and informal mechanisms. For 
example, democratic institutions like a free press, elections and parliament are formal 
mechanisms of political accountability. Informally, social media is becoming a more commonly 
used forum to call attention to government and corporate transgressions. Participation and 
consultation in mining (discussed further in Chapter Three) are another form of accountability 
that is not yet widely recognized as a component of “good” mining governance, despite being 
regarded as a human right by many international organizations.  152
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 In the early 2000s, civil society and foreign governments were instrumental in concluding 
multiple transnational transparency measures, including the EITI,  the Revenue Watch Institute 153
(precursor to the National Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)),  Transparency International 154
(TI),  the Kimberley Process (KP)  and Publish What You Pay (PWYP).  Of the five 155 156 157
initiatives, only TI’s origins were rooted in a broader anti-corruption movement that was not 
limited to mining. In fact, many national chapters in Africa, including Zambia and South Africa, 
are focused on combatting corruption generally, rather than exclusively in mining.  Since it 158
began 25 years ago, mining transparency has been taken up by individual TI national chapters in 
the Global North, including TI Canada and TI Australia, which have established projects like 
“Mining for Sustainable Development” and “Preventing Corruption in Mining.”   159
 The other four transparency schemes—EITI, NRGI, KP and PWYP—all began around 
the same time, in the early 2000s when the international good governance policy arena narrowed 
its focus on measures to combat the resource curse. The KP was the first adopter of a multilateral 
regime, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), that aimed at embedding a 
transparency mechanism in the diamonds trade in order to eliminate conflict diamonds. The 
KPCS is a voluntary mechanism that requires participating states to implement national 
legislation and institutions intended to certify any exported or imported diamonds as conflict-free 
in a  transparent way.  Much like the KP, the EITI is also a voluntary measure that established 160
 Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative, online: <https://eiti.org/who-we-are>.153
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, online: <https://resourcegovernance.org/about-us>.154
 Transparency International, online: <https://www.transparency.org/about>.155
 Kimberley Process, online: <https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp>.156
 Publish What You Pay, online: <https://www.pwyp.org/about/>.157
 Transparency International, supra note 155.158
 Transparency International Canada, online: <http://www.transparencycanada.ca/what-we-do/our-projects/>; 159
Transparency International Australia, online: <http://transparency.org.au/who-we-are/about/>.
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guidelines to promote the “open and accountable management”  of resource extraction. The 161
EITI actively tracks and monitors the progress of implementing countries and compiles the 
results in a publicly accessible database. The EITI standard and evaluation process is discussed 
further in section 2.5.2. 
 Unlike the KP and EITI, the NRGI and PWYP do not provide legislative frameworks to 
promote mining governance. Instead, both initiatives are transnational civil society groups that 
lobby and advocate for improved extractives governance. As the name suggests, payments 
disclosure is PWYP’s exclusive focus. It originally began as a coalition of six British charities: 
Global Witness, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the 
Children UK, and TI UK. The organization’s work revolves around four strategic priorities 
aimed at extending and implementing transparency while increasing civic participation in mining 
governance.  Much of the group’s work has been in the form of reports and studies examining 162
transparency gaps and evaluating disclosure obligations in host and home countries.  Like the 163
PWYP, the NRGI publishes resources to assist countries with broader extractives governance 
objectives. The organization also produces a unique tool, the RGI, which measures the quality of 
extractives governance in 81 countries. Due to the aspirational standards the RGI espouses, it is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.5.2 along with the EITI standard. 
 In addition to these transnational transparency initiatives, disclosure legislation has been 
adopted in several foreign states home to transnational extractive corporations, including 
 EITI, supra note 153.161
 PWYP, supra note 157.162
 “Host” and “home” states is terminology commonly used to refer to the two classes of states engaged in mining. 163
Mines are located in “host states” and are operated by corporations incorporated in a “home state” or jurisdiction.
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Canada,  Great Britain,  and the United States.  The legislation generally requires the 164 165 166
disclosure of payments over a minimum amount made to governments in the process of 
completing mining operations. For example, in Canada, the Extractive Sector Transparency 
Measures Act, which has been in force since June 2015, requires Canadian companies engaged in 
the commercial development of minerals (as well as oil and gas) to report any payments of at 
least CAD 100,000 made to governments or government entities.  The reports, which must be 167
filed with the federal ministry Natural Resources Canada, are publicly available. Currently, in 
Africa, only Nigeria and Tanzania have legislation dedicated exclusively to revenue 
transparency. However, both the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act, 2007 
and the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act, 2015 only govern 
payments made in the oil and gas sector. No African country has dedicated transparency 
legislation governing mining. Some, like Senegal  and the Democratic Republic of Congo,  168 169
include transparency obligations in their mining codes. The effect of transparency legislation in 
practice (whether or not it appears in a separate statute) has yet to be investigated in critical law 
and development or international legal scholarship. 
 Despite the efforts of multiple transparency initiatives and laws, the impact and 
effectiveness of transnational transparency mechanisms remain unsettled. Alexandra Gillies and 
Antoine Heuty examined the effect of transparency initiatives in resource-rich countries in their 
 Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, SC 2014, c 39, s 376 [ESTMA].164
 The Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014 implements the mandatory disclosure requirements 165
imposed by Chapter 10 of the European Union Accounting and Transparency Directive.
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (1977).166
 ESTMA, supra note 164, s 9(2).167
 Code Minier, Loi 2016-32.168
 Code Minier, Loi n 007/2002.169
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article, “Does Transparency Work?”  They argued that while “[t]ransparency has emerged as 170
the most broadly recommended policy response to the poor governance records in resource-rich 
states and their damaging developmental effects…the impact of transparency has fallen short of 
the broad positive changes lauded as possible by its proponents.”  The authors offer two 171
explanations for this shortcoming. First, transparency’s impact is difficult to measure. According 
to Gillies and Heuty, “[m]ethodological challenges prevent its accurate observation, and work in 
this area requires a more politically-nuanced and explicitly-stated causal chain between the 
disclosure of information and improved development outcomes.”  Second, existing 172
transparency initiatives are not designed to produce “a demonstrable and transformative impact” 
on their desired outcome to strengthen governance, foster accountability and promote 
socioeconomic development. In particular, Gillies and Heuty contend that the “externally-
driven” nature of transparency initiatives “affects both the intent and character of their 
implementation.”  In other words, transnational transparency norms utilize a cookie-cutter 173
approach that neglects local conditions and development needs. 
 Gillies and Heuty argued further that the high expectations associated with transparency 
initiatives led to a “misalignment” between the initiatives and their expected impact. Despite this 
simple objective, the expectations associated with transparency are much loftier. A 2010 
literature review of transparency initiatives conducted by the Institute of Development Studies 
(and summarized by Gillies and Heuty) captured some of their desired outcomes: improved 
public services; re-direction of resources to poor neighbourhoods…reducing clientelism; 
 Gillies & Heuty, supra note 148.170
 Ibid at 26.171
 Ibid.172
 Ibid at 26-27.173
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enhanced democratic representation; less leakage in public expenditure; public participation; 
trust; improved decision making; better public understanding of decision making; fulfillment of 
socioeconomic rights…; less corruption; improved public financial management; improved 
business environment; empower the public; empower reformers; empower local voices; better 
budget utilization and better delivery of services; increased state or institutional responsiveness; 
new democratic spaces for citizen engagement.   174
 As this list demonstrates, accountability is one of the primary goals of implementing 
transparency. In broad terms, accountability is meant to enable participatory governance 
processes that embrace underrepresented stakeholders like citizens and civil society.  175
Accountability mechanisms can include either formal, established institutionalized processes 
(including access to information, consultations in environmental and social impact assessments, 
free and fair elections and freedom of the press), or may consist of informal sites of contestation 
such as public opinion.  What ideal combination of accountability mechanisms should be in 176
place in mining-dependent countries is surely context-specific; however, a more comprehensive 
examination is not currently available in mining governance literature.   177
b. Rule of Law 
 The need for the rule of law in mining governance enjoys greater consensus than 
transparency and accountability. To its proponents, the rule of law refers to “a legal order 
 Ibid at 28.174
 UNECA/AU, supra note 22 at 45.175
 Leftwich, supra note 128 at 695.176
 My research uncovered descriptions of various accountability measures and what minimum standards are 177
required for them to be effective.
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consisting of predictable, enforceable and efficient rules”  that is applied to all persons, 178
institutions, and government entities equally. One of the most fundamental components is an 
independent and credible judiciary. The rule of law’s incorporation into mining governance 
mirrored the principle’s prominent place in mid-1990s development discourse.  In fact, the rule 179
of law’s treatment in good governance discourse shared many of the objectives of development’s 
law reform movement. That debate  saw the rule of law become “not only…a tool of 180
development policy, but as an objective for development policy in its own right.”  The rule of 181
law has similarly served a dual purpose in good mining governance: first, as a necessary means 
to achieve good governance goals; and second, as a goal of mining governance itself. This is 
apparent from the equal emphasis placed on the efficacy of mining laws to mitigate the resource 
curse (with a focus on the themes of anti-corruption  and attracting foreign investors)  and on 182 183
law reform as a distinct aim of mining governance initiatives.    184
 Optimal rule of law institutions in mining-dependent states should be “shaped by factors 
specific to given societies, including history, culture, political traditions and institutional 
 Alvaro Santos, “The World Bank’s Uses of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development” in David 178
Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The new law and economic development: a critical appraisal (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 253 at 253.  
 David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, “Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the 179
Emergence of a New Critical Practice” in David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds, The new law and economic 
development: a critical appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1 at 1.
 See for example Santos, supra note 178; David M Trubek, “The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The New 180
Developmental State” (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 28; and Adrian di Giovanni, “Making the Link 
between Development’s Regulation through Law and Law’s Promotion through Development” (2016) 8 Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law 101.
 Trubek & Santos, supra note 179 at 1.181
 David Kennedy, “‘Laws and Developments’” in Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century, 182
John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris, eds, (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003) 17 at 23.
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economic development: a critical appraisal, David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 74 at 89 [Trubek, “Rule of Law”].
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cultures.”  However, this was not the case over the past two decades that good mining 185
governance has been promulgated, much like what occurred in development practice from the 
1990s to the mid-2000s. The parallels between the treatment of rule of law in development 
practice and good governance are so considerable that it is also helpful to adopt some of the 
critiques from law and development scholarship, particularly in the absence of anything similar 
in the mining governance policy arena. David Trubek offered an assessment of what he described 
as the “first phase” of rule of law reform in development assistance that aptly describes the 
principle’s treatment in mainstream mining governance: 
 In addition to neoformalism and a focus on the administration of justice, there was 
great emphasis on contract and property…a strong belief in the possibility of legal 
transplantation, a willingness to conduct reforms at once in all parts and levels of the 
legal order, and a view that there was one model of “the rule of law” that made sense for 
all countries. Further, there was a faith that the needed reforms could be imposed from the 
top, and would be quickly and easily accepted.   186
Much like in development practice, invocations of the rule of law in mining governance seemed 
to “justify a set of inherent limits on institutional arrangements and policy priorities.”  By 187
extension, as law and development scholar Kerry Rittich argued in the development context, 
“[t]he salience of the rule of law [in good governance] seems directly related to the presumption 
that the state is dysfunctional.”  The two standard-bearers of “good” mining governance—the 188
RGI and EITI (discussed further in section 2.5.2)—adhere to this position.  
 Unlike transparency and accountability initiatives, transnational mining governance 
discourse has yet to define desirable rule of law principles, such as just laws and independent 
 Michael J Trebilcock & Ronald J Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of 185
Progress (Northampton, MS: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc 2008) at 12.
 Trubek, “Rule of Law”, supra note 183 at 86.186
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Debates” (2005) 55:3 UTLJ 853 at 866 [Rittich, “Functionalism”].
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dispute resolution; instead, the “rule of law” is subsumed in existing transparency movements, 
like the RGI and EITI. Outside of mining governance, individual state performance is regularly 
measured in such global indices as the Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by the World 
Bank, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index and the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance published annually by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.    189
2.5.2. Reinforcing “good” mining governance: the Resource Governance Index and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  
Accompanying the rise of transnational “good governance” legal norms in mining was 
the creation of two metrics used to monitor and evaluate state performance  in extractives 190
management: the RGI and the EITI. Unlike other governance indicators, these two metrics were 
designed to measure states’ progress in implementing transparency and accountability initiatives 
in oil, gas and minerals production.  By doing so, these metrics provide practical illustrations 191
of transnational good governance norms. Additionally, the RGI and EITI reinforce these norms 
as the standard for mining governance and the model to achieve better development outcomes.  192
Section 2.6 then considers critiques of these metrics, including the limitations of measuring 
governance and the formalistic conceptualization of the role for law that each metric 
promulgates.   
 Worldwide Governance Indicators, online: World Bank Group <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/189
#home>; Rule of Law Index, online: World Justice Project <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#>; Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance, online: Mo Ibrahim Foundation <http://iiag.online>. Both the World Justice Project and Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation are independent international non-profit organizations that work to advance the rule of law and 
governance. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation was founded by Mohammed Ibrahim, a wealthy Sudanese-British 
businessman.
 Campbell, “Regulation”, supra note 143 at 21.190
 Acosta, supra note 116 at S89, S 93.191
 Kevin E Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance”, 192
International Law and Justice Working Papers, IILJ Working Paper 2010/2 Rev (revised August 2011) at 11.
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a. Resource Governance Index  
 The RGI began during the midst of the early 2000s movement for more active responses 
to extractives governance concerns.  It was founded by the Revenue Watch Institute, the 193
predecessor of the NRGI, which was an offshoot of the transnational civil society group, Open 
Society Foundation (OSF).  The OSF is one of the world’s largest philanthropic non-194
governmental organizations committed to promoting democracy and government accountability 
in the Global South. What began as George Soros’s act of charity is now the second-largest 
private philanthropy organization in the United States.  Today, the NRGI is a transnational civil 195
society group that operates independently of the OSF. While it continues to receive funding from 
them, the NRGI also receives grants from other leading philanthropies, including the Ford 
Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, 
as well as donations from the governments of Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Great Britain and 
the United States.  The NRGI is currently led by former World Bank economist and founder of 196
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Daniel Kaufman (he is also a member of the EITI 
international board).   197
 Since its creation, the RGI has been a critical component of the NRGI’s mission to 
“[help] people…realize the benefits of their countries’ endowments of oil, gas and minerals…
through technical advice, advocacy, applied research, policy analysis, and capacity 
 Virginia Haufler, “Disclosure as Governance: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Resource 193
Management in the Developing World” (2010) 10:3 Global Environmental Politics 53 at 66.
 Ibid at 62.194
 Open Society Foundation, “About Us: History”, online: Open Society Foundation  <https://195
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history>.
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “What We Do”, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute <https://196
resourcegovernance.org/about-us/what-we-do>.
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Leadership Team”, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute 197
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development.”  In its brief history, the RGI has been published three times: first, in 2010 (under 198
the name “Revenue Watch Index”); in 2013; and most recently in June 2017. The latest report 
consisted of a 149-question survey, which was compiled and completed by RGI researchers that 
consisted of local civil society experts, independent consultants and out-of-country experts. The 
RGI utilized an index of 50 indicators to evaluate the governance of the oil, gas, and mining 
sector in 81 countries.  It was designed to mirror the NRGI’s Natural Resource Charter, a set of 
guiding "principles for governments and societies on how to best harness the opportunities 
created by extractive resources for development.”  The charter comprises 12 precepts that fall 199
into three groups:  
• Domestic foundations for resource governance, which considers the overarching local 
legal-institutional framework and accountability environment. 
• The decision chain, covering a range of domestic policy issues ranging from discovery to 
getting a good deal, to revenue management and investing in development.  
• International foundations for resource governance, considering the influence of extractive 
companies and the international community.   200
Figure 2.1 succinctly captures all twelve precepts: 
 Resource Governance Index, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute <https://198
www.resourcegovernanceindex.org>.
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Natural Resource Charter”, online: Natural Resource Governance 199
Institute <https://resourcegovernance.org/approach/natural-resource-charter>.
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Natural Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework”, online: Natural 200
Resource Governance Institute <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/
benchmarking_framework_introduction.pdf>. 
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Figure 2.1 – RGI precepts 
(Natural Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework: Introduction).    
 The RGI converted precepts 2-8 of the Natural Resource Charter into questions that are 
split into three components to measure: “value realization”, “revenue management” and the 
“enabling environment”.  Table 2.1 summarizes the definitions of each component: 201
Table 2.1 – RGI components 
Component Definition
Value realization Measures the quality of governance around exploration, 
production, environmental protection, revenue collection and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for those countries that have 
an SOE…These are the aspects of resource governance that 
together work to realize public value from a country’s oil, gas 




Covers the aspects of governments’ revenue management 
that are particularly important in resource-producing 
countries: national budgeting, subnational resource revenue 
sharing and sovereign wealth funds.
 2017 Resource Governance Index: Method Paper at 3.201
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(2017 Resource Governance Index: Method Paper).   
All three components are further subdivided into the following subcomponents captured in this 
graphic: 
Figure 2.2 – The Resource Governance Index 
 
(2017 Resource Governance Index: Method Paper). 
 All three categories consist of indicators that reflect the transnational good governance 
norms discussed earlier in section 2.5.1. Both value realization and revenue management capture 
the RGI’s conception of transparency, and to some extent, accountability, through the use of 
original questions. Enabling environment relies exclusively on data taken from external 
Enabling 
environment
Measures the quality of governance in the country as a whole 
in seven dimensions: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption 
control, and political stability and absence of violence.
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governance indicators, including the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, to 
evaluate performance in the rule of law and accountability. Included in Table 2.2 below are 
examples of questions related to transparency and accountability from the first two categories: 
Table 2.2 – Sample RGI questions 
(2017 RGI Questionnaire). 
To derive each country’s composite score, the RGI averages the scores of all three 
components. Each component is equally weighted, reflecting the NRGI’s belief that all three 
components equally contribute to the overall quality of mining governance.  The “value 202
realization” and “revenue management” subcomponents each consisted of 133 multiple-choice 
questions. Each answer had a corresponding numeric value of 0, 50, or 100.  
Table 2.3 illustrates how this scoring system operated by using two transparency-related 
law questions as examples: 
Component Sample Questions
Value realization • Are senior public officials required to publicly disclose 
their financial holdings in extractive companies? 
• Do rules require public disclosure of beneficial owners of 
extractive companies? 
• Is the government required to publicly disclose all signed 
licences/contracts with extractive companies? 
• Is the government required to publicly disclose data on 
payments from extractive companies to the government?
Revenue 
management
• Do rules require that an external body periodically audit 
the transfers of extractive resource revenues to subnational 
governments? 
• Is the sovereign wealth fund required to publicly disclose 
these annual financial reports?
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “2017 Resource Governance Index: Method Paper”, online: Natural 202
Resource Governance Institute <https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/about/methodology>.
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Table 2.3 – Measuring legal transparency questions in the RGI 
(2017 RGI Questionnaire). 
1.1.7 Financial interest disclosure rules (Law Indicator)
1.1.7a Public officials asset disclosure requirement




Yes, the law 
requires senior 
public officials 











































Scores 100 50 20 0
1.2.3 Company payment rules (Law Indicator)
Question Is the government required to publicly disclose data on payments from 
extractive companies to the government?
Answer 
choices







companies to the 
government.





















Scores 100 50 0
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 RGI's questions and measurement scheme reveal the index’s narrow conception of the 
role of law in mining governance. Rather than evaluate the law’s explicit content and impact, the 
RGI questionnaire merely provides a quantitative differentiation between a government having a 
particular law on the books or not. This has the effect of condensing complex legal regimes into 
simplified data systems that fail to interrogate how law may affect development outcomes. 
Section 2.6 considers this critique in greater detail. 
b. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 Much like the RGI, the EITI reflects the prioritization of law’s form, rather than function, 
in transnational mining governance. The EITI was conceived as a foreign policy proposal of the 
British government under Prime Minister Tony Blair at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.  Its founding principle was that “the prudent use of natural resource wealth has 203
the potential to provide the basis for sustainable economic growth and development”  if it was 204
managed wisely and devoid of such problems as corruption, conflict, and environmental 
degradation.  Given this focus, the EITI is concerned solely with payments made by oil, gas, 205
and mining companies to national governments.  Despite this narrow focus on transparency, the 206
EITI adopted a multi-stakeholder consultative process that includes civil society organizations, 
extractives companies, institutional investors, and partner organizations.   207
 “History of the EITI”, online: EITI <https://eiti.org/history>.203
 Haufler, supra note 193 at 54.204
 Ibid.205
 “History of the EITI”, supra note 203.206
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and Nigeria’s EITI implementation”, online: Leadership Initiative for Transformation and Empowerment <http://
www.nidprodev.org/EITI%20-%20Nigeria%20Analysis.pdf> at 7. EITI’s website list of “institutional investors” 
includes the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, the CPP Investment Board, Fidelity 
Investments, JP Morgan Asset Management, the Ontario Teachers’ Pensions Plan, and UBS Global Asset 
Management. “Partner organizations” include the African Development Bank, African Union, European Union, 
International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank.
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Almost half (24) of the 51 EITI implementing countries are in Africa.  Of the 24 208
countries, only 10—Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, and Zambia—are deemed to have made “meaningful progress” 
towards meeting the 2016 EITI Standard; the other 14 have yet to be assessed. 
The EITI Standard is a voluntary mechanism consisting of two parts: Implementation of 
the EITI Standard and Governance and Management. Each includes various subcomponents. Of 
particular importance to considerations of the role of law is subcomponent 3.2, which outlines 
the mandated Legal and Institutional Framework. An overview of this framework states that  
The EITI requires disclosures of information related to the rules for how the extractive sector 
is managed, enabling stakeholders to understand the laws and procedures for the award of 
exploration and production rights, the legal, regulatory and contractual framework that apply 
to the extractive sector, and the institutional responsibilities of the State in managing the 
sector. The EITI requirements related to a transparent legal framework and award of 
extractive industry rights include: (2.1) legal framework and fiscal regime; (2.1) license 
allocations (2.3) register of licenses; (2.4) contracts; (2.5) beneficial ownership; and (2.6) 
state-participation in the extractive sector. 
At its core, the Legal and Institutional Framework identifies types of payments and 
ownership information that should be disclosed. Like the RGI, the EITI’s evaluation of 
transparency offers little by way of using laws and regulations to produce “demonstrable and 
transformative impact”  on mining-led development. Using Zambia’s 2017 validation against 209
the 2016 Legal and Institutional Framework standard as an illustrative example helps explain this 
point further: 
 EITI, supra note 153. 208
 Gillies & Heuty, supra note 148 at 27.209
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Table 2.4 – Zambia’s First Validation (2017) 
Category: Licenses and contracts Level of Progress 
(Options: No progress; Inadequate; 
Meaningful; Satisfactory; Beyond)Requirements and Description
Legal framework (#2.1*): 
The 2015 EITI Report describes the legal framework and 
fiscal regime governing the extractive industries, including 
the level of fiscal devolution, an overview of the relevant 
laws and regulations, and information on the roles and 
responsibilities of the relevant government agencies. There 
are parts of the report that refer to laws that have been 
replaced, such as the Mines and Minerals Development 
Act 2008.
Satisfactory
License allocations (#2.2): 
While the report includes an overview of the licensing 
process, it is uncertain to what extent the information 
reflects any changes resulting from the MMDA 2015. 
There are gaps related to the process of license transfers, 
licenses transferred during the reporting year, and an 
explanation of the technical and financial criteria for 
awarding of licenses.
Inadequate
License register (#2.3): 
Comprehensive information on the licenses held by 
material and non-material companies is included in the 
mining cadastre. Data on the date of application/
submission of bid is not available for petroleum licenses, 
although this is not sufficient for the requirement to be 
unmet.
Satisfactory
Policy on contract disclosure (#2.4): 
While the EITI Report explains that there are currently no 
active contracts in the mining sector, the references to the 
MMDA 2008 does not make it clear whether the 
information is up to date and whether there are any 
changes resulting from the passing of the MMDA 2015. It 
is also not clear from the report whether there are any 
possibilities for entering into contracts with the 
government with regards to the exploration or production 
of petroleum, if so, whether there are any laws or 
contractual provisions that would affect disclosure of 
contracts in the petroleum sector.
Meaningful
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 (*The numbers correspond with the applicable EITI Standard; EITI Zambia - First 
 Validation 2017). 
Although the EITI does not offer a quantitative ranking of its implementing member 
countries, it nonetheless establishes a measurable evaluation of transparency against “the global 
standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources.”  By tracking state progress 210
and assigning a qualitative measure of that progress, the EITI operates similarly to the RGI’s 
quantitative indicator.  
 Additionally, aside from the 10 African countries that are EITI compliant, there is little 
information about how any of these states utilize either the RGI or the EITI. Additionally, there is 
no concrete information available that suggests that foreign investors or foreign governments 
utilize the metrics when making decisions to invest or provide development assistance. Instead, 
these metrics reproduce knowledge about African mining governance that perpetuate neoliberal 
State participation (#2.6): 
The EITI Report provides an overview of state 
participation in the sector, including the level of ownership 
held by Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – Investment 
Holding (ZCCM-IH) in mining companies, changes in the 
level of ownership and funding arrangements provided to 
by the ZCCM-IH to mining companies. ZCCM-IH’s 
annual audited financial reports are publicly available and 
include information on the rules and practices regarding 
transfer of funds between the ZCCM-IH and the state, 
licenses held, reserves, licenses held, the names of 
operating companies, royalties and dividends. There is 
limited information on the recently established Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and how dividends 
collected from the mining sector are managed, although 
state asset management companies do not fall under the 
scope of Requirement 2.6.
Satisfactory
 EITI, supra note 153.210
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conceptions of weak governance, with little information about the current legal frameworks or 
institutions that govern mining and aim to promote socioeconomic development. 
2.6. The limits of transnational norm creation and law-making 
 With the increasing popularity of the notion of “good governance” as the only viable 
solution to the “resource curse” over the past 30 years, donor governments, the BWIs and 
international civil society organizations have promoted normative prescriptions—transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law—accompanied specific legal and policy proposals designed to 
enact good mining governance. Through this formulation and promulgation of transnational legal 
norms, proponents of good governance became sites of transnational law-making and norm 
creation.  As metrics designed to measure good governance in mining, the RGI and EITI 211
engage in both the reproduction and recreation of these transnational legal norms. Each new 
iteration of the RGI and EITI standards offer reformulations of good governance in mining. For 
example, in June 2019, the EITI Standard was updated to include new contract transparency and 
environment reporting obligations,  while the RGI, through its various iterations, offers insights 212
into preferred institutional arrangements. Given their reproductive and recreative functions, the 
RGI and the EITI have become “integral to and constitutive of”  the transnational good 213
governance project in mining.  
 This section examines the limits of transnational good governance law-making and norm 
creation, as reflected in the RGI and the EITI. The analysis focuses on three critiques: first, that 
 Szablowski, supra note 139 at 87.211
 EITI, supra note 153.212
 Ruth Buchanan, Kimberley Byers & Kristina Mansveld, “‘What gets measured gets done’: exploring the social 213
construction of globalized knowledge for development” in Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang, eds, Research handbook 
on the sociology of international law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 101 at 101.
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the prescription of legal and policy norms, found in the RGI and EITI metrics, engages in the 
practice of “governing by measuring”  or “what gets measured gets done;”  second, it 214 215
presumes a linear correlation between “good governance” and development that both neglects 
local conditions and the evolving functions of law; and last, how it constrains the role for law in 
governing mining-led development in Africa.  
2.6.1. “Governing by measuring” or “what gets measured gets done” 
 The proliferation of metrics and indices to measure development outcomes, like the 
Millennium Development Goals, led Law and Development scholar Kerry Rittich to coin the 
phrase “governing by measuring” to describe the increased reliance on indicators in development 
practice.  Like a trio of scholars before her—Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle 216
Merry —Rittich notes the worrying trend of indicators being used to frame a social 217
phenomenon like development. Following Rittich’s analysis of the Millennium Development 
Goals, Ruth Buchanan, Kimberley Byers and Kristina Mansveld confirm the effect of the 
proliferation of indicators on development practice. Using the phrase “What gets measured gets 
done” (taken from the final Millennium Development Goals Report published in 2015), 
Buchanan, Byers and Mansveld corroborate Rittich’s hypothesis and formulate a critical 
sociology of development indicators that emphasize: the value-neutral creation of things that are 
measured;  their embeddedness in larger social projects;  how they generate reactivity by 218 219
 Kerry Rittich, "Governing by Measuring: The Millennium Development Goals in Global Governance” in Ruth 214
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen, eds, Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice 
(London: Hart Publishing, 2014) 165 [Rittich, “Governing”].
 Buchanan, Byers & Mansveld, supra note 213 at 101.215
 Rittich, “Governing”, supra note 214 at 165.216
 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, supra note 192 at 5.217
 Buchanan, Byers & Mansveld, supra note 213 at 108.218
 Ibid at 109.219
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changing how governments act;  and how they discipline governments and institutions by 220
simplifying complex social and political decision-making and privileging the creators of 
indicators over “local knowledge and decision-making.”    221
 Applying this critique to transnational good governance norm creation as represented by 
the RGI and EITI may seem incongruous because only the RGI is an indicator in the way that 
Rittich and Buchanan, Byers and Mansveld use it. The aptest definition comes from Davis, 
Kingsbury and Merry. They contend that despite the widespread use of global governance 
indicators and standards in a cross-section of different fields (human rights, development, rule of 
law, and corporate social responsibility),  there is no agreed meaning of indicator. They offer 222
the following definition in “Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance”: 
An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past 
or projected performance of different units. The data are generated through a process that 
simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and 
processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as 
countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate 
their performance by reference to one or more standards.  223
The RGI clearly fits within this definition. However, it could be argued that the EITI does as 
well. Although it is not a quantitative metric, the EITI is a qualitative indicator of rank-ordered 
data. It measures and evaluates states’ progress against a pre-defined set of transparency norms. 
As a result, it operates similarly to the RGI and other governance indicators.  
 Thus, transnational good governance norm creation, as represented in the RGI and EITI, 
can be said to be “governing by measuring” as it is  
 Ibid at 110.220
 Ibid at 112.221
 Sally Engle Merry, “Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance” (2011) 52:S3 222
Current Anthropology S83 at S83.
 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, supra note 192 at 5. Although “standards” are not explicitly included in their 223
definition, they operate like indicators by measuring complex social phenomena against evaluation criteria to 
produce rank-ordered data.
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premised on the idea that identifying goals and quantifiable targets and pursuing those 
targets with measurable indicators; monitoring progress or regress through peer and 
external surveillance; diffusing ‘best practices’ from better performers to laggards; and 
revising those practices on the basis of cumulative gains in knowledge is often the most 
promising way to generate desired change.  224
 By promoting and measuring the adoption of transnational legal norms in Africa, the 
“externally-driven” nature of good mining governance further “affects both the intent and 
character of their implementation.”  Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry argue that this is a problem 225
embedded in such initiatives because they embody an “ideology [of] what a good society is, or 
how governance should ideally be conducted to achieve the best possible approximation of a 
good society.”  Campbell argues that the implementation of good governance proposals is too 226
focused on technical and administrative aspects of capacity building, which neglects how past 
neoliberal interventions in extractives sectors severely weakened local political and institutional 
capacity.  227
Both the EITI and RGI are emblematic of transnational good governance norm creation 
and are further evidence of the misalignment between good governance practice and stated 
impact. The EITI does not explain how the public disclosure of company payments will support 
economic growth, encourage public debate, and enhance foreign investment. Also, while the RGI
—by exposing shortcomings in its conceptualization of mining governance—aims to “facilitate 
disclosure and public accountability, limit arbitrary powers, curb conflicts of interest, and clarify 
roles and authority,”  it is unclear as to how this will be achieved. Additionally, the inability of 228
EITI to effectively produce results across parts of Africa where it is being implemented further 
 Rittich, “Governing”, supra note 214 at 175.224
 Gillies & Heuty, supra note 148 at 26-27.225
 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, supra note 192 at 11.226
 Bonnie Campbell, “Corporate Social Responsibility and development in Africa: Redefining the roles and 227
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illustrates how good governance standards engage superficially with complex political and 
economic realities.  Without the ability to account for the distinct political and institutional 229
environment within a country, governance metrics can distort understandings of minerals 
management and offer few lessons on how to improve gaps or shortcomings. 
2.6.2. The causation presumption 
 Through the production and promulgation of transnational norms, good governance 
proponents assume a precise combination of laws and legal institutions as preconditions for 
effective minerals management and socioeconomic development. This approach is akin to a 
theoretical approach that has influenced understandings of the relation between law and 
economic development  known as the “endowment perspective.”    230 231
 Law and development theories by Max Weber, Douglass North, Hernando de Soto, 
Rafael La Porta and Daron Acemoglu all fall within this perspective. This approach asserts that 
only countries that possess optimal preconditions could support economic growth and 
industrialization.  In Weber’s case, these preconditions were a “Protestant work ethic and a 232
rational legal system.” For North, it was institutions. For La Porta and Acemoglu, the “legal 
origins” of a country predetermined economic growth. While for de Soto, it was legally 
enforceable property rights.   233
 Nikhil K Dutta, “Accountability in the Generation of Governance Indicators” in Kevin E Davis et al, eds, 229
Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) 437 at 438.
 Like critical law and development scholarship on the rule of law, the discipline also offers comparable critical 230
analytical tools to comprehend how law is conceptualized in mining governance discourse.
 Pistor & Milhaupt, supra note 140 at 18.231
 Ibid.232
 Ibid at 18-21.233
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 Much like the endowment perspective, good governance necessitates that specific legal 
institutions be in place for mining to support socioeconomic development, with little 
consideration of the local knowledge and conditions. Some of these, including the state of the 
mining sector and recent interventions made by African governments to promote socioeconomic 
development, are discussed further in Chapter Three. 
2.6.3. Hindering the role for law in the governance of mining developmentalism 
 Critical law and development scholarship again offers a lens to critique good 
governance’s limiting conception of the role for law in governing mining for development. In his 
review of the “rule of law” in development assistance, David Trubek critiqued early law reform 
efforts for emphasizing “formalism” in the creation of law and legal institutions.  In Trubek’s 234
words, this meant that “rules were developed, interpreted, and applied without careful attention 
to policy goals.”  Foreign laws and legal models were readily promoted and adopted with little 235
consideration of their effect on local conditions and the country’s needs.   236
 The same can be said about transnational good mining governance. As empirical 
representations of good governance, both the RGI and EITI reveal this key limitation through the 
measurement and evaluation of mining governance: formalist law and legal institutions are 
prioritized over functional law and institutions. Law is being formulated in such a way that it 
satisfies subjective standards of good governance with little consideration of what functions it 
achieves.  The EITI framework discussed in section 2.5.2 requires member countries to adopt 237
 Trubek, “Rule of Law”, supra note 180 at 76.234
 Ibid.235
 Ibid.236
 Rittich, “Functionalism”, supra note 187 at 861. World Bank Group, 2017 World Development Report: 237
Governance and the Law (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2017) at 5.
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and implement a body of law deemed by the organization to be the universal standard for 
managing mineral wealth. Similarly, through its evaluation criteria, the RGI infers that certain 
laws and institutions must be in place for a country’s extractives sector to be governed well. The 
push to see mining-dependent governments adopt and implement legislation upholding 
transnational good governance tenets fails to interrogate how different legal institutions may 
promote socioeconomic development. 
 Moreover, a detrimental effect of this formalist approach is the constraint placed on state 
function. Good governance is a highly political undertaking that presumes states lack the 
competence to effectively and efficiently manage resource wealth.  This presumption is rooted 238
in an “anti-state” bias premised on state dysfunction and susceptibility to corruption.  The 239
evolution of African state intervention in mining, as discussed in section 2.2, illustrated how this 
understanding contributed to the formation of the problem known as the resource curse and its 
commonly accepted solution, good governance. 
2.7. Conclusion: Rethinking law and mining governance in Africa  
 As mineral-rich African countries seek a greater share of mining wealth, it is time to 
rethink the role for law in mining governance and formulate an “integrated perspective which 
considers the transformative role” that mining-led development could play.  Good governance 240
in mining is currently framed as a formalist approach to constrain state action via three key 
tenets: transparency, accountability and the rule of law. Although all three are important means to 
support mining-led development, they should not be the sole purpose of good mining 
 Idahosa, supra note 3 at 203.238
 Ibid; Rittich, “Functionalism” supra note 187 at 866.239
 Campbell, “Regulation”, supra note 143 at 25.240
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governance. Instead, prioritizing these tenets fails to fully capture the developmental function of 
law and legal institutions in mining governance. Chapter Three considers how this can be done 
by incorporating a rights-based approach to development in the “developmental state.”  
80
3 (Re)framing Law and Mining Governance: Incorporating 
Development and the Developmental State 
3.1. Introduction 
 Chapter Two offered a critique of contemporary mining governance centred on its 
formalistic constraints on the role of law and states. Recognizing these limitations, Chapter Two 
concluded by contending that an alternative mining governance framework is needed. This 
chapter proposes such an alternative framework by adopting a functional human rights–based 
approach to development as the guiding legal norm. The framework is further contextualized by 
exploring the intersections between mining and relevant development and human rights concepts 
(the developmental state, the right to development, and the rights-based approach to development 
(RBAD)). It proposes the adoption, through developmental state institutions, of a rights-based 
approach to mining governance, through developmental state institutions that foster state 
participation and promotes development objectives.  
 As more mining-dependent Southern African states seek a greater share of mineral 
wealth, a rights-based approach to mining governance facilitated by mining developmental state 
institutions (MDSIs), could offer a means to regulate both the sector and the state’s participation 
in it. In a 2011 report, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa argued that much-
needed economic transformation across the continent would require a developmental state.  This 1
contention attempted to re-centre development in growth strategies across the continent. Mineral-
rich countries are well-positioned to undertake this transformation through developmental 
interventions in mining. What form this transformation could take has yet to be extensively 
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Governing development in Africa - the 1
role of the state in economic transformation (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2011) at 7 [“UNECA/AU, Governing”].
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studied, since most countries labelled as “developmental states” lack significant natural 
resources.  Borrowing from the experiences of “successful” developmental states, this chapter 2
intertwines orthodox and heterodox law and development scholarship to conceptualize the 
mining developmental state (MDS) and to construct a functional framework for a rights-based 
approach to mining governance that can analyzed in the Southern African case studies.  
 Section 3.2 provides a historical overview of law and development and explains the 
relationship between law and economic development. The right to development is also situated 
in the field. Section 3.3 examines the developmental state, including historical examples and 
defining features, while considering the role of law in the developmental state. The section 
concludes with an assessment of the developmental state paradigm. Section 3.4 transitions to 
consider developmental states across Africa and the post-colonial history of the African state in 
development. Current mining developmental state institutions in Africa are described in section 
3.5 and are used to further conceptualize the mining developmental state in line with a rights-
based approach. Like in Chapter Two, this analysis covers all of Africa to identify continent-wide 
trends that would support a more comprehensive understanding of mining developmentalism and 
the developmental state that has been informed by historical and contemporary events. Section 
3.6 concludes by summarizing the proposed law and mining governance framework that will be 
used to evaluate mining practices in Botswana, South Africa and Zambia in Chapters Four, Five 
and Six, respectively.   
 Paul Jourdan, “The optimisation of the developmental impact of South Africa’s mineral assets for building a 2
democratic developmental state” (2014) 26 Mineral Economics 107 at 108.
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3.2. What is law and development? 
 “Law and development”  has been simultaneously described as a “movement”  3 4
comprised of “a series of projects driven primarily by funding decisions”  and as “organized 5
efforts to transform legal systems in developing countries to foster economic, political, and social 
development.”  Accompanying this movement were a number of “academic projects”  designed 6 7
to study these efforts. Since the 1960s, law and development—as a field of study and practice—
has consistently shifted, due to its intersections with “law, economics, and the practices of states 
and development agencies.”  At its core, law and development has been, and remains, 8
“concerned with the relationship between legal norms and institutions and economic, social, 
cultural, and political transformation.”  Due to this breadth of study and practice, Kerry Rittich 9
describes law and development as “a ‘field’ with uncertain borders constituted by varied, often 
isolated, and sometimes incommensurable projects, preoccupations, and perspectives.”  This 10
section aims to summarize two divergent approaches in law and development scholarship along 
with their various historical moments. The first, which is described here as “law and 
development ‘orthodoxy’,”  captures the majority view in the field of “what development is and 11
 How “law” and “development” are defined is critical to conceptions of “law and development”. The meaning of 3
“law” and “development” used in this dissertation was discussed in Chapter One and will not be revisited here.
 Kerry Rittich, “Theorizing International Law and Development” in Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman, eds, The 4
Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 820 at 828 [Rittich, “Theorizing”].
 Ibid.5
 David Trubek, “Law and Development” (2015) 13:2 International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 6
Sciences 443 at 443.
 Ibid.7
 David M Trubek, “Law, State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction”, in David M Trubek, Helena A 8
Garcia, Diogo R Coutinho & Alvaro Santos, eds, Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience 
in Latin American Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1 at 3 [Trubek, “New 
Developmentalism”].
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 4 at 826.9
 Ibid at 828.10
 David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, “Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the 11
Emergence of a New Critical Practice” in  David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The new law and economic 
development: a critical appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1 at 2.
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what types of legal reform it requires or implies.”  The second, “law and development 12
‘heterodoxy’,”  considers an alternative approach to law and development that is grounded in 13
human rights, including rights-based approaches to development.  Institutions that were founded 14
based on either or both approaches are examined in greater detail later in this chapter.   
3.2.1. Law and development orthodoxy 
 “Development” and its companion “development assistance” emerged after the end of 
World War II as a political and economic mechanism to aid post-war reconstruction.  Through 15
the mandate of the newly created Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)—the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund—development and development assistance became conceptual and 
practical tools synonymous with the efforts of states and these institutions to support economic 
growth and employment.  After Europe recovered and its colonial empires began to dismantle, 16
newly independent countries embraced the mantle of development despite many having inherited 
institutions incapable of jumpstarting sustainable socioeconomic development.  How these 17
countries were to “achieve” development became the focus of numerous studies and theories, 
including the emerging field of law and development. 
 Although its intellectual boundaries began to be defined in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
theoretical origins of the law and development movement can be traced to Max Weber’s early 
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 4 at 830.12
 Ibid at 831.13
 Ruth Buchanan, “A Crisis and its Afterlife: Some Reflections on ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’” in Gráinne de 14
Búrca, Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott, eds, Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum 
David M Trubek (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014) 25 at 33.
 Andrea Cornwall & Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, “Putting the ‘rights-based approach’ to development into 15
perspective” (2004) 25:8 Third World Quarterly 1415 at 1421.
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 4 at 820.16
 Ann Seidman et al, “Introduction” in Ann Seidman et al, eds, Africa’s Challenge: Using Law for Good 17
Governance and Development (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc, 2007) at 6.
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efforts to study the relationship between law and the economy during his late nineteenth-century 
work on the “rational legal system” as a precondition for capitalism.  Over fifty years after 18
Weber’s sociological analysis of the relationship between law and capitalism in Europe, in the 
1960s early proponents of law and development (mainly scholars and practitioners in the Global 
North) resurrected Weber’s framework to help explain “underdevelopment” in the Global South. 
Further influenced by W.W. Rostow's modernization theory —the prevailing development 19
theory at the time, which argued that development occurred in a period of successive phases of 
economic growth—early law and development advocates claimed that the adoption and 
transplantation of Western legal traditions could accelerate modernization in the developing 
world.  Inherent in this view was the assumption that the levels of economic progress achieved 20
in the Global North were the desired development objective for poorer countries.  Consequently, 21
this movement supported a “top-down” approach that consisted of reforming legal institutions 
through Western transplants so that law was a means of achieving the developmental goals of the 
state.  Local legal traditions that were considered “non-modern” were deemed incompatible 22
with the economic reforms thought necessary to support economic growth and development.  In 23
this way, early law and development orthodoxy involved an “element of external engagement”  24
that shaped many of the domestic law and policy-making processes in developing countries. 
 Katharina Pistor & Curtis J Milhaupt, Law and capitalism: what corporate crises reveal about legal systems and 18
economic development around the world (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) at 18; David Trubek, “Max 
Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism” (1972) 3 Wis L Rev 720 at 721.
 Kevin E Davis & Michael J Trebilcock, “The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists versus 19
Skeptics” (2008) 56 Am J of Comp L 895 at 900.
 Ibid at 901.20
 David Trubek & Mark Galanter, “Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and 21
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 Due to the prominent idea of the role of developing states in early post-colonial economic 
development, the “developmental state” became critically aligned with orthodox law and 
development scholarship. Law and development’s embrace of the developmental state 
historically covers three distinct periods that are also aligned with the different moments in law 
and development scholarship. The first can be described as the “law of the developmental 
state.”  During this period, law was used as a tool of the developmental state, specifically 25
directed at making state intervention more effective. This approach was mostly used in the 1960s 
and early 1970s when development economists favoured the state guiding industrial growth over 
the private sector.  Since private sector actors were considered less equipped to manage the 26
demands of industrial expansion, states were regarded as better suited to carrying out 
development.   27
 The second period occurred in the 1980s after doubts were raised about the 
developmental state’s ability to promote development. Accompanying the declining faith in the 
state was the rise in neoliberal economic policies that facilitated heightened market influence and 
independence; the state was no longer deemed the leading site of socioeconomic development.  28
This period became known as “law in the neoliberal market”  in law and development 29
scholarship. Law’s role in the economy morphed during this period from a tool to advance 
development goals to a shield used to protect the market against unwanted state intervention.  30
The role of the state was limited to using law as a means to protect investor expectations and 
 Trubek, “New Developmentalism”, supra note 8 at 5. 25
 Ada Ordor, “Tracking the Law and Development Continuum through Multiple Intersections” (2015) 8:2 Law and 26
Development Review 333 at 335.
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 Trubek, “New Developmentalism”, supra note 8 at 5.29
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facilitate private business transactions.  Law was wholeheartedly a part of enforcing the 31
Washington Consensus and “good governance” agenda of BWIs discussed in Chapter Two.  32
 After Washington Consensus policies failed to achieve its presumed social and economic 
transformation, law and development scholars rejected the “night watchman” view of the state 
and accepted that various market distortions and failures might require direct state intervention 
and corrective action.  This period, from the late 1990s to the present, also mirrored changing 33
views of development that were influenced by Amartya Sen’s reconceptualization of 
development as freedom.  A significant outcome of the adoption of Sen’s expansive view of 34
development was the creation of “human development”  indicators as a new methodology for 35
tracking states’ progress.  The United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development 36
Report, the now defunct Millennium Development Goals and their successor, the Sustainable 
Development Goals, were evidence of this shift. Although some efforts have been made by 
human rights scholars to recalibrate the role for law in realizing human development,  law and 37
 Ibid.31
 See sections 2.2.3 and  2.4.32
 Kerry Rittich, “The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the 33
Social” in David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 203 at 212 [Rittich, “Future”]. 
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development orthodoxy has yet to wholeheartedly reorient away from market-centred approaches 
to development.  38
 Today, there is no prevailing theory that shapes law and development orthodoxy.  39
Despite the lack of consensus, the developmental state remains fundamental to law and 
development orthodoxy. While David Trubek, a prominent law and development figure due to 
his early work in the field, suggests “the consensus on which the neoliberal model was built is 
crumbling,”  he acknowledges new conceptions are emerging from state practices and 40
development scholarship. The absence of a theoretical consensus on the role of law in the 
developmental state led Trubek to reconceptualize the developmental state as the “new 
developmental state”  by relying on “different models of development and different roles for 41
law.”  42
 An overarching feature of this new developmental state is the revised relationship 
between the state and the private sector. No longer is the state acting as the guiding hand of the 
economy; neither is the private sector seeking to act unilaterally with little involvement from the 
state. Instead, new developmentalism acknowledges that optimal development goals will be 
realized if the state and the private sector collaborate. New developmentalists posit that this can 
include public-private partnerships and other joint efforts that originate from state promotion of 
industrial innovation and competitiveness.  Policies that may characterize this new 43
developmental state include:  
 Rittich, “Theorizing”, supra note 4 at 834.38
 Ordor, supra note 26 at 336.39
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• “Primary reliance on the private sector as investor rather than direct state ownership [with mining 
sectors being a possible exception]; 
• Acceptance of a major role for the state in steering investment, coordinating projects and 
providing information…; 
• Promotion of productive (rather than speculative) foreign direct investments; 
• Emphasis on making private firms competitive rather than on shielding them from competition;
…[and] 
• Promotion of domestic capital markets and the financial sector both to generate and to allocate 
resources.”  44
 Law and development scholars continue to offer differing insights into what form the new 
developmental state can take.  Before the emergence of this concept, the developmental state 45
took shape from models in East Asia. These models, and the developmental state experience in 
Latin American, are discussed further in section 3.3. 
 At its core, law and development orthodoxy is concerned with the relationship between 
law and economic development.  Although causal connections between orthodox law reform 46
proposals and development “remains…elusive,”  its adherents strongly believe that law matters 47
and can positively affect development goals in the Global South.  Heterodox law and 48
development similarly believes in the role for law. However, law and development heterodoxy 
adopted an expansive definition of development that was intrinsic to human rights and the right 
to development.  
 David M Trubek, “Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of Development 44
and Law” (2008) Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1075 at 11 [Trubek, “Legal Order”].
 See for example Karl Botchway and Jamee Moudud’s alternative take on the “new developmental state” in “The 45
Search for a New Developmental State” (2008) 37:3 International Journal of Political Economy 5 at 6 [Botchway & 
Moudud, “Search”].
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3.2.2. Law and development heterodoxy: the right to development and the rights-based 
approach to development   
 Development and human rights were polarized discourses in the post-colonial period 
before Sen’s work in the 1990s helped expand its understanding beyond the economic context.  49
Issa Shivji, an expert on law and development in Africa, argues that the contentious 
fragmentation between development and human rights was more pronounced in Africa than in 
other developing countries because human rights were viewed as antithetical to the development 
agenda taking place in the 1960s and 1970s.  Shivji’s critique of twentieth century human rights 50
discourse is rooted in what he contends are its Western origins and paradoxical application by 
reigning global superpowers. For example, he points to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ prioritization of political freedoms (such as freedom of expression and religion) when it 
was concluded in 1948, while European colonization was ongoing, over self-determination, 
social and economic rights—rights that were fundamental to independence movements and 
former colonies.  Recognizing this fragmentation, several newly independent countries—many 51
from Africa—made interjections at the United Nations aimed at advancing a developmental 
agenda.  This movement, despite its rejection of mainstream human rights discourse, used rights 52
language and instruments to promote its agenda, beginning with the 1966 International Covenant 
 Buchanan, supra note 14 at 34.49
 Issa Shivji, “Human Rights and Development: A Fragmented Discourse” in Ruth Buchanan & Peer Zumbansen, 50
eds, Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (London: Hart Publishing, 2014) 49 at 
53.
 Ibid at 52.51
 Ibid at 54.52
90
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)  and culminating the 1986 United Nations 53
Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD).  54
 The ICESCR marked a divergence in international human rights discourse. Due to the 
increasing number of post-colonial states in the United Nations system, social and economic 
rights were inserted for the first time, into an international sphere that had previously prioritized 
individual civil and political rights.  Foundational rights to former colonies, like the right of 55
self-determination  and the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources,  were 56 57
entrenched in the treaty.  
 Passage of the ICESCR also helped proponents of development discourse move ahead 
with efforts to formalize a normative instrument dedicated to advancing their agenda further.  58
Using human rights parlance once again, this change in international law was undertaken by 
galvanizing around the newly-formulated “right to development.”  Coined by Senegalese jurist 59
Kéba M’Baye in 1972,  the right to development was defined as  60
1. [A]n inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International 
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Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all 
their natural wealth and resources.  61
The right to development was constitutive of efforts to promote a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) led by newly-independent developing countries at the United Nations in the 1970s 
and culminating in the DRTD in 1986.  Given its alignment with an expansive definition of 62
development, the origins of heterodox law and development can be traced to this NIEO and right 
to development movement.  63
 In 1986—ten years after the ICESCR entered into force—the United Nations General 
Assembly passed the DRTD. Although the DRTD was intended to reflect the redistributive goals 
of the NIEO, some viewed it as a watered-down version of the movement’s goals.  Nonetheless, 64
some fundamental principles of the NIEO movement were incorporated into the DRTD, 
including a number of global dimensions such as the need for a collective response to economic 
inequality.  In addition to urging international cooperation to promote development, the DRTD 65
emphasized the role of states in ensuring development domestically. Article 8.1 reads 
States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right 
to development and shall ensure…equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income… 
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all 
social injustices.  66
 Concurrent to the formulation of the DRTD at the United Nations was the adoption of the 
right to development in the emerging African human rights system. In 1981, Member States of 
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the Organization African Unity (the predecessor of the African Union) finalized the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR),  which recognized, inter alia, that  67
Art. 21.1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 
Art. 22.1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with 
due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind. 
Art. 22.2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right 
to development.  68
Much like the DRTD, the right to development in the AfCHPR was multifaceted and 
encompassed economic, social and cultural rights in addition to dominion over natural resources. 
Unlike the DRTD, however, the AfCHPR explicitly framed the right to development as a 
collective right of “all peoples.” Although the term was not defined in the AfCHPR, African 
human rights scholars and jurists, including M’Baye, have argued that describing the right as a 
collective one did not negate it as an individual right as well.   69
 The legally binding obligation on African states to discharge the right, either individually 
and collectively, was also explicitly delineated in the AfCHPR. Member States, however, did not 
specify the nature of the obligation. Over 30 years later, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, which was established by Article 30 of the AfCHPR, adopted the non-binding 
Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  The Guidelines explained that the AfCHPR 70
imposed a combination of negative and positive duties on States parties that were best 
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understood using the human rights “respect, protect, promote and fulfil”  framework.  71 72
Recommendations related to the obligation to fulfil economic and social rights are particularly 
illuminating of the role for law and the state in ensuring development: 
10. The duty to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights requires States parties to take positive 
steps to advance the realisation of the rights. Such measures should be comprehensive, co-
ordinated, transparent, and contain clear goals, indicators and benchmarks for measuring progress. 
This obligation is, “a positive expectation on the part of the State to move its machinery towards 
the actual realisation of the rights.” The State should continually aim at improving both the range 
of individuals, communities, groups and peoples who have access to the relevant rights as well as 
the quality of enjoyment.  
11. The duty to fulfil includes the adoption of measures that enable and assist individuals and 
communities to gain access to these rights on their own. In cases where individual and 
communities are unable to gain access to these rights by the means at their disposal, the obligation 
will be, “to take measures necessary to ensure that each person within its jurisdiction may obtain 
basic economic, social and cultural rights satisfaction”  
12. The rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups should be prioritised in all programmes of 
social and economic development, and particular attention must be paid to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in programmes aimed at ensuring access to appropriate services and 
resources. 
  
 In addition to the Guidelines, both the Commission and the African Court of Human 
Rights considered the right in a series of five cases  since 2001: SERAC and Another v Nigeria 73
(SERAC);  Democratic Republic of the Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda (DRC);  Kevin 74 75
Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon (Gumne);  Centre for Minority Rights Development and 76
Minority Rights Group International (on behalf of the Endorois) v Kenya (Endorois);  and 77
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya (Ogieks).  Along with 78
considering violations of the right to development, the Commission adjudicated violations of 
other rights, including the right to wealth and natural resources.  Key conclusions regarding the 79
content of the right to development included: 
• The right to development is directly linked to the right to freely dispose of wealth and 
natural resources, given that access to resources is necessary to realize economic, 
social and cultural development (DRC);  80
• A state’s ability to fulfil its obligation to ensure the right to development is also linked 
to the right to wealth and natural resources (DRC);  81
• Equitable sharing of resources is a component of the right to development (Gumne);  82
• Meaningful and effective participation by groups impacted by development projects is 
part of fulfilling the right to development (Endorois);  83
•  Prior and effective consultation with Indigenous peoples and local communities 
regarding projects that may hinder their right to development is required to ensure the 
right to development (Ogieks).   84
 The preceding articulation of the right to development in the African human rights system 
offers a way to meaningfully re-conceptualize mining governance in the twenty-first century. The 
rights-based approach to development tethers mineral wealth, land, equality, participation and 
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consultation to the development project in a way the orthodox approach to law and development 
does not. Translating this approach into the laws and policies that govern mining would thus 
require the elevation of the relationship between the state and its population over that of the state 
and pure economic interests.  This is not to say that a rights-based approach to mining 85
governance cannot make use of the market to achieve its developmental goals, as economic 
factors are invariably a part of overcoming poverty and realizing development in Africa. Instead, 
high rates of economic growth and other such indicators should not be the only measure of 
developmental success; instead, they should be a means by which states could ensure the right to 
development for their peoples. Furthermore, using the RBAD to contextualize mining 
governance incorporates a method of accountability  and enforceability—as evidenced by the 86
jurisprudence from the African Commission and Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights—that is 
absent from orthodox law and development approaches. 
 The remainder of the chapter attempts to develop a framework for a rights-based 
approach to mining governance that incorporates both orthodox and heterodox law and 
development institutions. Section 3.3  begins this analysis with a closer examination of the 87
developmental state. 
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3.3. The developmental state 
 As discussed previously, the “developmental state” at its core is committed to economic 
development because it is “a state that intervenes and guides the direction”  of economic 88
growth. Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 study of Japan and its Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was the first to profile the characteristics of this state model. In his landmark 
study, MITI and the Japanese Miracle,  Johnson identified four key components of the 89
developmental state: a small, efficient bureaucracy; a political environment that allows the 
bureaucracy to operate independently and free of intrusive interests; state intervention in the 
economy; and pilot institutions, such as the MITI.  Johnson’s study helped identify a type of 90
state that gained prominence in the decades following World War II. Although state intervention 
was common among both industrialized and developing economies, the developmental state 
offered a way to characterize governments that went beyond intervention alone and used it as a 
tool to advance economic growth. 
 After dominating economic policymaking in the years immediately following World War 
II, active state intervention faced opposition as neoliberal economic policies gained popularity in 
the 1980s. The rise of neoliberalism coincided with the decline of the developmental state, as 
neoliberals argued it was not equipped to handle the economic crises that arose in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. As a result, the role of the state in development took a backseat to neoliberal 
policies that favoured deregulation, free trade and privatization. However, today—after years of 
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what many scholars agree was a failure of neoliberal policies to promote development — 91
several developing countries are channelling the principles of the developmental state model 
proposed by Johnson. According to Karl Botchway and Jamee Moudud, the mediocre record of 
neoliberalism has revived support for state intervention and refocused attention on the role of the 
state in development.   92
3.3.1. Historical examples of the developmental state 
 Studies of East Asian countries dominate developmental state scholarship due to the high 
rates of economic growth many of these countries experienced in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong are often considered the 
prototypes for developing countries seeking to replicate their success. Although experiences 
varied in each country, an examination of two leading examples—Japan and South Korea—helps 
illustrate some of the features that contributed to theorizing the developmental state. 
 The creation of the MITI in 1949 was central to Japan’s development efforts. Faced with 
economic collapse following the end of World War II, the MITI was initially tasked with 
coordinating the “Policy Concerning Industrial Rationalization,”  which aimed to combat 93
harmful regulations—particularly those contributing to deflation—put in place by the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers.  In addition to spearheading this policy, the MITI was soon 94
given powers under the Foreign Capital Law to negotiate the price and conditions of technology 
imports.  Within three years, the MITI’s authority was broadened to include control over 95
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merchandise imports and the foreign exchange budget. As a result, a system of import control 
responsible for protecting domestic industry was created. The concurrent control over foreign 
exchange also helped foster the growth of exports.  96
 After its early success, the MITI expanded its continued support of domestic industries by 
providing much-needed access to credit through the implementation of two connected policies. 
The first was the creation of the Japan Development Bank, which was initially responsible for 
lending to two key domestic industries: energy and metal production. The second policy 
expanded lending to other industries through a generous scheme that involved both the Japanese 
central bank and commercial banks.    97
 South Korea also pursued export-oriented policies after the end of a devastating war—in 
this case the Korean War—in 1953.  Following Japan’s example, South Korea created a 98
government agency tasked with pursuing economic growth. The Economic Planning Board was 
conceived as part of the country’s first five-year economic development plan; its mandate, like 
MITI’s, was to implement foreign exchange policies and export subsidies favourable to domestic 
industries while providing preferential access to credit.  99
 Central to both Japan’s and South Korea’s development strategies was fluidity. Economic 
policies were flexible and adapted to different times and conditions. In South Korea, these 
policies were comprised of distinct five-year plans that implemented incremental developmental 
policies over the length of each plan. The first two put in place after the Korean War focused on 
promoting self-reliance and strengthening the state’s economic instruments. The third plan 
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shifted its focus to the development and export growth of key industries, specifically agriculture, 
and heavy and chemical industries. Later, recognizing its growth potential, the South Korean 
government turned to the development of the high tech industry in the 1990s.  Much like South 100
Korea, Japan executed phased development plans, beginning with the initial focus of restoring 
the industrial process in the years immediately following the end of World War II, and then 
fostering strong export industries. Afterwards, in the 1980s, Japan supported the new, high-
growth technology sector while responding to less competitive industries, such as textiles and 
steel production.  101
 Based on the Japanese and South Korean developmental state models, Esteban Pérez 
Caldentey identified three additional features that complement Johnson's original scholarship. 
First, interventionist policies used by the state were not confined to public ownership; instead, 
the developmental state used various instruments including “tax credits, breaks, subsidies, import 
controls, export promotion, and targeted and direct financial and credit policies instruments that 
belong to the realm of industrial, trade, and financial policy.”  Second, state intervention is 102
fluid, and “varies over time in scope and content.”  Third, active participation by the private 103
sector is key to the developmental state’s success.  104
 Despite the initial consensus regarding the state’s role in East Asian economic 
development, the 1997 East Asian crisis raised doubts about the efficacy of this approach.  105
Commentators blamed the institutional framework of the developmental state—especially the 
 Caldentey, supra note 88 at 30.100
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close relationship between the state and business—for the poor regulatory framework and lack of 
transparency that instigated the crisis.  106
 Much like East Asia, Latin America’s developmental state experience was varied. 
Caldentey traces its origin to the first half of the nineteenth century when several Latin American 
states gained independence and were subsequently integrated into the global trade system. At that 
time, small domestic industries forced Latin American countries to rely extensively on exports 
for economic growth. Consequently, Latin American states used trade to achieve the dual 
purpose of facilitating the creation of domestic industry and generating government revenue 
through both tariffs and export taxes.  In the decades that followed, Latin American 107
governments assumed a greater interventionist stance in several areas: the construction of general 
infrastructure (roads, railways), the protection of specific domestic industries and export sectors, 
and the promotion of skilled labour. Government policies used to advance these development 
goals included subsidies, access to credit, tariffs, and export taxes.  108
 Latin American intervention continued in the middle of the twentieth century, when 
development strategy centred on state-led industrialization.  A variety of government measures 109
were used to achieve this goal, including control over natural resource sectors, supporting 
nontraditional industries through various fiscal and monetary policies, and creating national 
development banks to improve access to cheap credit.  The Latin American developmental 110
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state is often associated with this period in history, wherein domestic industrialization was 
favoured over export promotion.  111
 Unlike the experience in East Asia, Latin American developmental states were considered 
less successful, particularly in the wake of the 1980s debt crisis.  State intervention in the 112
region became synonymous with inflation and wasteful spending, rather than economic growth. 
This negative view of state action precipitated the introduction of structural adjustment 
programmes, and their accompanying neoliberal economic policies in several Latin American 
states in the 1980s.  113
 More recently, law and development scholars are studying the emergence of a “new 
developmental state” in Brazil. Under the auspices of the Law and the New Developmental State 
(LANDS) project conducted by the Global Legal Studies Center at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, David Trubek and his colleagues Diogo Coutinho and Mario Shapiro researched the 
“new state activism” of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government.  Their research revealed that 114
Lula’s administration set Brazil on a new developmental course by instituting new industrial and 
social policies that promoted growth and helped reduce inequality.  The authors distinguish 115
Brazil’s “new developmentalism” from the developmental state of the 1950s–1980s,  which 116
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3.3.2. Defining features of “successful” developmental states 
 The experiences of East Asian (and to some extent Latin American) developmental states 
have helped development scholars to define criteria that they believe are vital to its “success.” 
Thandika Mkandawire divides these features into two broad categories: ideological and 
structural.  Mkandawire contends that this “ideology–structure nexus” distinguishes 117
developmental states from other states. Ideologically, the developmental state is 
“developmentalist”: its “mission” is “that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted 
to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization.”  Other developmental state scholars, 118
such as Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor, argue that this involves achieving more than high rates 
of growth: “a developmental state is one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and 
one that earnestly seeks to deploy its resources to the job of economic development.”  119
Structurally, the developmental state is defined by its “capacity to implement economic policies 
sagaciously and effectively,”  which is determined by such factors as institutions, technology, 120
politics, and administration.  Additional measures, such as poverty levels and human capacity, 121
can also be used to conclude whether the state meets the structural criteria.  Improvements to 122
such areas as the day-to-day lives of the broader population can help entrench the state in society 
and enhance its legitimacy, thus supporting a sustainable developmental state and ensuring its 
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success. Much of the scholarly contributions discussed here were made after Johnson’s study of 
the MITI. This section attempts to consolidate these contributions with Johnson’s into a list of 
four defining features of the “successful” developmental state: development-oriented political 
leadership, autonomous and effective bureaucracy, performance-oriented governance, and 
production coordination and conflict-management.  These will later be used to assess whether 123
the three case studies—Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia—can be described as 
developmental states in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. 
a. Development-oriented political leadership 
 State intervention in the economy is not exclusive to the governments of developing 
countries; states of different political orientations have intervened in markets throughout history. 
When defining developmental states, however, scholars are keenly attentive to the type of 
economic intervention that is taking place.  Although the formula is not exact—it varies from 124
state to state—state intervention centres on the leadership of a development-oriented political 
base. The goals this leadership sets can elevate the state to an “entrepreneurial agent”  that 125
undertakes its developmental vision. 
 Ideologically, the political leadership is united by similar economic and political 
development beliefs. In the East Asian examples previously discussed, political elites had shared 
a common development agenda due to a combination of political alliances and authoritarian 
rule.  There are also variances in the emergence of development-oriented political leadership. 126
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In the East Asian experience, it had been attributed to a concerted response by political elites to 
respond to political and economic conditions (both local and international) in the post-war 
period, including “broad coalitional commitment, scarce resource endowment and severe 
security threats.”  Development-oriented political leadership may also emerge from a group of 127
like-minded political elites who share similar development goals and earn the trust of the 
bureaucracy and private sector to carry out their agenda.  A non-predatory group that was 128
generally uncorrupted and sought limited personal gains also contributed to the success of early 
developmental states, which suggests that the political will to guide the economy towards 
developmental goals is an essential feature of the successful developmental state.  129
b. An autonomous and effective bureaucracy 
 To realize its vision for development, the state, as an “entrepreneurial agent”, must use 
the necessary institutions.  If none exist, the developmental state can create them. Johnson’s 130
study of the MITI identified an autonomous and effective bureaucracy as one of the successful 
institutions created by the Japanese developmental state. Its success can be attributed to such 
Weberian characteristics as meritocracy, promotional incentives, and guaranteed prestige and 
legitimacy.  These features created a class of bureaucrats committed to a shared corporate-131
culture working in an environment that bred autonomy and isolation from political elites. Armed 
with this freedom, bureaucrats were able to carry out development goals using methods they 
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deemed effective, including a combination of “‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’”  that shaped markets 132
through both incentives and disciplinary measures.   133
c. Performance-oriented governance 
 Successful developmental states also possess political legitimacy that is generated from 
the support of the broader population. The developmental state can ensure it receives continued 
support by distributing the benefits of economic growth equitably.  Doing so entails a 134
combination of setting certain performance standards for the market while also committing to 
transferring those results into actual changes in the everyday lives of the population. Using this 
approach helped ensure the continued political success of East Asian developmental states, as 
economic growth coincided with greater income equality, lower unemployment, and a reduction 
in poverty.  135
d. Production coordination and conflict-management 
 Intervening in the economy to pursue development goals was a staple feature of the 
developmental state exemplified by East Asian countries. To achieve these goals, states 
coordinated with businesses to meet certain economic benchmarks. Measures used to assist the 
private sector included providing subsidies, implementing protectionist measures, and creating 
cooperative relationships between business and financial institutions. States’ use of these 
measures was not undertaken blindly: it was intended to promote productivity by incentivizing 
the private sector and ensuring continued government support.  136
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 Coordination among public and private sectors can also reduce transaction costs. Ha-Joon 
Chang contends the determination of investment decisions underpinning industrial policy may 
require knowledge of complementary projects from competing business entities.  Centralized 137
coordination, which may include identifying points of overlap and cooperation, or facilitating 
agreements between parties, can promote more effective economic change. To encourage 
collaboration, states can use both financial and political resources to address gaps that hinder 
cooperation.  138
 Resolving potential conflicts between coordinated actors is another feature of the 
successful developmental state.  The allocation of scarce resources requires making decisions 139
that one economic actor may consider disadvantageous, and subsequently resist. Coordination 
can not only help counter opposition, it can also commit to mitigating or resolving any conflicts 
that may arise.  140
3.3.3. Limitations of the developmental state paradigm 
 The four features of the “successful” developmental state identified above are based 
primarily on the exceptionalism of high-growth East Asian countries of the twentieth century. 
The economic performance of the East Asian Tigers over the latter part of the twentieth century 
has produced a significant body of literature devoted to the examination and explanation of that 
model’s success. The consolidated features above recognize elements of the East Asian model’s 
politico-economic apparatus that contributed to its embedded institutional autonomy and 
 Chang, supra note 125 at 193.137
 Ibid.138
 Ibid at 196.139
 Ibid.140
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promoted economic development in several countries.  Although the criteria gleaned from the 141
literature may suggest there was a single model for success, there is ongoing debate about the 
contributing factors to economic growth across the East Asian Tigers.  In fact, some scholars 142
contend that attempting to pinpoint specific causes makes the developmental state paradigm 
“self-limiting” and “self-selecting.”  Identifying “successful” developmental state case studies 143
in this manner is an inductive process that can limit the applicability of the paradigm to other 
countries. This likely explains why Southern African states, and African states generally, have 
rarely been labelled “developmental states”—so few have matched the success of the East Asian 
model.  While recognizing the limitations of the East Asian paradigm, this dissertation 
nonetheless relies on its concepts and terminology due to the paucity of alternative frameworks 
in the literature.  144
 Despite these limitations, this dissertation compares its case studies to the East Asian 
paradigm for two reasons: first, as a means to evaluate the model’s applicability to Southern 
Africa; and second, to consider what the successful mining developmental state could look like 
in Southern Africa. As the case studies will seek to illustrate, the “successful” developmental 
state is not fully present in Botswana, South Africa and Zambia in the same way it was in East 
Asia. To reach this conclusion, the case study chapters will analyze how each country’s past and 
present institutions fit the paradigm described above. This exercise is reductive because it 
 Ben Fine, “Beyond the Developmental State: An Introduction” in Ben Fine, Jyoti Saraswati & Daniela Tavasci, 141
eds, Beyond the Developmental State: Industrial Policy into the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2013) 1 
at 11; Peter Evans, “What will the twenty-first-century developmental state look like?” in Stephen Wing-kai Chiu & 
Siu-lun Wong, eds, Repositioning the Hong Kong Government: Social Foundations and Political Challenges (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012) 23 at 29.
 Jesse Salah Ovadia & Christina Wolf, “Studying the developmental state: theory and method in research on 142
industrial policy and state-led development in Africa” (2018) 39:6 Third World Quarterly 1056 at 1056.
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neglects multiple endogenous and exogenous factors that were either impertinent to the East 
Asian countries or had a lesser affect. This includes such things as the state’s politico-economic 
position and colonial legacy at independence, the minerals that have dominated the country’s 
mining sector, the state’s relationship with foreign capital, and the state’s relationship with its 
peoples. With these concerns in mind, the efficacy of the developmental state paradigm is 
revisited in Chapter Seven, where the mining experiences of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia 
are considered to propose a potential model that is more applicable to mining-dependent 
Southern African countries. 
3.4. Developmental states in Africa? Post-colonial African states and 
development 
 Of the nearly fifty countries in Africa, only four —Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa 145
and Uganda—are included in discussions of African developmental states. Compared to other 
African states, developmental scholarship describes these four states as playing an “activist” role 
in their economic development.  In most instances, the scholarship concerning the 146
developmental state in Africa centres on the question of whether the model is possible (outside of 
the four countries mentioned earlier). Referred to as “impossibility theorems,” some Africanist 
developmental state scholarship attempts to debunk these theories.  They contend the 147
arguments are not based on the reality of Africa’s historical, political, or economic climate: the 
developmental state existed in many parts of Africa, and still can today. This section discusses 
some of these counter-arguments by examining the replicability and rationale for the 
 This conclusion was reached after a review of the literature canvassed for this dissertation.145
 Mbabazi & Taylor, supra note 90 at 3.146
 Mkandawire, supra note 105 at 309-310.147
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developmental state in Africa. This section begins with a historical overview of the African state 
in development. 
3.4.1. History of the African state in development 
 Like East Asia and Latin America, the African state became a prominent player in 
development after the end of a tumultuous period in history. The end of colonialism and new-
found independence thrust African governments into the centre of each states’ development 
trajectories. Post-colonial leaders of Africa’s newly independent states inherited the task of 
pursuing social and economic development from their colonial predecessors. As heads of the 
nationalist parties that dominated the post-colonial one-party state system, these leaders and their 
parties quickly became synonymous with the state as agents of development.  Kwame 148
Nkrumah in Ghana, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, and Kenneth Kuanda in Zambia are a few 
examples.  At independence, these leaders were faced with a weak, almost nonexistent private 149
sector, which led many states to assume the role of the main economic actor. This responsibility 
extended from constructing social and economic infrastructure to owning and managing 
productive industries.   150
 For some scholars, the centrality of development to this group of post-colonial leaders is 
sufficient to describe these states as developmentalist.  For others, these leaders’ records raise 151
serious doubts about early post-colonial developmentalism in Africa.  Although development 152
 Botchway & Moudud, “Neo-liberalism” supra note 122 at 16.148
 Ibid.149
 Meyns & Musamba, supra note 123 at 28.150
 Francis B Nyamnjoh & Ignasio M Jimu, “Success or Failure of Developmental States in Africa: Exploration of 151
the Development Experiences in a Global Context” in Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of 
‘Developmental States’ in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005) 16 at 16; 
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was a priority for several leaders, some scholars argue that consolidating power was another 
objective that detracted from developmentalism. Claude Ake, for example, contends that state 
intervention was not used to promote development, but rather “to facilitate the appropriation of 
wealth by means of state power.”  Ake points to the early development failures across Africa—153
particularly in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire—to support this view.  154
 Despite some of these failures of early African leaders, development remained a central 
priority throughout the remainder of their political careers and those of their successors. 
Although the “state-development nexus”  altered as growth in African economies began to 155
decline during the period of economic hardship in the 1970s, African states remained active 
participants in development as neoliberalism gained prominence in the 1980s.  When the 156
neoliberal-inspired structural adjustment programmes failed to meet expectations, even the BWIs 
accepted a role for the state in the development process.  However, state involvement was often 157
predicated on the notion of “good governance” advanced by those same BWIs.  158
3.4.2. Replicability of and rationale for the developmental state in Africa 
 The mixed history of the African state in development raised doubts about the success of 
the East Asian developmental state model in the post-adjustment era. Some scholars argued that 
the developmental state was economically and culturally unique to East Asia and beyond the 
political and institutional capacity of African governments.  Mkandawire categorizes these 159
 Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996) at 6.153
 Ibid; Meyns & Musamba, supra note 123 at 29.154
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“impossibility theses” as lack of ideology, dependence syndrome, lack of autonomy, 
neopatrimonialism  and rent-seeking,  the lack of technical and analytical capacity, and a  160 161
poor performance record.  162
 Mkandawire dismisses these arguments by arguing that they are not based on African 
historical experiences, nor the development trajectories of successful developmental states.  163
According to Mkandawire, the climate exists in Africa for the developmental state. He contends 
that development has historically been a priority for African leaders, thus refuting the lack of 
ideology argument. He also dismisses the neo-patrimonial and rent-seeking arguments based on 
historical evidence. Neo-patrimonialsm and rent-seeking are automatically equated with 
corruption and patron-clientelism, without determining whether such behaviour is advancing 
developmental goals or not.  Mkandawire notes that both neo-patrimonial and rent-seeking 164
behaviour can positively impact growth through the redistribution of resources. In support of his 
argument, Mkandawire identifies East Asian developmental states where rents were used to help 
spur industrialization.  165
 The nature of African institutions is also used to argue that the developmental state is not 
replicable in the region. Democratic institutions are often touted as key requirements for the 
success of the African developmental state. The economic success of Botswana and Mauritius—
 “Neopatrimonialism” is a commonly used term to describe political and economic governance in Africa. 160
Mkandawire contends there are many definitions of neopatrimonalism that incorporate a range of subconcepts, 
including “despotism, clannish behaviour,…tribalism, regionalism, patronage, cronyism,…corruption, predation, 
[and] factionalism.” For his analysis, he treats neopatrimonalism as the bureaucratic exercise of private power; the 
concept has become synonymous with poor governance across Africa (Thandika Mkandawire, “Neopatrimonialism 
and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: critical reflections” (2015) 67:3 World Politics 1 at 2, 
4).
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two peaceful democracies—is used to support this assertion, in contrast to the lower, or negative, 
economic growth that occurred in the rest of Africa, where government institutions are 
considered “irredeemably greedy, corrupt and captured by rent-seekers.”  According to 166
Botchway and Moudud, this argument overlooks how other developmental states, particularly in 
East Asia, succeeded without democratic institutions but rather authoritarian regimes.  167
Mkandawire suggests that democratic institutions in Africa should, at the very least, provide a 
system of “checks and balances.”  His view recognizes a need for accountability but does not 168
imply that democracy is necessary for the African developmental state to succeed. 
 Despite the replicability debate, there is greater consensus in developmental state 
literature regarding the role this debate can play in promoting development in modern Africa. 
During the colonial period, African resources were misallocated as colonial institutions were 
enclaves and restricted production. Many of these colonial institutions remained intact after 
independence was secured.  In addition to inheriting extractive colonial institutions, newly 169
independent African states were left without a civil service, a strong-centralized taxation system, 
or vital infrastructure.  The state structure at that time was ill-equipped to meet the 170
development objectives of newly-independent states.  Over fifty years of independence has not 171
changed state structure in many African countries that struggled to build institutions amidst war, 
civil strife and a shortage of adequate resources. Today, state structure across the continent 
remains poor amidst what Howard Stein describes as a “developmental crisis”—African 
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economies are incapable of generating the conditions necessary for sustained levels of growth 
and improvements in the standard of living.  Poverty, unemployment, and inequality rates 172
remain high while several states are mired in conflict, disease, famine, and low levels of 
agricultural and industrial production.  Africa remains a “continent of paradoxes”: it possesses 173
abundant natural resources and human capacity that a developmental state can harness to 
promote meaningful economic development, yet such development is currently lacking in many 
parts of the continent.  174
3.5. Conceptualizing the mining developmental state in Southern Africa 
using a rights-based approach to mining governance 
 Sections 3.3 and 3.4 explained the law and development concept of the developmental 
state and its place in Africa. Overwhelmingly, the developmental state is theoretically used to 
conceive of the state’s relationship with the economy and the promotion of economic 
development. Yet it need not be confined to this limited conceptualization of its institutions. As 
section 3.2.2 explained, socioeconomic development can also be pursued through a rights-based 
approach to development grounded in the human right to development. An expansive view of the 
developmental state can offer a way to conceptualize the role of the state and legal institutions in 
promoting socioeconomic development using a rights-based approach in mining-dependent 
countries. This section attempts to propose a mining developmental state framework for Southern 
African states that acts both as an aspirational model and a standard to evaluate the case studies 
in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The intent is that this framework is not simply used to measure 
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development and governance in Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia, similar to how the “good 
governance” model discussed in Chapter Two is used. Rather, it serves the dual purpose of 
considering the viability of a rights-based approach to mining governance using institutions 
formulated by Southern African states themselves to promote socioeconomic development, while 
also identifying any shortcomings in initiatives currently underway. Since the “resource 
boom”  began in the early 2000s, many Southern African governments have undertaken 175
measures to reconstitute mining governance and frequently pointed to their development agendas 
to justify their actions.  Two regional frameworks articulate this new commitment: the Protocol 176
on Mining in the Southern African Development Community (Protocol)  and the Africa Mining 177
Vision (AMV).   178
3.5.1. Regional frameworks: the Protocol on Mining in the Southern African 
Development Community and the Africa Mining Vision 
 The failure of neoliberal policies to advance socioeconomic development in the 1980s 
and 1990s had motivated several African states to reshape their relationship with their mining 
sectors.  Propelled by the belief that mineral wealth is vital to generating revenue  179 180
 “Resource boom” refers to a period of dramatic increases in the prices of oil, gas or minerals that creates huge 175
economic rents for governments (Andrew Warner, “Natural Resource Booms in the Modern Era: Is the curse still 
alive?” (2015 November), online: International Monetary Fund <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/
wp15237.pdf> at 4. The most recent resource boom began in the early 2000s and lasted until 2014. Although 
mineral prices declined in 2015-2016, they have increased steadily since 2017 (World Bank, “World Bank 
Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet) (2 April 2019), online: World Bank <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/
895911554230066764/CMO-Pink-Sheet-April-2019.pdf>). 
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(particularly for the African states fiscally dependent on revenues derived from mining),  181
African governments have attempted to reconstitute mining governance over the past 20 years to 
ensure greater shares of mineral wealth. Although these reforms had not been fuelled by the 
intention to reshape mining governance using a rights-based approach to development, the 
principle is evident within the two frameworks discussed below. One of the earliest articulations 
of reshaping states’ relationship with the mining industry was the Protocol on Mining in the 
Southern African Development Community.  
a. The Protocol on Mining in the Southern African Development Community 
 SADC is one of Africa’s many regional economic communities. First established 1980 as 
the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, SADC came into being in 1992 
when Member States adopted the SADC Treaty and transformed the loosely formed regional 
organization into a legally binding entity.  As part of its objective to promote development, 182
growth and poverty alleviation through regional integration, SADC Member States agreed to 
adopt regional standards in 1997 aimed at ensuring that successes in the mining sector would 
contribute to “economic development, alleviation of poverty and an improved standard and 
quality of life throughout the region.”  183
 Signed by 12 of SADC’s 14 Member States (at the time)—including Botswana, South 
Africa and Zambia—the Protocol stipulates legally binding commitments  in a number of areas 184
ranging from environmental protection to occupational health and safety and small scale mining. 
 International Monetary Fund, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Sustaining Growth amid Global Uncertainty” (2012), World 181
Economic and Financial Surveys, online: <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf>.
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Article 2 details general principles outlining the importance of mining to socioeconomic 
development in each Member State: 
2.1. Member State recognize that a thriving mining sector can contribute to economic 
development, alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the standard and quality of life 
throughout the region. 
… 
2.8. Member States shall promote economic empowerment of the historically disadvantaged in the 
mining sector.  
 Additionally, Article 6 mandates that Member States promote private sector participation 
in mining: 
6.1. Member States shall adopt policies that encourage the exploration for and commercial 
exploitation of mineral resources by the private sector. 
6.2. Member States shall undertake to develop a mechanism that will enable the private sector’s 
continued participation in the sector. 
6.3. Member States shall strive to create a conducive environment for attracting local and foreign 
investment to the region and to the mining sector in particular. 
 Beyond these provisions, there are no other expressed commitments to governing the 
mining sector for development. Nonetheless, the Protocol has been the foundation for promoting 
increased regional cooperation on mining, including the 2004 “Harmonization of Mining 
Policies, Standards, Legislative and Regulatory Framework in Southern Africa” (Framework)  185
developed with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to support the Protocol’s 
implementation. Among some of the Framework’s key recommendations related to development 
are in the areas of taxation, mineral beneficiation, participation in ownership, and management 
and governance.  Unfortunately, it is unclear how either the Protocol or the Framework has 186
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contributed to the formation of mining policies in SADC Member States. Regardless, both are 
fundamental to the mining developmental state institutions discussed below in section 3.5.2. 
b. The Africa Mining Vision 
 Like the SADC Protocol and Framework, the AMV was developed under the auspices of 
the African Union because Member States recognized mining’s importance to the socioeconomic 
development.  The AMV has been described by mining governance scholars Hany Besada and 187
Philippe Martin as  
…[advancing] a holistic framework for improving Africa’s mining regimes, focused on balancing 
the requirements of transparency and accountability with the need to integrate mining into Africa’s 
long-term development at the local, national and regional level. Above all, this means transforming 
natural resource capital and ‘transient’ wealth into lasting forms of capital and industrial growth, 
with the ultimate objective of reducing African states’ economic dependence on primary resource 
exports.  188
  
 The AMV intends to promote “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral 
resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socioeconomic development.”  In 189
his article discussing the AMV, Antonio Pedro (the Director of UNECA’s Sub-regional Office for 
Eastern Africa) described the following four “principal opportunities” for the implementation of 
the AMV: 
1. To optimize the capture, management, sharing and use of resource rents to improve 
physical, social and human capital and infrastructure… 
2. The collateral use of the high-rent resource infrastructure to open up other resource 
potential in areas such as agriculture, forestry and tourism and to provide access to zones 
of economic potential with lower returns, but that cannot afford their own infrastructure; 
3. To promote downstream value addition, through the use of the locational advantage of 
producing crude resources, with a view to establishing resource-processing industries… 
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Minerals and Africa’s Development: 187
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4. To promote upstream value-addition, through the use of relatively large resources sector 
market to develop the resource supply and inputs sector.  190
 Although it is not legally binding, the AMV expresses states’ willingness to promote 
long-term development by restructuring mining governance through developmental state 
institutions.  The developmental state structure can assist mining-dependent African states in 191
meeting the commitments outlined in the AMV. The model is not static, nor is there a blueprint 
that can be transplanted to every mining-rich African state.  Instead, the model varies and can 192
be adapted to the different conditions of each state.  However, the model relies extensively on 193
economic developmental state institutions that encourage state-private sector collaboration and 
thus it supports tailored engagement between the state and the private sector across Africa.  The 194
capacity of states and their extractive industries differ across Africa; therefore, the particular 
economic mining developmental states institutions (MDSIs) implemented should depend on a 
state’s fiscal, political and economic position.  
3.5.2. Mining developmental state institutions 
 The varied involvement of Southern African states in mining has led many commentators 
to speculate about how state involvement should be framed. The purpose of this section is 
twofold: first, many Southern African governments have instituted recent reforms to their mining 
sectors that aim to ensure increased economic benefits for the state. These reforms will be 
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situated in the proposed mining developmental state (MDS) framework. Second, given that these 
reforms only respond to economic concerns in the RBAD, this section will also discuss an 
essential institution that expands the MDS beyond solely economic concerns. Before discussing 
these two distinct groups of MDSIs, a graduated model for implementing economic components 
of the MDS is examined.   
a. Implementing economic mining developmental state institutions 
 A gradual approach to implementing economic MDSIs acknowledges the differing 
capacities of Southern African states. It also recognizes the importance of progressive policy 
implementation to further entrenchment and enhancement of the MDS. While developmental 
state literature offers some guidance on possible modes of implementation, its applicability is 
less obvious in contemporary mineral-rich Southern African states that lack the institutional 
frameworks embraced by resource-scarce developmental states. What follows is a tentative 
model for implementing economic MDSIs that is based on two broadly categorized stages of 
mineral development: the early stages, focused mainly on exploration, discovery and initial 
extraction, and the middle to later stages after some economic MDSIs have been entrenched. The 
proposed model is specific to mining and assumes a long resource-horizon;  states facing 195
depleting mineral reserves encounter particular concerns that a burgeoning mineral economy 
does not.  The model is also not specific to a particular mineral. 196
 “Resource horizon” refers to the longevity of a state’s mineral sector and is based on the state’s mineral reserves 195




i. Early stages: exploration, discovery and initial extraction 
 Attracting and incentivizing foreign investment should be a priority for Southern African 
states with growing extractive sectors. Since many Southern African states tend to lack the fiscal 
and structural resources to conduct exploration and production in these early stages, foreign 
extractive companies can be used to commence these extractive activities.  Once minerals are 197
discovered, states can maintain or enhance any incentive regimes used to entice investment in 
order to encourage additional exploration and production. As foreign mining companies become 
profitable, incentives can be progressively removed to generate greater revenue for the state.  198
These funds can then, in turn, be redirected to meet developmental objectives, or can be used to 
enhance future state participation in the mining industry. 
 Partnering with foreign firms is one measure a mineral-rich state can use to attract 
investment. Since the initial costs of mining projects are high, foreign firms can potentially share 
these costs with the state.  In addition to encouraging foreign investment, a joint venture can 199
act as a source of revenue for the resource-rich developmental state. For example, in post-
colonial Botswana, the Khama regime entered into an agreement with De Beers, the world’s 
largest diamond mining company, to establish a joint venture, Debswana, in which the state held 
a 50-percent stake.  Through Debswana, the Botswanan government was able to secure a 200
steady stream of resource revenue, which helped promote early socioeconomic development and 
enhanced the capacity of the state to further participate in the extractive sector. 
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 Establishing a steady revenue stream can also support the operations of “pilot 
institutions”  that are tasked with directing the policy objectives of the developmental state, 201
both inside and outside the extractive sector. These institutions should be given the “power, 
authority, and technical competence.”  to shape the development priorities of the state. 202
Structuring these plans as regularly issued national development plans also fits into the 
progressive model proposed here, as successive plans can take into account any growth achieved 
in the extractive sector.  One example of such an institution is a devoted government ministry 203
or agency, such as Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.  Tasking an 204
institution with shaping the development objectives of the state can ensure any benefits accrued 
from mining are directed to meeting priorities outside the sector, rather than solely being re-
invested in the industry.  
 A separate institution that can be created in the early stage of mining is a state-owned 
enterprise. Although this institution would operate exclusively in the mining sector, it could be 
structured to accrue greater benefits for the state beyond what the fiscal regime alone can 
provide.  Through a state-owned company, the state can directly share in the financial rewards 205
from the sale of minerals, the development of linkages to other sectors and the creation of local 
business opportunities by prioritizing local procurement.  Such entities currently exist in 206
several mineral-rich Southern African states. As revenues increase and capacity improves, the 
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state-owned enterprise should be tasked with a greater role in the production and beneficiation of 
minerals during the middle to later stages of production.  207
 With mining tax rates often set above other sectors, revenue generated once minerals are 
discovered can quickly become a critical source of government income. The newfound wealth 
can greatly support achieving development objectives; however, it can also lead to increased 
reliance on mineral wealth, raising the risks associated with the resource curse.  In an effort to 208
neutralize the impact of the resource curse, an MDS can structure its mining fiscal regime to 
accommodate its level of dependence on mineral revenue, and so mitigate any detrimental 
effects. How this can look depends on the state’s level of dependence.  209
 Mineral-rich Southern African states with a high dependence on mining revenue can 
strive to maintain consistent levels of revenue while also enacting fiscal policies that can help 
reduce dependency long-term. These efforts can consist of both government- and firm-related 
measures. At the government level, the state can direct some revenue to non-mining industries, 
such as agriculture and manufacturing, in order to encourage economic diversification and 
support other exporting sectors of the economy harmed by the effects of Dutch disease. At the 
firm level, the state can provide either fiscal incentives or stipulate contractual provisions, or can 
use a combination of both, to encourage foreign firms to engage in activities that support value-
added production in mining, such as greater downstream activities (which is explained further in 
the next section), many of which will become increasingly important in the middle to later stages 
of resource extraction.  210
 Ibid at 17.207




ii. Middle to later stages 
 An MDS can increase its level of intervention based on related improvements in capacity 
as it continues to engage with private sector entities. At this stage in production, greater focus 
can be paid to harnessing increased levels of local participation in order to ensure transfer of 
foreign technical expertise and knowledge. The purpose of this objective is to support the 
development of local industry to ensure long-term growth and linkages to other local 
industries.  211
 Strengthening linkages should be an important policy objective for resource-rich 
developmental states in the middle to later stages of production. Undertaking such measures can 
help diversify the country’s economy to produce spillovers to other industries and to ensure 
sustainable growth.  These linkages are divided into three clusters: upstream, downstream and 212
side-stream.  Each is discussed in greater detail below, in the section titled “Developing 213
sectoral linkages.” 
 Providing finance is one measure that can secure greater involvement by local firms.  214
Access to finance is a significant obstacle for many local firms in Southern Africa.  An MDS 215
can support local firms once sufficient revenue has been generated from earlier stages. The state 
can provide financing to local firms either through nationally owned banks or the central bank.  216
Securing financing can assist local firms in purchasing the needed technology to compete with or 
act as local suppliers for foreign firms.   217
 Jourdan, supra note 2 at 110, 115.211
 Ibid at 110.212
 Ibid.213
 Botchway & Moudud, “Search”, supra note 45 at 11.214
 World Bank, Africa Development Indicators 2007: Spreading and Sustaining Growth in Africa (Washington, DC: 215
World Bank, 2008) at 131.
 Ibid.216
 Ibid at 12.217
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 To ensure that local firms gain industry knowledge, local content requirements (LCRs) 
can be stipulated in later joint-venture agreements or in national legislation.  These 218
requirements can help promote meaningful employment, as well as support the development 
objectives of an MDS.  More information about local content requirements is discussed in the 219
following section examining economic MDSIs.   
b. Economic mining developmental state institutions 
 Two key themes link the legal reforms discussed below to the MDS framework. First, 
states are intervening to accrue more revenue; the recent increase in commodity prices provided 
an opportunity for mineral-rich states to revise fiscal regimes and amass more mining revenue. 
Generating more revenue can assist Southern African states in directly achieving socioeconomic 
development goals, which is a central tenet of the developmental state. Second, these recent legal 
reforms support continued state involvement in extractive industries through revised 
relationships with the private sector, thus enhancing the opportunity for long-term benefits that 
can contribute to the growth and evolution of mining industries. 
i. Enhancing local participation and content 
 To maximize the benefits of foreign investment in extractive industries, many Southern 
African states have introduced “indigenization and local equity schemes,”  or LCRs. These 220
measures typically demand that “a certain percentage of intermediate goods used in the 
 Thus far, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia 218
have all legislated local content requirements in mining (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Local Content Policies in Minerals-Exporting Countries, Case Studies (2 June 2017) TAD/TC/WP(2016)3/PART2/
FINAL, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/TC/
WP(2016)3/PART2/FINAL&docLanguage=En>.
 Jesse Salah Ovadia, Local Content and the Emergence of the Petro-Developmental State in the Gulf of Guinea 219
(PhD Thesis, York University Graduate Program in Political Science, 2013) at 154 [unpublished].
 Martin Kwaku Ayisi, “The Review of Mining Laws and the Renegotiation of Mining Agreements in Africa: 220
Recent Developments from Ghana” (2015) 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade 467 at 480.
125
production processes … be sourced from domestic manufacturers.”  LCRs can take many 221
forms, including  
mandating foreign firms to give preferences to local suppliers in the procurement of goods and 
services, preferences to local labour in matters of employment and preferences to (or mandatory 
minimum percentages in) the use of local raw materials in production. They may also take the 
form of “price preferences” to domestic firms that participate in government procurement bids, 
“import licensing procedures designed to discourage foreign suppliers, and discretionary 
guidelines that both encourage domestic firms and discourage foreign firms.”  222
 There are several reasons for mineral-rich countries to adopt LCRs. Legal scholar 
Chilenye Nwapi contends that 
[t]hey are undertaken to reduce inequalities faced by domestic companies in relation to foreign 
companies, increase the participation of the national industry in specific sectors of economic 
activity, improve national technological development, create job opportunities for nationals to 
improve their personal income, support economic diversification, promote intersectoral linkages 
and reduce overdependence on one sector by enhancing the value-creating capacity of a particular 
sector, and to enable domestic companies to compete regionally and internationally.  223
 Across mineral-rich African states, specific LCRs undertaken range from local 
employment quotas to the preferential treatment of local companies when procuring goods and 
services. The following table  highlights some of these measures in five countries: 224
 Sherry M Stephenson, “Addressing local content requirements: Current challenges and future 221
opportunities” (2013) 7:3 BIORES, online: <http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/addressing-local-
content-requirements-current-challenges-and-future>.
 Cathleen Cimino, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J Schott, A Proposed Code to Discipline Local Content 222
Requirements, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No PB14-6 (February 2014), online: 
<http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb14-6.pdf> quoted in Chilenye Nwapi, “Defining the ‘Local’ in Local 
Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas and Mining Sectors in Developing Countries” (2015) 8:1 Law and 
Development Review 187 at 191.
 Ibid.223
 a. Burkina Faso: Stéphanie Brabant, “Current Trends in Mining Law and Regulation in West  224
     Africa” (MineAfrica 4th Annual Focus on West Africa Seminar, London, October 2014) at 41.  
     b. Ghana: Robin Bloch and George Owusu, “Linkages in Ghana’s gold mining industry: Challenging the enclave  
     thesis” (2012) 37 Resources Policy 434 at 437.  
     c. Guinea: Republic of Guinea, Ministry of Mines and Geology, “Local content”, online: Republic of Guinea    
     <http://mines.gov.gn/en/priorities/local-content/>; Ana Elizabeth Bastida, “From extractive to transformative   
     industries: paths for linkages and diversification for resource-driven development” (2014) 27:2-3 Mineral  
     Economics 73 at 77.  
    d. Liberia: OECD, supra note 218.  
    e. Tanzania: Mining (Local Content) Regulations GN 3 (2018) made under sections 102 and 112 of the Mining Act  
    (CAP. 123).
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Table 3.1 – List of sample local content requirements 
Country LCRs
Burkina Faso The country’s 2015 Mining Code introduced the following LCR obligations: 
• Preference should be given to local businesses in the procurement of 
goods and services;  
• Local employees should be hired to fill senior executive positions, which 
includes a training program to ensure the progressive replacement of 
foreign staff in senior positions; and  
• Local labour shall be employed in low-skilled jobs.a
Ghana Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act (2006) promotes local participation by:  
• Reserving small-scale mining for Ghanaian citizens;  
• Requiring gold mining companies to give preferential treatment to locally 
made products; and  
• Mandating local labour be recruited, which includes the creation of a 
mandatory training program designed to ensure the progressive 
replacement of foreign staff by local personnel.b
Guinea Guinea’s 2011 Mining Code requires that:  
• Foreign companies must expend a certain percentage on training and 
employment in local communities; 
• Preference must be given to local companies for the procurement of goods 
and services; 
• Feasibility studies must accompany applications for mining concessions 
and permits. The study must specify a plan to support building capacity of 
Guinean small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly those that 
supply goods and services to the industry. A plan for employment 
increased numbers of Guineans, in accordance with requirements state in 
the Mining Code, must also be included.c
Liberia Liberia’s Mining and Minerals Law, 2000 includes the following LCRs: 
• Mining companies are prohibited from employing unskilled foreign 
labour; 
• Preference should be given to employing Liberians; 
• Liberian employees must receive ongoing training in order to qualify for 
skilled, technical, administrative, financial or managerial positions.d
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 The local content requirements in the three case studies, Botswana, South Africa and 
Zambia, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Four to Six. 
ii. Developing sectoral linkages 
 The AMV identified harnessing sectoral linkages as a key area of improvement for 
mining governance. Since mineral endowments are finite, and prone to price volatility, 
integrating the industry into other areas of the national economy can provide long-term benefits 
to mineral-rich countries.  Integration can occur by developing relationships between the 225
extractives sector and other industrial sectors: upstream linkages,  downstream linkages,  and 226 227
sidestream linkages.  Table 3.2 defines each type and gives relevant mining examples: 228
Tanzania Tanzania’s Mining (Local Content) Regulations introduced in 2018 included 
some of the following LCRs: 
• A Tanzanian company should be given first preference in the grant of a 
mining license; 
• Foreign companies must secure a 5 percent equity participation stake of a 
Tanzania company in order to qualify for a mining license (the Minister of 
Minerals may waive this requirement); 
• Licensees must submit a local content plan for approval by the Mining 
Commission before commencing the mining project that specifies the role 
and responsibilities of the Tanzanian company, the equity participation of 
the Tanzanian company, and the strategy for technology and knowledge 
transfer to the Tanzanian company.e
 UNECA/AU, supra note 187 at 101.225
 Jourdan, supra note 2 at 110.226
 Jourdan, supra note 2 at 110; Bastida, supra note 224 at 74; UNECA/AU, supra note 187 at 104.227
 UNECA/AU, supra note 187 at 103, 104, and 106; Jourdan, supra note 2 at 110; Bastida, supra note 224 at 74.228
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Table 3.2 – Definitions of sectoral linkages 
 Many Southern African governments reversed their position on mandating linkages 
development from that in the 1980s when it was thought this requirement could deter foreign 
investment.  Today, supplementary investments that support linkage creation are widespread. 229
Many are infrastructure-focused and require certain investments in transportation networks and 
power grids.  Such measures have been undertaken across Africa in the Democratic Republic 230
Linkage Definition Examples
Upstream The relationships between an 
industry and its suppliers. In mining, 
upstream linkages typically arise 
early in the production process, 
when new “deposits are identified; 
finance is secured; legal and 
permitting issues addressed; plans 
for development and earthworks 
commissioned; and labour, raw 
materials equipment and utilities 
sourced.” (UNECA/AU, at 103).
• Inputs manufacturing (i.e. 
machinery), 
• Engineering, and  
• Financial services.
Downstream Downstream linkages connect 
extracted resources to value-added 
production processes like smelting 
or refining, semi-fabrication, or final 
product manufacturing.
• Value-added resources processing 
(i.e. mineral beneficiation).
Sidestream Sidestream linkages are created 
when mining activities support 
growth in other industries, including 
“financial services, power, logistics, 
communications, skills and 
technology 
development.” (UNECA/A, at 106.)
• Construction, 
• Marketing, and 
• Transport infrastructure.
 UNECA/AU, supra note 187 at 107.229
 Besada & Martin, supra note 176 at 276.230
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of the Congo, Gabon, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.  Zambia’s requirements 231
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
iii. Broader “resource nationalism”   232
 In addition to state efforts to increase local participation and strengthen sectoral linkages, 
Southern African states are inserting themselves in the extractives industry by increasing state 
interests in mining projects; reviewing and renegotiating contracts with foreign investors; and 
reforming fiscal regimes to ensure a greater share of mining revenue. 
 After the period of neoliberal structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s did not yield 
the success Southern African states were expecting, many are now asserting greater roles either 
directly or indirectly through state participation, including equity participation (where 
government acquires a stake in production), service agreements and production-sharing 
agreements.  Additionally, several Southern African states introduced recent changes to their 233
participatory regimes that increased the level of equity participation, installed minimum levels of 
equity participation, and stipulate additional levels of participation are at the discretion of the 
state.  Table 3.3 summarizes some examples from six countries across the continent:  234 235
 Ibid.231
 The characterization of tightening regulation in the extractives industry as “resource nationalism” is problematic 232
for some scholars. Martin Kwaku Ayisi provides a brief overview of this debate in his article, “The Review of 
Mining Laws and the Renegotiation of Mining Agreements in Africa: Recent Developments from Ghana” (supra 
note 220), and concludes that the label “can only obstruct a better understanding of why and how contemporary 
governments are intervening more forcefully in the sector” (at 473). This larger conceptual debate will not be 
discussed further here. 
 Evaristus Oshionebo, “Fiscal regimes for natural resource extraction: implications for Africa’s development” in 233
Francis Botchway, ed, Natural Resource Investment and Africa’s Development (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 
200.
 Stephenson, supra note 221 at 31.234
 i. Côte d’Ivoire: Stephenson, supra note 221 at 35; Ayisi, supra note 220 at 494. 235
ii. Ghana: African Mining Legislation Atlas, online: <https://www.a-mla.org>. 
iii. Guinea: Ayisi, supra note 220 at 480. 
iv. Mali: Stephenson, supra note 221 at 32. 
v. Togo: Stephenson, supra note 221 at 32.
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Table 3.3 – Resource nationalism examples 
 Little research has been conducted to assess the impact of these measures on revenue 
generation and investment decisions. Some of these effects will be considered with respect to the 
three case studies, along with what the resource nationalism measures are in each country and 
how they compare to emerging continental trends. 
3.5.3. Incorporating a rights-based approach to development in the mining 
developmental state 
 The preceding sections examined the configuration of the mining developmental state by 
taking a closer look at possible MDSIs. As previously mentioned, these institutions can inform 
the economic components of the rights-based approach to development and, relatedly, comprise 
institutions in the rights-based approach to mining governance. However, as the rights-based 
Country Resource nationalism measures
Côte d’Ivoire • 10 percent state participation for zero dollars; and  
• Up to an additional 15 percent (unless the state is involved in 
exploration); 
• Increased royalties and tax rates.
Ghana • 10 percent state participation for zero dollars; 
• The state can acquire a share of a mining company for zero dollars 
upon notice from the Minister; 
• Increased royalties and tax rates.
Guinea • The state can acquire interest in a project up to a maximum 
shareholding of 35 percent;  
• 15 percent equity participation available for free upon the issuance of 
a mining licence for bauxite, iron ore, uranium, gold, and diamond 
deposits; 
• Increased royalties and tax rates.
Mali • 10 percent free participation is mandatory;  
• An additional 10 percent participation can be negotiated.
Togo • 10 percent free participation is mandatory;  
• An additional 20 percent participation can be negotiated.
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approach to development connotes, development consists of more than just economic rights. In 
the mining context, concern must also be paid to social rights related to community participation 
in decision-making processes about the location and approval of mining projects.  In 236
international law, the most explicit and robust articulation of participation and consultation in 
mining is through the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). It is generally 
accepted, both under international law and in several countries, that Indigenous peoples should 
be consulted on decisions affecting them and their livelihoods, particularly those concerning 
resource extraction.  It has been recognized under international law in the International Labour 237
Organization’s 1989 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (ILO 169) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
almost 20 years later.  238
 The right to participate in environmental decision-making is also recognized in 
international law. Grouped in a series of “procedural environmental rights” (along with access to 
environmental information and legal redress for environmental harm),  this participatory right 239
is included in Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  and 240
in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
 Damilola Olawuyi, “The emergence of right-based approaches to resource governance in Africa: false start or 236
new dawn?” (2015) 15:2 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 13 at 13.
 James Anaya, “Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights in relation to decisions about natural resource extraction: 237
the more fundamental issue of what rights Indigenous peoples have in lands and resources” (2005) 22:1 Ariz J Int’l 
& Comp L 7 at 7.
 C169 Indigenous and Tribal People Convention, 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into force 2 September 238
1993) [“ILO 169”]; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 
61st Sess, A/Res/61/295 (2007) [UNDRIP].
 Penelope Simons & Lynda Collins, “Participatory rights in the Ontario mining sector: an international human 239
rights perspective” 6:2 JSDLP 177 at 186.
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), (1992) 31 240
ILM 874.
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(Aarhus Convention).  Of these four aforementioned international agreements, only ILO 169 241
and the Aarhus Convention are legally binding; no Southern African state is a signatory to either 
convention, making both agreements inapplicable to the development of participation and 
consultation in mining.  As soft law, the other two agreements could potentially influence the 242
interpretation and implementation of participatory decision-making in Southern Africa. However, 
as Pacifique Manirakiza, the former member of the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights and Chairperson of the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human 
Rights Violations noted, there “is a need for an African human rights perspective in the extractive 
industry.”  The remainder of this section considers how FPIC expresses that perspective in 243
Africa before section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 Several Southern African countries have been reluctant to implement the right 
domestically, despite public support for international statements and agreements incorporating 
FPIC. Eleven African states voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People,  while 13 are parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 244
and Cultural Rights, which first articulated the principles on which FPIC is based. Despite this 
broad endorsement, no state has legislated FPIC for mining projects.  Only two African states245
—Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—have legislated FPIC in any capacity. In 
Liberia, FPIC of the local community must be obtained when forest lands are impacted. 
 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, Public 241
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, UNTS (entered 
into force 30 October 2001).
 ILO 169, supra note 238; Aarhus Convention, ibid.242
 Pacifique Manirakiza, “Towards an African Human rights Perspective on the Extractive Industry” (2013) Loy U 243
Chicago Intl L Rev 1 at 4.
 Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, 244
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe voted in favour of the Declaration (UNDRIP, supra note 238).
 Ricarda Roesch, “The story of a legal transplant: The right to free, prior and informed consent in sub-Saharan 245
Africa” (2016) AHRLJ 505 at 511.
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Similarly, FPIC of Indigenous groups is required for development projects in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  246
  In addition to these two country examples, FPIC has gained increased recognition from 
some African regional organizations since the early 2000s. For example, Article XVII (3) of the 
revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources requires that 
“[t]he Parties … take the measures necessary to enable active participation by the local 
communities in the process of planning and management of natural resources upon which such 
communities depend.”  Out of 44 signatories, only 16 Member States of the African Union 247
have ratified the treaty.  248
 Although it has not been widely adopted across Africa, it has begun to gain traction in 
recent years in various regional agreements and recent case law. At its 51st Ordinary Session in 
2012, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights detailed this expansive approach 
in its Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Natural Resources Governance.  249
According to the Commission, the rights-based approach to mining governance should  
ensure participation, including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision 
making related to natural resources governance; … [and] respect human rights of all and require 
transparent, maximum and effective community participation in a) decision-making about, b) 
prioritization and scale of, and c) benefits from any development on their land or other resources, 
or that affects them in any substantial way.  
In addition to the Commission, participation and consultation in mining was also endorsed in 
several soft law instruments recently concluded by the African Union, including the AMV and 
the AU Model Law for the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders.  In the AMV, 250
 Ibid at 505, 511. 246
 Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (adopted 7 March 2017).247
 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Lesotho, 248
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, and South Africa have ratified the treaty.
 Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Natural Resources Governance, Res 224, ACHPR, 51st Sess 249
(2 May 2012) (emphasis added).
 Roesch, supra note 245 at 505, 510.250
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Member States are encouraged to “ensure broad-based, active and visible involvement of 
affected communities in the approval, planning, implementation, and monitoring of mining 
projects.”  251
 Participatory rights of Indigenous or local communities were considered in two cases 
heard by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: SERAC  and Endorois.  252 253
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also recently released the 2017 decision 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya.  FPIC was not explicitly 254
mentioned in SERAC, although the Commission did hold that the Nigerian government was 
required to conduct environmental and social impact assessments, and to grant the local 
community access to relevant regulatory bodies if the collective right to a satisfactory 
environment is to be met.  Although the Commission and the Court arrived at different 255
conclusions in Endorois and Ogiek, both bodies held that the eviction of Indigenous peoples 
from their ancestral lands without prior consultation was a violation of their rights under the 
ACHRP.  256
 As the highest standard of community participation and consultation, FPIC is 
instrumental to implementing a rights-based approach to mining governance in an MDS. 
Fundamental to any meaningful implementation of FPIC is a determination of what it entails in a 
given community. What would “free, prior, and informed consent look like in a remote 
community governed by customary law? Who may provide “consent” on behalf of that 
 AMV, supra note 178 at 34.251
 SERAC, supra note 74.252
 Endorois, supra note 77.253
 Ogieks, supra note 78.254
 Roesch, supra note 245 at 505, 509.255
 Roesch, ibid, at 519; Ogieks, supra note 78 at para 131.256
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community?  These are all important considerations in the meaningful implementation of a 257
rights-based approach to mining governance. FPIC has yet to be implemented in mineral-rich 
Southern African despite its growing prominence and adoption internationally. Consequently, all 
forms of community participation and consultation (including through environmental and social 
impact assessments) will be considered when the case studies are evaluated in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six.   
3.6. Conclusion: (Re)framing law and governance for mining-led development 
in Africa 
 The primacy of mining and the institutions discussed in the previous two sections 
warrants acknowledging and distinguishing novel forms of law and governance in mining-
dependent states. Since, at its core, the developmental state is concerned with state-led 
socioeconomic growth, it is necessary to conceptualize a new governance framework that is 
better suited to promoting and evaluating mining developmentalism. Section 2.6 in Chapter Two 
captured shortcomings in the contemporary approach to mining governance. The discussion of 
law, development and the developmental state in Chapter Three elucidated different forms of 
governance and the role for law in promoting development. In particular, section 3.5 described 
innovative institutions and offered a new conceptual framework, the rights-based approach to 
mining governance, that could facilitate community-centred mining developmentalism.  
 Daniel Huizenga, “Governing territory in conditions of legal pluralism: Living law and free, prior, and informed 257
consent (FPIC) in Xolobeni, South Africa” (2019) 6:3 The Extractive Industries and Society 711 at 716.
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 Table 3.4 summarizes the differences between the traditional approach described in 
Chapter Two, and proposes three guiding principles for rethinking mining governance for 
development in the MDS:  258
Table 3.4 – Principles for rethinking law and mining governance for development 
 Using the MDS framework explored in section 3.5, all three principles are meant to work 
in tandem to reframe mining developmentalism in a changing world in which African states are 
seeking more meaningful returns from mining. In the MDS, the role of law is to promote 
socioeconomic development through a unique combination of MDSIs that adapts to local 
conditions and circumstances. To ensure the MDS is not impeded by a focus on the form of legal 
institutions, it must also be attentive to their functions. During their research on the new 
developmental state and new state activism (NSA) in Brazil, Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro 
identified four functions for law and legal institutions in the developmental state: (i) 
Traditional approach Principles for rethinking mining 
governance for development in the MDS
Is occupied with designing the right form of 
legal institutions.a
Consideration must be given not only to the 
form of institutions, but also to their 
functions.a,b
Is focused on strengthening the rule of law to 
ensure that good governance policies and 
rules are applied impersonally.a
The role of law matters as much as the rule of 
law.a
Adopts legal transplants imposed by 
exogenous entities to enforce transnational 
good governance norms.c,d
Legal institutions must adapt to changing 
local socioeconomic conditions and 
circumstances.c,d
 Adapted from: aWorld Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (Washington, DC: 258
World Bank, 2017) at 29; bDavid M Trubek, Diogo R Coutinho & Mario G Schapiro, “New State Activism in Brazil 
and the Challenge for Law” in David Trubek et al, eds,  Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian 
Experience in Latin American Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 28 at 54; cMari-Lise du 
Preez, “Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’: Rethinking Natural Resource Governance Theory and 
Practice in Africa” in J Andrew Grant, WR Nadège Compaoré, and Matthew I Mitchell (eds) New Approaches to the 
Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015) 25 at 36; and dPistor & Milhaupt, supra note 18 at 21-23.
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safeguarding flexibility, (ii) stimulating orchestration, (iii) framing synergy, and (iv) ensuring 
legitimacy. Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro elaborated further and described each criterion 
 as follows: 
Safeguarding flexibility means using legal norms to allow room for experimentation, promote 
innovation, and facilitate feedback from experiments to policy. NSA demands legal regimes that 
permit learning-by-doing and encourage path correction…NSA requires that some degree of 
flexibility and learning is ensured to implement initiatives that in most cases do not resemble 
preexisting recipes or strategies… 
Stimulating orchestration means using law to structure state activities for effective new style 
industrial and social policy. This means facilitating coordination and articulation within the state— 
both horizontally (i.e., between entities that belong to the same bureaucratic state level) and 
vertically (i.e. between entities that are subject to hierarchies or belong to different state levels)… 
Framing synergy involves using the law to frame public-private partnerships and ensure they are 
more effective than purely public or private solutions… 
Ensuring legitimacy means keeping government transparent and ensuring adequate participation. 
NSA seems to require a regime in which it is easy for new ideas to percolate and be widely 
shared…  259
Based on the success of the Brazilian experience, these four functions for law can also be used to 
assess the effectiveness of legal institutions in the MDS.   
 In the next three chapters, mining governance in Botswana, South Africa and Zambia will 
be evaluated using the MDS rights-based approach to mining governance proposed in this 
chapter. These analyses will assess: (1) whether each country is a developmental state, using the 
criteria set out above in section 3.3.2; (2) the MDSIs in place in each country and their functions 
based on the Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro framework; and (3) the rights-based approach to 
mining governance present in each country.  
 Trubek, Coutinho & Schapiro, supra note 258 at 55-56.259
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4  Botswana: the Model Mining Developmental State?  1
4.1. Introduction 
 Dubbed the “African miracle”  and “African success story,”  Botswana has achieved 2 3
unparalleled levels of post-colonial socioeconomic development compared to its African 
counterparts: growth in Gross Domestic Product (GPD) from USD $51.5 million at 
independence to over USD $18 billion in 2018; an increase in Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita from estimates of USD $100 at independence to USD $7,750 in 2018; improved life 
expectancy at birth from 52.6 years at independence to 65.8 years in 2015; and a decrease in the 
percentage of the population living in poverty from 59 percent in 1985 to 19.3 percent in 2010.  4
Unlike other mineral-rich states across the continent, however, Botswana’s success was achieved 
despite its mineral wealth—it is regarded as having avoided both the resource curse and poor 
governance that have stunted socioeconomic performance in other mineral-rich African states.  5
Heralded for combatting the resource curse with its sound institutions and governance,  6
 Many parts of this chapter are taken from three articles I published during my PhD: “Conceptualizing the 1
Developmental State in Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa” (2015) 8:2 Law and Development Review 467 
[Ghebremusse, “Conceptualizing”]; “Good Governance and Development in Botswana—The Democracy 
Conundrum” (2018) 11:2 Law and Development Review 913; and “Application of YS Lee’s General Theory of 
Development to Botswana” (2019) 12:2 Law and Development Review 403. They are reprinted here with 
permission of the editors.
 Abdi Ismail Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana 2
Development (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A Robinson, “An African Success Story: Botswana” (2001) MIT 3
Department of Economics Working Paper No. 01-37.
 World Bank, “Botswana Country Profile”, online: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana>.4
 Philippe Martin, “A Closer Look at Botswana’s Development: The Role of Institutions” (2008) 9 Paterson Review 5
35 at 36.
 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3 at 1.6
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Botswana’s socioeconomic success has also been attributed to developmental policies that have 
drawn comparisons with several East Asian developmental states.   7
 Botswana’s abundant mineral wealth directly contributed to the creation and 
sustainability of its developmental state. With the revenue generated from mineral extraction, the 
country had the means to promote employment and industrialization and fund its social 
development goals in healthcare and education. Due to this direct correlation between 
Botswana’s mineral wealth and its developmental state features, this chapter agrees with the near 
scholarly consensus that Botswana is as a developmental state.  In recognition of mining’s role in 8
the creation of Botswana’s developmental state, however, this chapter goes further and describes 
the country as a mining developmental state (MDS) following the criteria established in Chapter 
Three.  Additionally, this chapter further examines Botswana’s iteration of the developmental 9
state by examining whether elements of the governance and institutions attributed to its success 
are compatible with the transnational good governance principles that are regarded as necessary 
for escaping the resource curse. This chapter argues that Botswana’s mining developmental state 
does not conform with the “good governance” norms described in Chapter Two. Instead, the 
success of Botswana’s mining developmentalism is better explained by examining its 
institutional apparatus using the developmental state model described in Chapter Three, and 
considering whether the “legal functionalities” of its mining developmental state institutions 
 Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, “Conclusion: Developmental States and Africa in the Twenty-First 7
Century” in Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of ‘Developmental States’ in Africa: 
Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005); David Sebudubudu, “The Institutional Framework of 
the Developmental State in Botswana” in Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of ‘Developmental 
States’ in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005).
 See Emannuel Botlhale, Pamela Mbabazi, David Sebudubudu and Ian Taylor. The one exception, Ellen Hillbom, 8
and her rationale will be examined in more detail in section 4.3.
 See section 3.5.2.9
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(MDSIs) adhere to David Trubek, Diogo Coutinho and Mario Schapiro’s framework (also 
outlined in Chapter Three).  10
 However, the success of Botswana’s mining developmental state has come at the expense 
of some disadvantaged local communities. Botswana has given little consideration to fully 
implementing a rights-based approach to mining governance by mandating that mining cannot 
proceed without the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of Indigenous peoples and local 
communities. Indigenous peoples, particularly the Basarwa minority,  have been systemically 11
denied land rights and excluded from participating and consulting on mining decisions. 
Moreover, not all Botswanans  have benefited equally from the wealth generated from mining. 12
The country’s high levels of income inequality and unemployment contradict its strong record of 
economic growth and its vast mineral wealth.    13
 To assess Botswana’s characterization as a mining developmental state, this chapter is 
divided as follows: section 4.2 provides an overview of mining and development in Botswana 
from colonialism to the present; section 4.3 describes Botswana’s mining developmental state, 
including its main mining developmental state institutions and applies the legal functionalities 
 David M Trubek, Diogo R Coutinho & Mario G Schapiro, “New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for 10
Law” in David Trubek et al, eds,  Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin 
American Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 28. See section 3.6 for a brief discussion of this 
framework.
 Basarwa, also commonly referred to as the San, are the Indigenous hunter-gather inhabitants of Botswana who 11
mostly reside in the Kalahari and surrounding areas (Ian Taylor & Gladys Mokhawa, “Not Forever: Botswana, 
Conflict Diamonds and the Bushmen” (2003) 102:407 African Affairs 261 at 261). An introduction to the Basarwas 
treatment in Botswana is provided in section 4.2.4. Further discussion of the groups mistreatment in relation to 
Botswana’s mining sector can be found in section 4.4.
 According to both the Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries, the correct term for nationals from Botswana is 12
“Botswanan.” The term “Batswana” is also commonly used by Botswanans. However, the direct translation of that 
term is “people of Tswana,” suggesting that everyone in Botswana is of Tswana descent (Sitinga Kachipande, 
“Botswanan or Batswana? It’s complicated” (August 17, 2015), online: Voices of Africa <https://
voicesofafrica.co.za/botswanan-batswana-its-complicated/>). The term “Botswanan” is used in this dissertation to 
reflect Botswana’s multi-ethnic society.
 Amelia Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, “Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human 13
Rights versus Economic Development” (2010) 19 Transational Law & Contemporary Problems 453 at 458.
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framework to help explain Botswana’s developmental state success; section 4.44 critiques the 
absence of a rights-based approach to mining governance in Botswana. Section 4.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
4.2. Mining and development in Botswana from colonialism to the present 
 Botswana has achieved significant economic growth and development despite its low-
income status when it gained independence from Great Britain in 1966. Its location between 
South Africa and Germany’s South West Africa colony meant Bechuanaland (Botswana’s 
colonial predecessor) mainly served as a buttress to other colonial interests in the region and was 
of little importance to the British Empire.  Britain’s lack of interest in the colony was evident in 14
its minimal investment—the physical infrastructure and political administration in Bechuanaland 
left Botswana with neither a local economy nor an educated bureaucracy  and only 50-60km of 15
paved roads.  Today, Botswana is classified as an upper-middle income country with a GDP of 16
USD $15.5 billion and GDP per capita of USD $7,877.  The annual growth rate  has remained 17
steady over the past decade, averaging 5 percent per annum.  This section explores Botswana’s 18
transformation from a neglected thought in the British Empire to one of Africa’s leading 
economies today. 
 Scott A Beaulier & J Robert Subrick, “The political foundations of development: the case of Botswana” (2006) 14
17:2 Constitutional Political Economy 103 at 108.
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 68.15
 Beaulier & Subrick, supra note 14 at 104.16
 World Bank, “Botswana – Data”, online: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana>; Open Data for Africa, 17
“World GDP per Capita Ranking 2017”, available at: <http://botswana.opendataforafrica.org/sijweyg/world-gdp-
per-capita-ranking-2017-data-and-charts-forecast>.
 World Bank, “Botswana Overview”, online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana/overview>.18
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4.2.1. Britain’s neglected protectorate and its legacy: the colonial and early post-
colonial periods 
 The first recorded peoples in the area that is today known as Botswana were the Basarwa, 
who settled in the region in approximately AD 500.  Other ethnic groups soon followed. It was 19
not until the mid-nineteenth century that political unrest in Southern Africa caused several 
Tswana groups to settle in the area.  The Tswana’s entrenched community structures and 20
institutions were adapted to local conditions by embracing cattle production as the main 
economic driver and source of wealth. These systems, which will be discussed in greater detail 
below, became instrumental in maintaining local hierarchies of power throughout the colonial 
and early post-colonial periods.  21
 To consolidate its territories in Southern Africa and counter any encroachment from the 
Germans to the west (in what is now modern-day Namibia) and the Boers to the south (in what 
became South Africa),  Great Britain demarcated the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885.  22 23
Britain’s interest in the territory as a purely strategic enclave produced a colonial administration 
that failed to disrupt several aspects of traditional Tswana governance. Unlike many of Britain’s 
other African colonies, especially those with large settler populations, Bechuanaland was 
 Ladipo Adamolekun & Philip Morgan, “Pragmatic institutional design in Botswana: Salient features and an 19
assessment” (1999) 12:7 The International Journal of Public Sector Management 584 at 585.
 Ellen Hillbom & Jutta Bolt, Botswana – A Modern Economic History: An African Diamond in the Rough 20
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) at 25.
 Ibid at 26.21
 Adamolekun & Morgan, supra note 19 at 587. Germany consolidated its German South West Africa colony at the 22
1884 Berlin Conference after it had annexed territory along the Namibian coast in the preceding year (Jan-Bart 
Gewald, “Namibia (German South West Africa and South West Africa)” in Dinah L Shelton, ed, Encylopedia of 
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (Detroit, MI: Macmillan, 2005) vol 2 at 721). Dutch settlers in Southern 
Africa, known as Boers, established independent settlements after the British seized control of Cape Colony from 
the Dutch in the early 1800s. Viewing the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State as a threat to its 
territorial control of the Cape–Rhodesia corridor, Britain colonized what became modern day Botswana (“South 
Africa in the 1900s (1900–1917)”, online: South African History online <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-
africa-1900s-1900-1917>.) 
 Monageng Mogalakwe & Francis Nyamnjoh, “Botswana at 50: democratic deficit, elite corruption and poverty in 23
the midst of plenty” (2017) 35:1 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 1 at 1.
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governed by a thin system of indirect rule that utilized traditional sites of authority, notably local 
chiefs and community councils, known as the kgotla.  Traditionally, the kgotla was a form of 24
communal governance that allowed members of a community to discuss matters of concern and 
raise any grievances with local leaders;  it was a forum for leaders to engage directly with their 25
community and offered a way for the community to hold leaders accountable.  Although the 26
British interfered with the selection of chiefs beginning in 1934,  hereditary authority was 27
upheld, which led to the ascendency of Seretse Khama, Botswana’s first president, within pre-
independence governance structures and ultimately in the country’s main political party. Britain’s 
minimal interference in Botswana’s customary institutions sustained traditional systems of power 
by entrenching the political and economic elite, primarily wealthy cattle holders. 
 During the early colonial period, the administration generated income through a dual 
scheme of labour migration and taxation.  Robust agricultural production was not feasible in 28
Botswana due to its dry and arid climate. Nor was an extractive economy possible due to the 
perceived lack of natural resources in the territory. In order to pay the taxes imposed on 
individual households, poor Botwanans were enticed by the employment opportunities available 
in the mines being developed to the south in the territory that eventually became South Africa.  29
Beginning in the 1930s, the colonial administration sought to develop an export economy to 
increase sources of government revenue and to further enhance Britain’s colonial ambition in the 
 Adamolekun & Morgan, supra note 19 at 587.24
 Hillbom & Bolt, supra note 20 at 32.25
 Acemoglu, Simon & Robinson, supra note 3 at 23.26
 Adamolekun & Morgan, supra note 19 at 587.27
 Hillbom & Bolt, supra note 20 at 42.28
 Ellen Hillbom, “Cattle, diamonds and institutions: Main drivers of Botswana’s economic development, 1850 to 29
present” (2014) 26 Journal of International Development 155 at 162.
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region. Since agriculture and mining were not options, the existing cattle economy was identified 
as the industry that could achieve this endeavour.  30
 Botswana’s traditional cattle economy has been traced back 2,200 years.  Its place as the 31
region’s principal industry was due to the abundance of available land for grazing, the minimal 
labour inputs necessary to maintain a herd of cattle and the high value that was placed on cattle.  32
In their studies of Botswana’s economic success, Abdi Ismail Samatar and Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James Robinson alleged cattle was privately held, and this form of 
ownership contributed significantly to the post-colonial institutions that were instrumental to the 
country’s development.  Ellen Hillbom and Jutta Bolt challenged this assertion by arguing the 33
cattle were held communally and that “it was through the sharing of property, rather than 
exclusion based on the private property rights structures, that elites best managed their herds 
while in the meantime putting their capital (cattle) to good use by investing it in the building of 
socioeconomic networks, controlling labour, and securing political power.”   34
 Natural sources of water were insufficient to sustain Botswana’s traditional cattle 
economy. However, once the colonial administration set its sights on an export cattle economy, 
access to water was identified as the main obstacle to expansion. Soon after, colonial efforts were 
directed at drilling boreholes in strategic areas. Once construction was complete, boreholes were 
given to local elites to administer, resulting in an unequal distribution of water resources and 
further entrenchment of power in cattle farming elites.  35
 Ibid at 164.30
 Hillbom & Bolt, supra note 20 at 35.31
 Ibid.32
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 69; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3 at 10.33
 Hillbom & Bolt, supra note 20 at 37.34
 Hillbom, supra note 29 at 166.35
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 Botswana’s colonial political structures were reformed in the years following World War 
II. These reforms were instrumental in subsequently shaping Botswana’s post-colonial politics. 
In 1951, the colonial administration created a Joint Advisory Council that amalgamated separate 
local councils comprised of white settlers and Botswanans. Upon his return to Bechuanaland, 
Seretse Khama (the hereditary chief of the Bangwato, a Tswana-speaking community) took an 
active role in the Council after his exile imposed by the British for marrying a white 
Englishwoman was lifted in 1956.  Both Khama and his uncle, Tshekedi, renounced their claims 36
to the Bangwato chieftainship, which further contributed to Khama’s ascendancy as the head of 
the Bechuanaland Democratic Party’s (later the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)). 
 Before the formation of the BDP, the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) was formed in 1960 
by three Botswanan from traditionally marginalized communities who were migrant workers in 
South Africa.  Influenced by the anti-apartheid struggle that was taking shape in South Africa, 37
these three men established the BPP as a militant party that was vehemently opposed to “colonial 
rule and its attendant racial discrimination.”  The BPP’s focus on economic injustice was 38
popular among the rural poor. To combat the radical BPP, white settlers and colonial 
administrators encouraged the creation of the more moderate BDP, which was formed two years 
later with Khama as its leader. BDP’s conservatism and Khama’s popularity attracted a range of 
members from across the country, including civil servants, local chiefs and the working poor.  39
 Khama was studying in Britain when he met his wife, Ruth Williams. Their marriage angered both Khama’s 36
uncle, Tshekedi, who was the acting chief in Khama’s absence, and the emerging apartheid regime in South Africa, 
which opposed the inter-racial marriage and led Britain to impose the ban in an effort to placate the South Africans 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3 at 14).
 Christian John Makgala & Mokganedi Zara Botlhomilwe, “Elite interests and political participation in Botswana, 37




With this widespread support, the BDP won Botswana’s first elections in 1965 and formed 
government, with Seretse Khama as president when the country gained independence on 
September 30, 1966.  40
 The promise of independence quickly thrust President Khama into a development-
focused nation-building project, even though Botswana was poor. Samatar has detailed 
Botswana’s “shallow financial base from which to launch a development program,” as well as its 
“[dependence] on [Britain’s] financial support to balance its annual budget.”  The shortage of 41
employment opportunities in the country further impeded its development prospects at 
independence.  Despite the significant obstacles the country’s new leadership faced in 1966, 42
they embarked on an ambitious development agenda that aimed to improve socioeconomic 
conditions. Remarking on Botswana’s status at independence on its tenth anniversary, the new 
president Seretse Khama said 
When we attained independence in 1966 we had no economic base from which to proceed with the 
development of our country. Our chances of survival as a viable country were almost nil but we were 
not discouraged nor could we ever willingly return to the old days of colonial neglect. Having 
accepted the challenges of independence we had no other alternative but to get down to work to make 
our independence a meaningful one.  43
Thus, “the very process of nation-building after independence took on a nature that was inspired 
by the fundamental task of development.”  44
 Ibid.40
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 63.41
 Ibid at 64.42
 Ian Taylor, “Botswana’s Developmental State and the Politics of Legitimacy” in Graham Harrison, ed, Global 43
Encounters: International Political Economy, Development, and Globalization (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 41 at 45 [Taylor, “Politics of Legitimacy”].
 Ibid.44
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4.2.2. Avoiding the “lost decade” and structural adjustment: 1980s–1990s 
 Unlike its African counterparts, the discovery of diamonds set Botswana on a course of 
economic growth throughout the late 1970s and into the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, 
Botswana’s economy was one of the fastest-growing in the world—outpacing even the East 
Asian Tigers and developmental states—with an average annual GDP growth rate of 7 percent.  45
Botswana’s extraordinary economic growth was due almost exclusively to diamonds: Figure 4.1, 
taken from Hillbom, illustrates the changing face of Botswana’s economy from independence 
into the 2000s. As the table shows, agriculture as a share of Botswana’s GDP declined steadily 
since diamond mining began in 1968. Over this same period, diamond mining’s share in GDP 
(captured under the “Industry” category) grew as agricultural value-added declined.  46
Figure 4.1 – Botswana’s “Agriculture and Industry, value added (% of GDP) 1960–2011” 
 
(Hillbom, “Cattle, diamonds and institutions: Main drivers of Botswana’s economic development, 1850 to 
present” at 170). 
 J Clark Leith, Why Botswana Prospered (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2005) at 4. From 1974-1985, Botswana’s 45
average GDP growth rate was even higher at 11 percent, making it one of the highest in the world during that time 
(Kenneth Good, "Democracy and development in Botswana” (2017) 35:1 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 
113 at 115).
 Hillbom, supra note 29 at 169.46
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 The growth in Botswana’s diamond production also contributed to the country’s 
increased reliance on diamond revenue. Ten years after the Orapa Mine was established, 
Debswana launched the Jwaneng Mine, which began production in 1982, in southern Botswana. 
Eventually nicknamed the “Prince of Mines,” Jwaneng became the most productive diamond 
mine in the world.  47
 Due to its stable economic performance, Botswana managed to avoid any interference 
from the Bretton Woods Institutions wishing to use the politics of conditionality to impose 
structural adjustment programs and expand the influence of Washington Consensus neoliberal 
policies. Ultimately, Botswana dodged the “lost decade” that saw the reversal of post-colonial 
economic progress in many other African countries.  However, Botswana’s growth came at a 48
cost: economic success was credited to the BDP and elites within the party as architects of the 
country’s development, making them almost immune to critique and entrenching them in 
government for decades to come.  49
4.2.3. The “good governance” champions: early 2000s to the present 
 In the wake of Africa’s lost decade and the emergence of the resource curse theory, 
academics began studying Botswana to better understand its success and how it escaped the 
curse. Development economists like J. Clark Leith (Why Botswana Prospered)  and Acemoglu, 50
Johnson and Robinson (“An African Success Story”),  and geographer Samatar (An African 51
 Peter Guest, “Inside the world’s richest diamond mine” (December 3, 2015), online: CNN <https://www.cnn.com/47
2015/12/03/africa/botswana-diamonds-jwaneng/index.html>.
 Fadekemi Abiru, “Africa’s Lost Decade” (September 25, 2018), online: The Republic <https://48
www.republic.com.ng/augustseptember-2018/africas-lost-decade/>.
 One vocal critic, Kenneth Good, who has consistently challenged the narrative that Botswana is an African 49
“success story” and “miracle,” described this period as “the origins of [the] elitist perambula” (Good, supra note 45 
at 115).
 Leith, supra note 50.50
 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3.51
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Miracle)  all conducted in-depth investigations into Botswana’s colonial and post-colonial 52
history, its diamond industry and its contemporary political economy. Samatar and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson concluded that Botswana’s institutions—many of which survived the 
country’s colonial encounter with the British—and its political leadership were critical to 
directing diamond wealth towards meeting its development objectives.  According to Leith, 53
these institutions spared the country from suffering the same economic and political symptoms 
of the resource curse—including Dutch disease, corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and civil 
conflict—that plagued several African countries.  Botswana has been the longest continuous 54
multi-party democracy in Africa.  Although the BDP has dominated the country’s politics since 55
independence, having formed the government after each election, no BDP president has sought 
to serve beyond the constitutional two-term limit introduced in 1997.  Botswana’s 56
socioeconomic success, which is often compared to the East Asian Tigers discussed in section 
3.3.1, has led other academics to unequivocally characterize Botswana as a developmental 
state.  57
 Research from Leith, Samatar and Acemoglu made Botswana a darling of “good 
governance” discourse on Africa. The country was seldom a target of policy conversations 
related to mining transparency, accountability or the rule of law. In fact, during negotiations in 
 Samatar, supra note 2.52
 Ibid; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3.53
 See section 2.3 for a general discussion of the resource curse in Africa.54
 Sebudubudu, supra note 7 at 79.55
 “Botswana Profile – Timeline”, online: BBC <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13041658>. Only 56
Botswana’s first two presidents—Seretse Khama and Quett Masire—served longer than 10 years, and their tenures 
were peaceful and were not marred by the coups and civil disruption that afflicted many other African rulers in the 
early post-colonial period. Coups d’état were common occurrences in post-colonial Africa. Several leaders, 
including Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Patrice Lumamba in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Milton Obote in 
Uganda, Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria were overthrown in coups. 
Many, like Lumamba and Sankara, were also assassinated. 
 See note 8.57
150
2001 to finalize the Kimberley Process (KP), the main diamond mining transparency mechanism, 
the Government of Botswana heralded its success under the banner “Diamonds for 
Development” as a way to distinguish its “clean” diamonds from the conflict, or blood, diamonds 
that were the impetus for launching the Process.  Fiver years after the campaign was launched 58
and Botswana was the Chair of the Process, then-president Festus Mogae further championed 
Botswana’s diamond-led development during an interview with former US diplomat, Richard 
Holbrooke, at the Council on Foreign Relations in October 2006 by highlighting: the numbers of 
Botswanans employed in the industry, improvements in literacy, easy access to health facilities 
for most citizens, increased access to clean water for rural communities and free antiretroviral 
therapy for HIV/AIDs patients.  59
 The KP was the only transnational transparency mechanism that Botswana joined in the 
early 2000s as it and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) became the 
standard-bearers of mining transparency. Despite publicly committing to joining the EITI on 
multiple occasions in the early 2000s,  Botswana has yet to do so and shows no signs of 60
subscribing to the initiative in the near future.  Nonetheless, Botswana’s government has made 61
meaningful commitments to transparency and accountability in national policy, notably in 
National Development Plan 11 (April 2017–March 2023) (NDP 11).  Botswana’s National 62
Development Plans (which are discussed in greater detail below in section 4.3) outline the 
 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 11 at 272. 58
 “Diamonds for Development” (October 10, 2006), online: Council on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/59
event/diamonds-development>.
 Keith Jefferis, “The role of TNCs in the extractive industry of Botswana” (2009) 18:1 Transnational Corporations 60
61 at 77.
 EITI, “Implementation status”, online: EITI <https://eiti.org/countries>.61
 Government of Botswana, National Development Plan 11 - Volume 1 (April 2017 - March 2023), online: Ministry 62
of Finance and Economic Development <https://www.finance.gov.bw/images/NDP_11_2017-2023.pdf>. 
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country’s national development objectives and strategies across all industries and social sectors. 
In NDP 11, Botswana’s government detailed a commitment to promoting transparency and 
accountability as “a key dimension of democratic governance”  and improved citizen 63
participation: 
During NDP 11, efforts will be made to increase Government’s ability and capacity to provide 
information about Government business across all sectors to encourage more effective and 
accountable institutions and better outcomes for citizens … Citizen participation and transparency 
would assist citizens to inform the decision-makers, by making sure they have the necessary and 
accurate information to influence policy formulation, improvement of service delivery, and 
management of national resources for the benefit of all, including poverty eradication.  64
To achieve these objectives, Botswana’s government committed to introducing two new audits: 
forensic and environmental audits. The forensic audits would be designed to help combat 
corruption and strengthen accountability in government spending, while the environmental audits 
would improve compliance and support achieving the sustainable development goals.  Thus far, 65
there is no available public information about the implementation of these audits and other 
transparency and accountability measures have yet to be released by the government. 
 Botswana’s strong mining governance record was also reflected in the 2017 Resource 
Governance Index (RGI), which ranked the country 18th of 89 assessments with a composite 
score of 61 out of a possible 100 points.  Compared to the previous RGI, Botswana’s score 66
increased by 14 points from 47 out of 100 points and a rank of 30 of 58 countries.  Botswana’s 67
high score was due to the positive assessment of its enabling environment and revenue 
 Ibid at Section 8.85.63
 Ibid at Section 8.86.64
 Ibid at Section 8.87.65
 2017 Resource Governance Index, “Botswana”, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute <https://66
resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/BWA/mining>.
 2013 Resource Governance Index, “Botswana”, online: Natural Resource Governance Institute <https://67
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/country_pdfs/botswanaRGI2013.pdf>.
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management, although it scored poorly in open data and licensing transparency.  Significant 68
changes were made to the RGI’s components from its 2013 to 2017 indices; therefore it is 
difficult to concretely say if the higher score was due to improvements in governance or changes 
to the evaluation method. 
 In contrast to its hesitancy to join the EITI, Botswana is a party to several regional and 
continental efforts to reform mining-led development prospects, in addition to a number of 
human rights treaties. Through the African Union, Botswana is a member of the Africa Mining 
Vision.  Botswana is also signatory to the Southern African Development Community’s 69
Protocol on Mining.  Additionally, Botswana is a party to the African Charter on Human and 70
Peoples’ Rights.   71
 Despite its well-regarded reputation in many international mining governance policy 
circles, several critics of Botswana’s government are quick to pinpoint numerous flaws in the 
country’s development record, which are discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
4.2.4. Flaws in the “African success story”: Botswana’s development failings 
 One of the main critiques of Botswana’s development record is its deficient and 
paradoxical democracy. Since its independence, Botswana has maintained strong democratic 
institutions that have withstood the challenges other countries have faced, including many of its 
SADC partners: Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, South Africa and 
 2017 Resource Governance Index, supra note 66.68
 African Union, Africa Mining Vision (February 2009), online: Africa Mining Vision <http://69
www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf>.
 Southern African Development Community (SADC), Protocol on Mining in the Southern African Development 70
Community (September 1997), online: SADC <https://www.sadc.int/files/3313/5292/8366/
Protocol_on_Mining.pdf>.
 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986 .71
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Zimbabwe have all experienced various forms of political conflict and unrest over the past sixty 
years. Botswana is regarded as one of Africa’s most stable democracies, frequently ranking at the 
top of African democratic indicator rankings, including the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance.  Free and fair parliamentary elections have been held every five years since 72
independence.  However, beyond the regular elections, there are few opportunities for 73
Botswanans to participate in democratic processes.  
 Additionally, the BDP has held a monopoly on political power, having won every single 
election since independence with little competition from the opposition.  Critics have argued 74
that the country is not a democratic developmental state, but rather an authoritarian state that 
suppresses public criticism and restricts participation of other political parties through covert 
mechanisms.  The BDP’s stranglehold on power has been attributed to the “unity of a small 75
dominant class” ; its leadership continues to rule Botswana with no oversight or accountability 76
from parliament.  Based on the thick-thin description of the democratic spectrum discussed in 77
section 2.4, Botswana at best could be characterized as a “minimalist democracy”  that falls 78
along the thin half of the spectrum. However, similar to some of the East Asian developmental 
 In the 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Botswana ranked eighth out of 54 countries for “Participation”, 72
the category that best represented democratic participation (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, online: <http://
iiag.online>.
 Cook & Sarkin, supra note 13 at 461.73
 Ibid.74
 Ibid at 475.75
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 69.76
 Emmanuel Botlhale, “Accountability and Democracy” in Karin Alexander & Gape Kaboyakgosi, eds, A Fine 77
Balance: Assessing the Quality of Governance in Botswana (Pretoria: Idasa, 2012) 53 at 55-56.
 Gape Kaboyakgosi & Keneilwe Marata, “Introduction” in Karin Alexander & Gape Kaboyakgosi, eds, A Fine 78
Balance: Assessing the Quality of Governance in Botswana (Pretoria: Idasa, 2012) 2 at 4.
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states like Singapore and South Korea, Botswana’s high levels of economic growth through 
“authoritarian liberal” structures is often reluctantly credited to its deficient democracy.  79
 Critics of Botswana’s development record also point to the country’s unequal distribution 
of wealth and the human rights abuses carried out against Indigenous communities, notably the 
Basarwa.  Despite decades of steady economic growth, Botswana’s poverty and unemployment 80
rates remain high.  Critics argue that the country’s elites disproportionately benefitted from the 81
mining wealth generated from the government’s partnership with De Beers.  Although diamond 82
revenues were consistently directed towards social and infrastructure development—Botswana 
did not suffer the same levels of corruption and rent-seeking present in other resource-rich 
African countries—critics argued the industry did little to support local communities and provide 
more employment opportunities.  For decades, the only available jobs in the industry were 83
diamond extraction; the process is capital intensive, and few linkages existed at either the 
upstream or downstream stages of the value chain.  Despite recent diversification in the industry 84
(discussed in greater detail in section 4.3.2), Botswana’s unemployment rate remains around 20 
percent, which is almost double the rate in countries with similar income levels.   85
 Ian Taylor, “As Good as it Gets? Botswana’s ‘Democratic Development’” (2003) 21:2 Journal of Contemporary 79
African Studies 215 at 216; Kaboyakgosi & Marata, supra note 78 at 4.
 The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the adult population (currently 22.8 percent, which is the third highest 80
globally behind Eswatini (Swaziland) and Lesotho (“Prevalence of HIV, total”, online: World Bank <https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/sh.dyn.aids.zs?most_recent_value_desc=true>) is regarded by many observers as 
another blemish on Botswana’s development record (Cook & Sarkin, supra note 13 at 485). Botswana has 
responded to the crisis and currently provides anti-retroviral treatment to 84 percent of people living with HIV/AIDS 
(“Botswana”, online: UNAIDS: https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/botswana>). The Government 
of Botswana contends this provision would not have been possible but for its mining revenue (see “Diamonds for 
Development”, supra note 59). Consideration of this aspect of Botswana’s social development is outside the scope 
of this chapter’s focus and will not be discussed in greater detail.
 Cook & Sarkin, supra note 13 at 487.81
 Ibid at 464.82
 Ibid at 480.83
 Jefferis, supra note 60 at 72.84
 Stephanie Hanson, “Botswana: An African Success Story Shows Strains” (December 19, 2007), online: Council 85
on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/botswana-african-success-story-shows-strains>.
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 Further concerns with the lack of widespread benefits from mining and the effects of the 
government’s close relationship with De Beers were raised in a 2009 report by the Bench Marks 
Foundation.  The report was critical of the environmental and community impact of diamond 86
mining’s operations, specifically criticizing the prominence of the relationship at the expense of 
the country’s “communities, human rights, the environment and sustainable local economic 
development.”  David van Wyk, the author, maintained that these concerns could only be 87
addressed if the government took the necessary steps to “assert its own independence and 
responsibility not just to [De Beers], but to the people of Botswana as a whole.”  For this to 88
occur, investigative journalist and political activist Khadija Sharife suggests the corporate 
partnership that has generated so much of Botswana’s growth, Debswana, must be critically 
restructured to ensure greater benefits from mining are directed to the country’s poorest.  With 89
its most recent Gini index of 53.5,  Botswana ranks as the fourth most unequal country in the 90
world.  91
 The aforementioned development failings have disproportionately affected Botswana’s 
marginalized Indigenous peoples who have routinely been excluded from the country’s mining-
led development.  Botswana’s Indigenous peoples are among the world’s poorest, an issue that 92
 David van Wyk, “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Diamond Mining Industry in Botswana - SADC Research 86
Report Policy Gap 5” (2009), online: Bench Marks Foundation <http://www.bench-marks.org.za/research/
botswana_edit_fina_dvw.pdf>.
 Ibid at 7.87
 Ibid.88
 Khadija Sharife, “Flaws in Botswana’s Diamond Industry” (2016) 33:2 World Policy Institute 77 at 81.89
 The Gini index measures income inequality in a country by providing an indication of how income is distributed. 90
It is measured from 0, in which everybody is equal, to 100, which reflects perfect inequality (“Glossary of Statistical 
Terms”, online: OECD <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4842>.)
 “Inequality index: where are the world’s most unequal countries?”, online: The Guardian <https://91
www.theguardian.com/inequality/datablog/2017/apr/26/inequality-index-where-are-the-worlds-most-unequal-
countries>.
 Since much of this mistreatment was a direct consequence of Botswana’s mining regime, more details are 92
discussed further in section 4.4, in which the absence of a rights-based approach to Botswana’s mining governance 
is explained.
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has been directly attributed to the government’s systemic efforts to exploit and plunder their 
resources.  The government’s past mistreatment was rooted in its official position that all 93
Botswanans are “[I]ndigenous and deserve equal treatment,”  despite historical records that 94
show Botswana’s Indigenous peoples pre-date the majority Tswana and have experienced 
discrimination and marginalization based on their status.  The government has only been willing 95
to recognize the country’s Indigenous peoples as marginalized minority groups that possess 
unique cultural and linguistic attributes.  Contrary to the government’s position, however, 96
Indigenous peoples in Botswana have self-identified as such, the Basarwa being the largest 
population.  Their position in Botswana society has led many international actors—including 97
the United Nations Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights—to acknowledge and recognize the Basarwa as Indigenous peoples deserving of the 
rights afforded to Indigenous peoples under international human rights law.   98
 Despite its development failings, Botswana continues to be heralded as the African 
miracle and success story by international and regional bodies that evaluate governance in 
 Motsomi Ndala Marobela, “The State, Mining and the Community: The Case of the Basarwa of the Central 93
Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana” (2010) 43:1 Labour, Capital and Society 137 at 138.
 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities - Republic of 94
Botswana, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 38th Ordinary Session (21 November - 5 December 
2005) at 81 [“AfCHPR Report”].
 Most sources that recognize Botswana’s Indigenous peoples, including academic and international sources, rely 95
on their status as first peoples in the region along with their historical experience of discrimination and 
marginalization as a minority group to define their indigeneity (see Marobela, supra note 93; AfCHPR Report, supra 
note 94; and Anaya, infra note 96). As discussed in section 3.5.3, recognizing indigeneity in Africa is a complex 
legal and political issue.
 James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 96
Indigenous people, Addendum – The situation of Indigenous peoples in Botswana, A/HRC/15/37/Add.2, UNHRC (2 
June 2010) at 1.
 AfCHPR Report, supra note 94 at 27.97
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Africa.  The following section conducts an in-depth examination of the mining developmental 99
state institutions that contributed to Botswana’s success.  
4.3. Botswana’s mining developmental state 
Academics across multiple social science disciplines have widely accepted Botswana’s 
characterization as a developmental state.  Ellen Hillbom, an associate professor of economic 100
history at Lund University and the author of several journal articles and books about economic 
development in Botswana, is the only exception. She has argued that Botswana is best 
understood as a “development-oriented gate-keeping state.”  Hillbom coined the term to 101
distinguish Botswana’s economic success—that relied on mining, lacked diversification and was 
institutionally dependent on a close relationship between government and wealthy elites—from 
the model that led growth in East Asia.  Her use of the term “gate-keeping state” is borrowed 102
from historian Frederick Cooper, who developed the concept in his book, Africa Since 1940: The 
Past of the Present.  By adopting Cooper’s conceptualization of the African state, Hillbom 103
argued that Botswana’s socioeconomic development was rooted in a state structure that was 
extractivist and dependent on institutions that entrenched the state as the principal agent of 
development.  Although Hillbom attempted to offer a different model to evaluate Botswana’s 104
development, her assessment neglected the emergence of an African developmental state “that 
 See the World Bank and Ibrahim Index of African Governance.99
 Mbabazi & Taylor, supra note 7; Peter Meyns & Charity Musamba, “The Developmental State in Africa: 100
Problems and Prospects” Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF-Report, 
101/2010);  Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa” (2001) 25 Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 289;  Ian Taylor, “Botswana as a ‘Development Oriented Gate-Keeping State’: A Response” (2012) 
111 African Affairs 466.
 Ellen Hillbom, “Botswana: a development-oriented gate-keeping state” (2011) 111:442 African Affairs 67-89 101
[Hillbom, “Gate-keeping”].
 Ibid at 67.102
 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).103
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seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the test of economic 
development,”  which Thandika Mkandawire encouraged in “Thinking about developmental 105
states in Africa.” Much like the commonly accepted developmental states of East Asia, Botswana 
has directed significant government resources at promoting socioeconomic development since 
independence, when it was was one the world’s poorest countries with a per capita income of 
approximately USD $80.   106
In my 2015 Law and Development Review article “Conceptualizing the Developmental 
State in Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa,” I argued that Botswana is one of two 
developmental states in Africa because its post-colonial socioeconomic transformation was state-
led and was attributable to the developmental state mechanisms briefly described in Chapter 3: a 
development-oriented political leadership willing to intervene in the economy; an autonomous 
and effective bureaucracy; a production-oriented private sector; and performance-oriented 
governance.  This section elaborates on this point further to explain Botswana’s developmental 107
state structures in general terms, then considers Botswana’s specific mining developmental state 
institutions in greater detail to support my assertion that Botswana is a mining developmental 
state. 
4.3.1. Botswana: an African developmental state 
 Before examining how Botswana’s developmental state conforms to the criteria described 
in Chapter 3, it is helpful to understand the country’s legal and political structure, which are the 
focus of the ensuing analysis. As discussed in Chapter 1, “law” in the context of African law and 
 Mkandawire, supra note 100 at 291 (emphasis in the original).105
 Sebudubudu, supra note 7 at 82.106
 Ghebremusse, “Conceptualizing”, supra note 1 at 484.107
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development comprises various sources, including international and transnational law and legal 
norms, state law, and customary law.  In the following analysis of Botswana’s mining 108
developmental state, state law (and the contracts derived from legislative authority) are the 
exclusive focus for three reasons. First, Botswana adopted a Westminster democratic system 
similar to Great Britain’s, in which the power to make law rests with two key branches of the 
state: parliament and the executive.  Botswana’s parliament consists of a unicameral assembly 109
that is responsible for debating and passing laws “for the peace, order, and good government of 
Botswana.”  The executive branch, made up of the president, vice-president and cabinet, also 110
possesses constitutionally granted law-making powers.  Unlike some other Westminster-style 111
democracies in the British Commonwealth, however, greater power rests with the executive to 
challenge laws proposed by parliament: the president can withhold signing bills, which results in 
their return to the assembly.  As a result of this power imbalance, Botswana’s president has 112
been a critical figure in the country’s nation-building project.   
 Secondly, Botswana’s socioeconomic development has been a state-led project since 
independence. The state’s role has often been compared to East Asian Tigers like South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore: the Botswana government deliberately implemented developmental 
institutions that guided the nation’s economic growth.  Botswana transformed from one of the 113
world’s poorest countries in 1966 to an upper-middle income country today, with a gross national 
 See section 1.3. 108
 Beaulier & Subrick, supra note 14 at 109.109
 Constitution of Botswana, 1966, s. 86. 110
 Ibid, ss. 47, 49-50.111
 Beaulier & Subrick, supra note 14 at 109.112
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income (GNI) per capita of USD $6,760 in 2016.  Like the East Asian Tigers, similar 114
developmental state structures were critical to Botswana’s transformation: a development-
oriented political leadership willing to intervene in the economy, an autonomous and effective 
bureaucracy, a production-coordinated private sector, and performance-oriented governance.   115
 Third, the early relationship formed between the national government and the private 
sector, namely the De Beers Group, was one of the key features of Botswana’s developmental 
state. Soon after independence, the Government of Botswana partnered with De Beers to develop 
the country’s first diamond mine,  which eventually led to the creation of Debswana.  116 117
Consequently, the contracts and other legislatively authorized binding agreements that framed 
this public-private partnership are the third consideration in the “law” contemplated in 
Botswana’s mining developmental state. 
 Despite the focus on state law, it is important to note that customary law and traditions 
continue to influence the law-making process in Botswana. For example, although this 
minimizes the dominance of elites in the BDP and the power they wield when shaping 
government direction, several scholars trace the broad-based participation and consensus-driven 
approach commonly used in Botswana’s contemporary legislative process to the traditional 
political customs that were in place during colonial rule.  Due to Britain’s relatively weak 118
colonial administration in Botswana, governance was less hierarchical and included more space 
 World Bank, supra note 4. For much of the past 20 years, Botswana’s annual GNI either surpassed or was level 114
with the average GNI for upper middle income countries as classified by the World Bank. Of course, an economic 
indicator such as the GNI does mask the significant wealth gap that exists in Botswana. See World Bank Data 
available online at https://data.worldbank.org.
 Meyns & Musamba, supra note 100 42.115
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for traditional rulers (the chiefs) in decision-making.  This practice continued after 119
independence, with slight variations to account for the prominent role of the bureaucracy and 
evolving elite interests.  According to Scott A. Beaulier and J. Robert Subrick, the successful 120
integration of customary practices into Botswana’s modern institutions helped to explain the 
legitimacy and strong public support for Botswana’s democratic institutions, including its 
political leadership.  121
a. Development-oriented political leadership 
 Visionary leadership was decisive to setting and maintaining Botswana on its 
developmental course after it gained independence in 1966. A strong central government was 
critical for President Khama because it limited the influence of non-government actors on the 
decision-making process.  Early on during colonial rule, the British Protectorate’s 122
administration decentralized some decision-making power to wealthy, cattle-owning chiefs in an 
effort to maintain a semblance of traditional authority, but ultimately created divisive, conflicting 
interests within the country.  To avoid perpetuating this division, the BDP adopted the 123
methodology used by the Protectorate Administration in its final years of existence: centralized 
development planning.  124
 Independence raised the challenge of unifying the country around a common agenda 
while appeasing the traditional political and economic elite without granting them any control or 
diminishing central government authority through their influence. President Khama's vision for a 
 Ibid.119
 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3 at 3.120
 Beaulier & Subrick, supra note 14 at 109.121
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strong central government respected the influence of traditional rulers but purposefully made 
them less powerful by not creating a constitutionally mandated role for them.  The Botswana 125
constitution vested greater decision-making power with a small group of leaders—namely, the 
president and cabinet—who faced little to no opposition in carrying out their economic and 
political objectives from the legislature.  Despite purposefully situating power in a small sector 126
of the state, making it potentially vulnerable to elite capture, President Khama appeased elite 
interests by focusing early national development planning on the concerns of rural areas, the 
richest at the time.  Identifying common interests between elites and senior government 127
officials translated into directing collective efforts towards national development rather than self-
enrichment.  Leith contends this was due to “mostly homogenous”  interests that “were based 128 129
on cattle, thereby creating an overwhelming encompassing interest.”  Coincidentally, elites in 130
government made use of the policy and legislative process to move the developmental project 
forward by providing public goods and investment in rural health, infrastructure, and 
education.   131
 To further centralize economic power in the state, President Khama proposed vesting 
mineral rights in the state rather than individual communities in the year before independence. 
He declared in the Bechuanaland Democratic Party’s 1965 Election Manifesto that 
“[c]onsequently leaving mineral rights vested in tribal authorities and private companies must 
necessarily result in uneven growth of the country’s economy, as well as deprive the Central 
 Adamolekun & Morgan, supra note 19 at 588.125
 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3 at 15.126
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Government of an important source of revenue for developing the country.”  This policy 132
proposal soon became entrenched in legislation following independence in section 3(1) of the 
country’s first Mines and Minerals Act, 1967.  133
 In addition to vesting mineral rights in the national government, President Khama’s 
government moved quickly to foster further benefits from potential mineral resources. Although 
industrial mining had not yet occurred in the country before independence, it was believed that 
large deposits of diamonds, copper and coal existed within Botswana.  The BDP sought to 134
continue exploration efforts but lacked the human or economic resources to do so. As Samatar 
succinctly described, Botswana’s prospects at independence seemed dismal: it was “an 
impoverished society” that “lacked two main ingredients necessary to transform its economy…
educated and skilled labour and immediately exploitable natural resources.”  135
 President Khama and the BDP did not have to wait long to begin exploiting the country’s 
mining potential—to encourage mining, Botswana entered into a strategic partnership with De 
Beers, the world’s leading diamond mining company, soon after diamonds were discovered at 
Orapa in central Botswana in 1968.   It was only after four years of development and a USD 136
$33 million investment that diamonds were first extracted at the Orapa Mine.  Debswana 137
generated significant revenue for the state, which was then redirected to infrastructure projects 
 Leith, supra note 45 at 60. 132
 Mines and Minerals Act, 1967.133
 Jefferis, supra note 60 at 62 and 65.134
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and funding for much needed social services like health and education.  The government’s 138
partnership with De Beers has remained a critical component of Botswana’s mining 
developmental state. 
President Khama’s early commitment to social and economic development continued 
through the government’s formalization of development planning via the National Development 
Plans (NDPs). Development planning was conducted at the highest levels in the Vice-President’s 
office, where the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) was housed.  Quett 139
Masire’s leadership role in Seretse Khama’s government as Vice-President, and later as his 
successor, was critical to sustaining the long-term success of the NDPs development and 
implementation process.  In addition to Vice-President Masire, the country’s autonomous 140
bureaucratic institutions were critical to shaping and implementing Botswana’s development 
agenda.  141
b. An autonomous and effective bureaucracy 
 At independence, Botswana’s civil service comprised mostly of expatriate Britons who 
remained in the country.  Relying on this expertise at first, Botswana’s government created a 142
meritorious bureaucracy based on a Weberian-model that avoided political interference and did 
not immediately indigenize.  Further contributing to the bureaucracy’s effectiveness was their 143
quick assimilation into the policy-making bloc and their favourable intersection with political 
and economic elites. This close relationship between the bureaucracy and the ruling party created 
 Martin, supra note 5 at 43.138
 Taylor, “Politics of Legitimacy”, supra note 43 at 53.139
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a civil service that become a recruitment site for senior positions in the ruling party and the 
state.  Although the revolving door of government and ruling party officials likely contributed 144
to the consensus-driven approach to governance, it entrenched elites within the echelons of 
power in Botswana. 
 The national government also established centralized ministries empowered to direct 
development planning and minerals governance. The MFDP was mandated to carry out the 
government’s developmental planning and became the centrepiece of Botswana’s developmental 
state.  The Ministry’s role was so critical, Samatar described it as both the “institutional nerve 145
centre”  and “the institutional brain of the economic-planning process.”  Development 146 147
planning was centralized in the MFDP due to the dearth of skilled professionals capable of 
managing large-scale projects across the bureaucracy.  Rather than divide skilled development 148
professionals across different ministries, the MFDP’s centralized structure was an effective and 
efficient way to manage the government’s development planning—from agriculture to health, 
education and housing—and also ensured a uniform developmental agenda was implemented at 
the most senior levels across diverse portfolios.  149
 To develop the country’s mining policies, the Department of Mines—the original agency 
that was eventually merged into the current Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources—
was tasked with drafting Botswana’s early mineral governance institutions. Among other things, 
the Department was responsible for developing and coordinating operational activities in the 
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 Samatar, supra note 2 at 82.146
 Ibid at 85.147
 Ibid,148
 Ibid at 84.149
166
mining sector, which included devising the governing fiscal regime that comprised the royalty 
rate and equity sharing option.   150
 Complementing the civil service’s work were several public sector institutions, including 
the Botswana Development Corporation, the Botswana Enterprise Development Unit, the 
National Development Bank and the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency.  These entities 151
were tasked with promoting industrialization through infrastructural development and 
investment, credit and service support for Batswana small business, and trade promotion within 
and beyond Southern Africa.  The creation of these institutions helped ensure the effective 152
implementation of Botswana’s development policies through specialized organizations with the 
knowledge and capacity to support the state’s agenda. 
c. Performance-oriented governance 
 Botswana’s diverse development objectives were implemented through a broad spectrum 
of policies across a range of areas. Despite these seemingly disparate policies, it can be argued 
that Botswana’s range of development policies were designed and governed, at a minimum, to 
maximize social or economic development, both at the state and individual level. At the state 
level, this encompassed growth-promoting policies that addressed minerals, land and agriculture, 
international trade, money, exchange rates, fiscal revenues, fiscal expenditure, labour market, 
state-owned enterprises and industrialization.  At the individual level, development policies 153
were designed to impact health, gender equality and rural poverty reduction.  
 Jefferis, supra note 60 at 78 and 80.150
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 141, 147.151
 Ibid at 143.152
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 The table below summarizes some of Botswana’s key state-level development policies 
since independence, and their anticipated outcomes:  154
Table 4.1 – Botswana’s performance-oriented governance 
Policy Area Sample Policies Anticipated policy outcomes
Minerals • Mines and Minerals Act, 1967; 
• Mines and Minerals Act, 1999; 
• Establishing agreements 
directed at state-ownership in 
mineral extraction.
Vested mineral rights in the state so 
that mineral wealth was directed to 
national purposes. This included 
using such measures as royalties, 
equity shares, and state ownership of 
extractive enterprises along the value 
chain (the effects of these mining 
specific policies are examined further 
in section 4.3.2).
Trade • Renegotiation of the Southern 
African Customs Union 
(SACU) agreement in 1969; 
• Special protections for beef 
exports in the 1975 Lome 
Convention.
Increased government revenues and 
access to foreign markets for key 
exports.
Money • A Monetary System for 
Botswana, Government Paper 
No. 1 (1975); 
• Creation of the Bank of 
Botswana.
Created a new currency (the pula, 
launched in 1976), and established 
the framework for monetary policy 
that was advantageous to domestic 
business and the national economy.
Labour market • National Policy on Incomes, 
Employment, Prices and 
Profits, Government Paper No. 
2 (1972); 
• Public sector-led skills 
training.
Established a national minimum 
wage that varied by sector, and 
combat unemployment by increasing 
available skilled labour.
 The data summarized here is taken from Leith, supra note 45 at 59-101; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra 154
note 3 at 16-19; and Gervase S Maipose, “Institutional Dynamics of Sustained Rapid Economic Growth with 
Limited Impact on Poverty Reduction", prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
project on Poverty Reduction and Policy Regimes (Geneva, January 2008).
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 In addition to these growth-promoting policies, the Government of Botswana introduced 
policies aimed at improving the human social development outcomes of individual Botswanans. 
Some notable examples included the National Policy for Rural Development,  the National 155
Policy on Gender and Development  and the National Policy on HIV and AIDS.   All of these 156 157
policies complemented Botswana’s central social development policy, the NDPs. 
d. Production coordination and conflict-management 
 Botswana’s initial priorities in this area were to “establish a coordinated institutional 
capability and to attract sufficient public and overseas private funds.”  Four years after 158
State-owned 
enterprises
• Creation of the National 
Development Bank (1965), 
and the Botswana 
Development Corporation 
(1970); 
• Creation of public enterprises 
providing utilities including 
water, electricity, telephones, 
and transportation.
Supported the development of 
Indigenous businesses and 
investment, and ensure the provision 
of essential services without draining 
government revenue.
Industrialization • Financial Assistance Policy 
(1985); 
• Industrial Development Policy 
(1996); 
• Citizens Entrepreneurial 
Development Agency; 
• Economic Diversification 
Drive (2011-2016).
Diversified the economy beyond 
minerals extraction.
 National Policy for Rural Development, Government Paper No. 2 (May 1973).155
 National Policy on Gender and Development, online: <http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/156
Ministry-of-Labour--Home-Affairs-MLHA/Ministers-Speeches/THE-NATIONAL-POLICY-ON-GENDER-AND-
DEVELOPMENT/>.
 National Policy on HIV and AIDS, online: <http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/State-157
President/National-AIDS-Coordinating-Agency-NACA1/Tools--Services/Services--Forms/HIV-and-AIDS-Policies/
>. 
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independence, the MFDP was established as the centralized "institutional brain of the economic 
policy-making process.”  The Ministry became responsible for planning, coordinating, and 159
budgeting all development activities; designing the state’s financial affairs; implementing 
development projects; and negotiating and liaising with aid agencies.  Under the leadership of 160
Vice-President Quett Masire, the MFDP undertook development planning through the six-year 
NDPs, which addressed both social and economic development objectives.  In addition to 161
contributing to the creation and implementation of a coherent development vision for the state, 
the Plans allowed the government to combat internal conflict and destructive neo-patrimonial 
and rent-seeking behaviour by implementing a consensus-driven approach to Plan 
formulation.   162
 Botswana’s NDP remains a crucial component of the country’s national production 
coordination. For example, Botswana’s current NDP 11  includes objectives in five key areas: 163
macroeconomic strategies; economy and employment; sustainable environment; governance, 
safety and security; and social upliftment. A summary of the current objectives is included in the 
following table: 
 Ibid at 85.159
 Ibid.160
 Leith, supra note 45 at 58. 161
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 NDP 11, supra note 62 at 62.163
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Table 4.2 – Production coordination in Botswana’s NDP 11
(Source: Botswana, National Development Plan 11, Volume 1 [April 2017–March 2023]). 
 Botswana’s state-led production coordination resulted in the achievement of one of the 
highest average annual growth rates in the latter part of the twentieth century (10.7 percent 
Areas of Focus Key Objectives
Macroeconomic 
Strategies:
• Developing diversified sources for economic growth; 
• Using domestic expenditures as a source for growth and 
employment creation; 
• Expanding the export-led growth strategy; 
• Ensuring a conducive environment for the private sector to grow 
the economy and employment creation; 




• Improving the quality and relevance of education and training; 
• Improving educational quality and skills development to promote 
workforce productivity; 
• Improving capacity in research and innovation; 




• Ensuring a healthy environment for a healthy population; 
• Encouraging sustainable management of natural and cultural 
resources; 
• Developing climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies; 




• Further enhancing citizen participation; 
• Promoting government transparency through the creation of two 
new audits; 
• Modernizing the courts through measures such as e-government, 
simplified rules of courts, and reduced litigation costs; 
• Promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Social 
Upliftment:
• Combating rural poverty; 
• Supporting the development of small, medium, and micro-
enterprises; 
• Continuing the provision of social safety nets; 
• Eradicating absolute poverty; 
• Improving access to quality health care services.
171
between 1974 and 1992).  This economic growth continued into the twenty-first century, with 164
average rates of 5 percent per annum over the last decade.  Annual growth in Botswana’s per 165
capita income also averaged 7 percent in the period from 1966 to 1999.  By comparison, 166
Botswana’s average annual growth in per capita income surpassed that of Chile, Indonesia, 
Ireland, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand during that same period.  In addition to its 167
successful economic development, Botswana’s social development achieved favourable results in 
education (88.5 percent literacy rate;  universal primary education; 9 percent of GDP directed 168
towards education funding ) and health (64.5 years life expectancy at birth;  reductions in 169 170
HIV prevalence rate among adults ages 15–49 from 26 percent in 2000 to 22.2 percent in 
2015).  Compared to the rest of Africa, Botswana’s human development ranking is only 171
surpassed by Seychelles, Mauritius, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.  It is the highest-ranked Sub-172
Saharan African country, ahead of Gabon and South Africa in the top ten.  However, despite its 173
success in promoting human development, Botswana maintains a high unemployment rate of 
17.8 percent, which has stalled efforts to combat income inequality and reduce poverty.  174
 Samatar, supra note 2 at 65.164
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 Promoting production-oriented private investment was another central element of 
Botswana’s developmental state. The diamond industry dominated Botswana’s policy in this 
area, with Debswana modelling the government’s position. In addition to its ownership-stake in 
Debswana, the Botswana government has required corporations seeking mining licenses to 
include a provision in their application that allows the state to purchase an equity stake in the 
venture.  Other than Debswana, there is no indication that the Government of Botswana has 175
purchased ownership shares in any mining company. Additionally, in sectors that were slow to 
attract foreign investment after independence, the state intervened and created development-
oriented state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that delivered necessary services, such as electricity, 
telecommunications and water.   176
4.3.2. Botswana’s mining developmental state institutions 
 In the years since Botswana’s first independent government implemented policies to 
strengthen mining developmentalism, the industry has been critical to sustaining and promoting 
the country’s economic growth. As explored in the preceding section, Botswana has facilitated its 
mining developmentalism through several institutions that adhere to the developmental state 
paradigm described in section 3.3.2. Based on the preceding analysis, it is easy to see why 
Botswana is often described as Africa’s only developmental state. The discussion also considered 
how these institutions interact with the mining industry, illustrating that the developmental state 
paradigm could potentially function effectively within a mining-dependent country.  
 Jefferis, supra note 60 at 80.175
 Leith, supra note 45 at 94.176
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 However, as will be discussed in section 4.4 below, this paradigm does not in fact account 
for the inequities embedded in Botswana’s developmental state, notably the systemic inequalities 
that continue to disadvantage Indigenous peoples and local communities in the country. 
Additionally, the established developmental state paradigm does not consider mining-specific 
institutions that can operate with the mining developmental state, including those that promote 
local participation and content, develop cross-sectoral linkages, and broaden resource 
nationalism within the sector. Due to these measures, Botswana continued to avoid economic and 
political symptoms of the resource curse discussed in Chapter Two and also defined several of 
the mining developmental state institutions discussed in Chapter Three. These initiatives are 
discussed further in this section. 
a. Enhancing local participation and content 
 Botswana’s dependence on skilled expatriates and foreign investors early in its mining 
developmental state restricted economic and business opportunities for Botswanan citizens 
beyond low-skilled mining jobs.  Over time, as Botswana’s government increased its stake in 177
Debswana and deliberately structured mining governance to promote socioeconomic 
development, more opportunities were sought to enhance economic opportunities for Botswanan 
citizens and businesses in the mining sector. The opportunities were unmistakable: in 2010, the 
mining industry was responsible for up to 50 percent of imported goods into Botswana 
(approximately USD $1.27 billion).  To promote this objective, Botswana’s government 178
 Gosego Rockfall Lekgowe, “The Trajectory of Citizen Economic Empowerment in Botswana After Fifty Years: 177
An Endless Road of Hapless Policies” (2016) 22 University of Botswana Law Journal 138 at 138.




introduced local participation and local content requirements (LCRs) in three separate legal and 
quasi-legal sources: the Mines and Minerals Act, 1999 (MMA);  the 2012 Citizen Economic 179
Empowerment Policy (CEEP);  and the Economic Diversification Drive: Medium to Long-180
Term Strategy, 2011-2016 (EDD).   The content of Botswana’s local participation requirements 181
included preferential treatment of Botswana citizens, employment and training obligations, 
procurement standards and accountability mechanisms.  
 The MMA is the only source of legislated LCRs. Article 12 of the Act outlines the 
obligation for mining companies to procure materials from local business, employ Botswanan 
citizens and train employees:  182
12. (1). The holder of a mineral concession issued under this Act, shall, in the conduct of his 
operations under such concession, and in the purchase, construction and installation of facilities, give 
preference, to the maximum extent possible consistent with safety, efficiency and economy, to—  
(a) materials and products made in Botswana; and  
(b) service agencies located in Botswana and owned by Botswana citizens or bodies corporate 
established under the Companies Act.  
(2) The holder of a mineral concession shall, in all phases of his operations, give preference in 
employment to citizens of Botswana to the maximum extent possible consistent with safety, efficiency 
and economy.  
(3) The holder of a mining licence shall, in his operations, conduct training programmes in 
consultation with the Minister for the benefit of employees so that such employees may qualify for 
advancement.   183
 Preference to grant minerals permits to Botswanan citizens is included in Article 53(1) of 
the Act, although the government can waive that requirement under Article 53(2): 
 Mines and Minerals Act, 1999, Ch. 66:1, Vol. XIV.179
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 Although the use of “shall” in the statute may imply that these obligations are “soft” (see the interpretation of 182
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 Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 179 at Art. 12.183
175
53. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), a minerals permit to exploit industrial minerals 
shall not be granted to a person who is not a citizen of Botswana.  
(2) The Minister may exempt any person from the provisions of subsection (1) if he is satisfied that—  
(a) it is in the public interest that a minerals permit to exploit industrial minerals should be granted 
to such person; or  
(b) the permit applied for is in respect of industrial minerals required for specific works and the 
applicant has given an undertaking that the minerals concerned will not be sold or otherwise 
disposed of for profit.   184
 Explicit accountability measures are not included in the MMA to ensure compliance; 
however, Article 55(2) authorizes the responsible Minister to terminate a minerals permit if the 
holder ceases to be a Botswanan citizen.   185
 Developing an economy centred around Botswanan citizens was also the focus of the 
CEEP, which was approved by the National Assembly in July 2012.  At the time of its passage, 186
the Minister of Finance and Development Planning explained its rationale: “rapid economic 
growth and diversification without citizen empowerment could ultimately lead to a more fragile 
and vulnerable economy, subject to the vagaries of international markets over which the country 
has little or no control.”  The CEEP emerged in response to contentions that Botswanans were 187
not equitably benefiting from the economy: Botswanans were underrepresented at senior 
management levels in the private sector, and non-citizens had greater access to finance.  To 188
redress Botswanans’ economic disadvantage, the CEEP encouraged local procurement, 
employment and training.  189
 Like the CEEP, the EDD was a non-mining specific policy that lacked legislative force. 
The EDD outlined the government’s plan to encourage economic diversification from 2011–
 Ibid at 53(1), 53(2).184
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ß2016 in response to growing concerns with Botswana’s reliance on primary products. It was 
developed by a Ministerial Committee constituted by the Vice President in 2010.  Employing 190
Botswanans and procuring goods and services from Botswanan businesses were the two main 
LCRs promoted in the EDD, often jointly. Employment creation was a presumed outcome of 
local procurement in the short-term.  The EDD encourages both the public and the private 191
sector to procure goods locally in order to “[facilitate] the development of local capacity of 
enterprises in Botswana.”  Since 2016, the government’s economic diversification strategy has 192
been encapsulated in NDP 11. However, express promotion of LCRs was not included in NDP 
11; instead, enhanced local content and participation were components of the strategy to develop 
more sectoral linkages.    193
b. Developing sectoral linkages 
 As the EDD illustrated, the Botswana government recognized there was a need to 
promote economic diversification away from diamonds. The recent slowdown in the global price 
for rough and polished stones in 2015 and 2016, which lowered Botswana’s growth forecast, also 
magnified the need to diversify.  Lower global demand forced Debswana to cut its 2015 194
production target by 3 million carats, from 23 to 20 million carats.  Botswana’s dwindling 195
reserves have also exacerbated the impact of lower global diamond prices and demand. Recent 
modelling estimated that the decline in Botswana’s diamond reserves could cut the country’s 
 Economic Diversification Drive, supra note 180 at 6.190
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GDP per capita in half by 2027 when the effects are likely to be felt.  Creating additional 196
sectoral linkages was prioritized in both the EDD and NDP 11.  For the mining industry, this 197
meant developing more upstream and downstream linkages within the sector while also 
expanding linkages to other sectors in the economy. 
 The creation of new upstream linkages in diamond mining has been rare due to the 
established nature of the industry. Most of Botswana’s diamond exploration occurred in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, and a majority of diamond mining takes place at mines that were 
built in the 1970s and 1980s.  Opportunities for upstream linkages can emerge, particularly 198
since new prospecting and mining licences continue to be issued.  However, recent data about 199
any upstream linkages developed from these opportunities is unavailable. Additionally, 
government policy over the past decade—reflected in the EDD and NDP 11— has prioritized the 
creation of downstream linkages, particularly mineral beneficiation. Some specific diamond-
related strategies were identified in NDP 11: 
• “Expansion of the Diamond Beneficiation beyond cutting and polishing and introducing alternative/
additional diamond supply; 
• Industrial minerals beneficiation will be promoted to enhance use of locally available raw materials 
for construction materials and dimension stones; 
• Growing and sustaining diamond cutting and polishing through the increase of rough diamond 
supply and the development of Botswana Diamond Exchange in order to provide a catalyst for 
secondary rough trading, polished trading, space to support diamond business incubation, set up 
SMMEs and other diamond support services;…”  200
 Two meaningful initiatives demonstrate Botswana’s successful attempt at mineral 
beneficiation. The first was the establishment of the Diamond Technology Park located in 
 Neicho, supra note 194; Roman Grynberg, “And we will live like Swazis” (17 November 2014), online: Sunday 196
Standard <http://www.sundaystandard.info/and-we-will-live-swazis>. 
 Economic Diversification Drive, supra note 181 at 18; NDP 11, supra note 62 at 59.197
 Letsema Mbayi, “Linkages in Botswana’s Diamond Cutting and Polishing Industry” (March 2011) MMCP 198
Discussion Paper No. 6 at 27.
 Ibid at 25.199
 NDP 11, supra note 62 at 59.200
178
Gaborone. The Park incubates small-scale companies (and their spinoffs) that cut, polish and sell 
diamonds under the banner of the government’s diamond sales corporation, Okavango Diamond 
Company.  Secondly, Botswana successfully negotiated the relocation of De Beers’ rough 201
diamonds sales operations—which handled diamonds from all of De Beers’ international 
operations—from London to Gaborone, as discussed below.  Recent statistics indicate the 202
efforts to encourage downstream mining have been successful: more than 3,000 polishing jobs 
were created (up from 500 in 2006), and polished diamond exports totalled USD $800 million in 
2013, compared to USD $100 million in 2008.   203
 The creation of downstream sectoral linkages between mining and other industries has 
also been encouraged by Botswana’s government in both the EDD and NDP 11. “Cluster 
developments”  were conceived as a means to achieve this objective. A cluster development, 204
unique to each industry, identified “interlinked companies, suppliers and service providers linked 
to [that] sector.”  The cluster for diamond mining, briefly described in NDP 11, identified 205
linkages to “security, banking, tourism, [and] logistics.”  Although it did not specifically 206
examine the diamond cluster, a 2017 econometric study by Kegomoditsiwe Koitsiwe and 
Tsuyoshi Adachi concluded significant causal linkages existed outward from diamond mining to 
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manufacturing and services,  suggesting some success in the efforts to create downstream 207
cross-sectoral linkages. 
c. Broader resource nationalism 
 As discussed, Botswana’s first instance of resource nationalism occurred shortly after 
independence when it inserted itself in the diamond industry by acquiring a 15 percent stake in 
De Beers’ Botswana’s operations. Shortly after that, Botswana increased its partnership to 50 
percent and Debswana was born.  Partnering with De Beers secured revenues for Botswana’s 208
government without requiring any capital investment from the state. De Beers was granted the 
licence to explore and then construct the country’s first diamond mine at Orapa.  The state’s 209
close relationship with De Beers further facilitated its resource nationalism, which also assisted 
its position when it convinced De Beers to relocate its aggregation business in 2005. The 
operations were eventually moved in 2013.  210
 Beyond Debswana and diamonds, the state may automatically acquire a 15 percent stake 
in all non-diamond mining operations under Article 40(1) of the MMA.  Government 211
participation in diamond mines can only occur on a case-by-case basis, as mandated by MMA 
Article 51(1): 
51. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Part, any application for the issue, renewal, transfer or 
amendment of a licence to mine diamonds shall initiate a negotiating process, in good faith, between 
Government and the applicant covering all technical, financial and commercial aspects of the 
proposed project including Government participation.   212
 Kegomoditsiwe Koitsiwe & Tsuyoshi Adachi, “Linkages between mining and non-mining sectors in 207
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 Other than its real and potential ownership stakes, Botswana has not implemented any of 
the other nationalistic mining developmental institutions described in section 3.5.2, such as 
renegotiating contracts with foreign investors or increasing royalty rates. This inaction suggests 
that Botswana has been content with its De Beers partnership. Moreover, it also signifies the 
government’s position that diversifying the economy, rather than further relying on diamond 
mining, is a more worthwhile development objective at the country faces a depleting supply of 
diamond deposits. 
4.3.3. Assessing legal functionalities in Botswana’s mining developmental state  
 The governance record of Botswana’s mining developmental state highlights the 
opposing sides of the “good governance”–development debate. Botswana’s example questions 
the centrality of transnational good governance norms to combatting the resource curse. If these 
principles are vital to combatting the resource curse, how could Botswana’s less than ideal 
governance model—reflected in the country’s lack of EITI membership and its moderate score 
on the RGI’s transparency index—have accomplished levels of economic development not seen 
in other mining-dependent states? Academics have offered various explanations: Botswana’s 
traditional institutions; the consensus-seeking approach of the immediate post-independence 
governments; the broad political coalitions established after independence that placated the elite; 
and the development of institutional knowledge that contributed to political stability.  Given 213
the disconnect between the good governance paradigm and the factors that contributed to 
Botswana’s mining developmental state success, it is helpful to also evaluate the institutions 
 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, supra note 3; Leith, supra note 45; and Martin, supra note 5.213
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using Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework, which encompasses: 
safeguarding flexibility, stimulating orchestration, framing synergy, and ensuring legitimacy.  
a. Safeguarding flexibility and framing synergy 
 Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro defined safeguarding flexibility and framing synergy as 
legal functions that “allow room for experimentation, promote facilitation … [and] frame public-
private partnerships and ensure they are more effective than purely public or private 
solutions.”  In their discussion of Brazil, flexibility and synergy in industrial policy are 214
discussed in tandem;  therefore, the same discussion approach is duplicated here. For Trubek, 215
Coutinho and Schapiro, Brazil’s collaborative public-private process—which facilitated 
innovation and flexible legal partnerships between the state and private actors—advanced the 
country’s development via a new role for the state.  Much like Brazil, Botswana’s mineral 216
governance and development policies relied on a willingness to work closely with the private 
sector in innovative and flexible ways. Rather than limit its role in diamond mining, the 
Botswana Government under President Khama’s leadership sought an equity stake in De Beers’ 
operations, thus allowing Botswana to eventually become a joint partner in diamond mining. 
Through the creation of legal institutions that safeguarded the state’s flexibility, Botswana was 
not entrenched in an unfavourable legal environment that could have limited its ability to seek 
greater benefits from mining. Additionally, the legal framework that governed Botswana’s 
private-public mining partnerships framed synergies that created incentives for greater foreign 
investment from De Beers and enhanced public-private cooperation. 
 Trubek, Coutinho & Schapiro, supra note 10 at 55-56.214
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 Botswana’s early history with De Beers further illustrates the flexibility and synergy of 
the country’s mining developmental state. Burdened with the lack of capacity to develop newly 
discovered diamond reserves, the Botswana government recognized the need to partner with a 
foreign investor to ensure it benefited from the wealth potential they presented. However, rather 
than limit the state’s share of the wealth to royalties and corporate taxes, the government 
employed available legal mechanisms to create a flexible and synergistic institution that ensured 
long-term economic development benefits generated from Debswana income. Flexibility and 
synergy were also evident in Botswana’s recent collaborative efforts with De Beers. The 
agreement entrenched the Debswana partnership in the future of diamond extraction in Botswana 
and also resulted in the creation of two government of Botswana institutions committed to 
further garnering economic benefits in the country: the Diamond Trading Company Botswana, 
and the Okavango Diamond Company.  217
 Additionally, the EDD and NDP 11—Botswana’s main institutional mechanisms to 
promote local content and develop sectoral linkages in recent years—also illustrate the flexibility 
and synergy of contemporary mining governance and development policies. Both were drafted 
with pressing economic development concerns. Neither are permanent, which also allows the 
state to evaluate development progress and reassess needs moving forward. Moreover, the EDD 
and NDP prioritized enhanced opportunities for the private sector without compromising state 
action and limiting Botswana’s potential to restructure its mining governance, or to formulate 
new mining developmental state institutions, to further support its socioeconomic development 
agenda. 
 Diamond Trading Company Botswana, supra note 202.217
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b. Stimulating orchestration 
 Stimulating orchestration refers to “using law to structure state activities for effective 
new-style industrial and social policy” through horizontal and vertical coordination both within 
state infrastructure and externally.  Visionary leadership was decisive to the creation of state 218
institutions capable of stimulating orchestration. Botswana’s development planning was 
conducted at the highest levels in the Vice-President’s office, where the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning was housed.  Masire’s leadership role in Khama’s government as Vice-219
President, and later as his successor, was key to establishing the NDPs development and 
implementation process.  220
 Botswana’s development and mining governance orchestration and coordination can be 
evaluated horizontally across different state institutions and vertically between the national 
government and specific elements in society who were partners in the country’s development. 
The country’s early efforts to promote consensus-building and broad-based institutional 
participation within government helped stimulate orchestration across departments. Since 
Botswana’s development project was state-centric and relied heavily on the participation of 
various state actors, institutional acceptance of the government’s agenda across all ministries was 
crucial to ensuring its effectiveness. This allowed for better coordination in the planning of 
development objectives, particularly the NDPs.  The preparatory process for the NDPs 221
typically extended over multiple years and included consultations at sub-national governments at 
the regional and local levels, as well as municipal authorities.  Once broad-based compliance 222
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was achieved across government, specific coordination with private sector actors was required to 
ensure development-facilitating policies and legislation were effectively implemented. 
 Horizontal coordination across Botswana’s state institutions was also evident in the 
government’s efforts to ensure widespread support and agreement with a policy during its 
development process, and subsequently during the implementation phase. The practice of 
reaching widespread agreement across the national government is a continuation of Botswana’s 
pre-colonial and colonial political decision-making processes. It encompasses Botswana’s 
traditional institutions, the consensus-seeking approach to policy formulation, and the creation of 
broad political coalitions established after independence that placated the elite.   223
 Vertical orchestration and coordination were visible through private sector participation 
in the formulation and implementation of development policies. One such example is the High 
Level Consultative Council. Chaired by the President, the Committee includes top ministry 
officials and members of the private sector who meet twice a year to consult on industrial and 
economic development policies.  In addition to private sector coordination achieved through 224
consultation, the state’s negotiated agreements with various businesses, particularly mineral 
extraction corporations, produce further acceptance of the state’s development-facilitating 
agenda.  225
c. Ensuring legitimacy 
 Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro’s final legal functionality, ensuring legitimacy, 
encompasses opportunities for “new ideas to percolate upward and be widely shared”  through 226
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democratic and participatory processes. The degree of participation or the type of democratic 
institutions is not specified beyond “accountability, transparency, and participation in 
development policies.”  Since the type of accountability and participation described in their 227
Brazil project is less comprehensive than what was proposed in the rights-based approach to 
mining governance described in Chapter Three, the analysis in this section considers any 
opposition to state-led development projects and challenges to the governance framework 
through state capture. This includes coups d’état, and violent civil strife and conflict. 
  Despite of its thin democratic institutions, the Botswana mining developmental state 
enjoyed legitimacy through decades-long public support of its initiatives and policies. The civil 
wars and political instability common to other parts of Africa never occurred in Botswana. Its 
peace and minimal political dissent indicate reasonably broad public support and endorsement of 
the state’s economic and development planning.  The government’s legitimacy was also 228
secured through continued support for the BDP that was buttressed by the state’s mineral-fueled 
growth. Relying more extensively on mineral revenues limited the Government’s reliance on 
taxes generated from the middle and lower classes, which yielded more socioeconomic benefits 
for these groups, and protected them from state exploitation.  However, of the four legal 229
functionalities outlined by Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro, Botswana’s institutions have not 
ensured legitimacy beyond basic citizen and private sector support for the state’s ongoing 
development agenda. 
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 Botswana’s mining developmental state institutions have demonstrated legal 
functionalities that have enhanced the state’s interventions in mining and has facilitated its 
economic development agenda. However, this analysis does not fully account for the rights-
based approach to governance, which is critical to ensuring the pursuit of development in its 
holistic sense. Section 4.4, below, evaluates Botswana’s performance against the rights-based 
model described in Chapter Three.  
4.4. Diamonds for development? The absence of a rights-based approach to 
mining governance and its implications  
 There is no doubt that Botswana has achieved remarkable economic and developmental 
success. It has done so despite its vast mineral wealth via a combination of mining 
developmental state institutions that did not fit the “good governance” mold. Nonetheless, 
Botswana is far from an equitable society: mineral wealth continues to be unevenly distributed, 
with the country’s Indigenous peoples bearing the brunt of this inequality. The adoption and 
implementation of a rights-based approach to mining governance described in Chapter Three is 
urgently needed if Botswana’s diamonds will indeed promote development. The mistreatment of 
the Indigenous Basarwa peoples since independence illustrates this imperative. 
 As discussed in section 4.2, vesting mineral rights in the state at independence was a 
deliberate attempt to evade conflict and ensure the state-controlled access to the resources that 
ultimately drove Botswana’s development. While this measure proved beneficial for the state, it 
denied Indigenous peoples rights to mineral resources in their communities. Doubly affecting the 
Basarwa was the denial of their right to land ownership through their exclusion from both the 
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Tribal Territories Act and the Tribal Land Act.  The Basarwa were not consulted, nor did they 230
have any recourse to challenge these discriminatory decisions. In fact, the Basarwa deny that 
they relinquished their mineral rights because they did not sign the Mineral Rights in Tribal 
Territories Act  like the dominant Tswana tribes.  Without access to land or resources, the 231 232
Basarwa were immediately entrenched in an economically disadvantaged position at 
independence. 
 The Basarwa continued to inhabit the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) after 
independence. Although they have lived in that region as nomadic hunter-gatherers for thousands 
of years, the Basarwa’s home in the CKGR was officially recognized by the British colonial 
government in 1961 and respected by the post-colonial government.  The state’s tone began to 233
change in the mid-1990s when it sought to relocate the Basarwa from the CKGR.  While some 234
Basarwa voluntary relocated, many refused. The consultation process was also deemed 
“inadequate” by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples, who 
also expressed concerns with whether consent to relocate was freely given.   235
 After asserting that relocation was necessary to preserve wildlife in the CKGR, the 
government changed its position and claimed relocation was for the Basarwa’s benefit: it was 
only through relocation that the community could gain access to clean water and fully benefit 
from Botswana’s socioeconomic development.  However, relocation was undertaken without 236
 Anaya, supra note 96 at para 40.230
 Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act, 1967, Ch. 66:02, Act 31.231
 Marobela, supra note 93 at 145.232
 Ibid at 140.233
 Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana (Woodbridge, UK: James Currey, 2008) 234
at 125.
 Anaya, supra note 96 at paras 66-67.235
 Taylor & Mokhawa, supra note 11 at 277.236
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first attempting to expand service provision within the CKGR. In fact, many observers believed 
relocating the Basarwa outside the CKGR was part of an effort to exploit diamond deposits 
discovered near their settlements.  After denying claims that Basarwa relocation was motivated 237
by diamond mining for more than a decade,  Botswana’s government granted a licence to Gem 238
Diamonds to construct the Ghaghoo Diamond Mine (previously known as the Gope Mine) in the 
CKGR in January 2011.  239
 While the lack of consultation with the Basarwa is the most egregious example of the 
absence of a rights-based approach to mining governance in Botswana, it is important to note 
that any meaningful consultation with communities affected by mining development is lacking in 
the current mining governance regime. Currently, only Article 11 of the Environmental 
Assessment Act  permits public consultation at the states’s discretion: 240
11. (1) The [Department of Environmental Affairs] may hold a public hearing if — 
(a) after examining the statement, the [Department] is of the opinion that the activity is of such 
a nature that the public should have the opportunity to make submissions or comments at a 
public hearing; or 
(b) the public concern over the activity is that the activity may have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment. 
Consultations that have occurred were criticized by local communities for not being sufficiently 
inclusive of traditional institutions (namely in the case of the Basarwa) or only being procedural 
and not substantive considerations of a community’s concerns.  241
 Obstructing Botswana’s adoption and implementation of a rights-based approach to 
mining governance is the absence of a clear source for the human rights that need protection. 
 Ibid at 278.237
 Survival International, “Botswana government lies exposed as diamond mine opens in Bushman 238
land” (September 4, 2014), online: <https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/10410>.
 Gem Diamonds, “Operations overview”, online: <https://www.gemdiamonds.com/operations.php>.239
 Environmental Assessment Act, 2011, Ch. 65:07, No. 10.240
 Anaya, supra note 96 at para 53.241
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Socioeconomic rights in Botswana are not enshrined in the Constitution.  Additionally, despite 242
being a party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  and having voted in favour 243
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),  the rights 244
protected in these international legal mechanisms must first be incorporated into Botswanan 
domestic law because it is a dualist state that does not automatically adopt international law into 
its domestic legal order.  The absence of clear legal sources for implementing a rights-based 245
approach to mining governance remains a major hindrance to Botswana’s developmental agenda.  
4.5. Conclusion 
 Botswana’s developmental state makes it a governance leader among mining-dependent 
African states. Since independence, Botswana has consistently formulated and implemented 
legal institutions that utilized the country’s strength—namely diamonds—to facilitate its 
developmental agenda. Through the use of flexible and synergistic partnerships and state 
coordination and orchestration, Botswana elevated its economy from one of the poorest in the 
world in 1966 to a middle-income country today with a growth record that rivals some of the 
world’s leading economies. By successfully avoiding the resource curse without implementing 
 Bonolo Ramadi Dinokopila, “The Justiciability of Socioeconomic Rights in Botswana” (2013) 57:1 J Afr L 108 242
at 109.
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M 58 243
(1982), entered into force 21 October 1986.
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA, 61st Sess, A/RES/61/295 (2 October 244
2007).
 Dinokopila, supra note 242 at 111. The AfCHPR and UNDRIP are the only potential sources for the rights 245
proposed in the rights-based approach to mining governance. Botswana did not sign any other international human 
rights treaties that support the right to development or the participation and consultation of Indigenous peoples and 
local communities in development projects. However, there is ongoing debate about the status of UNDRIP under 
international law, particularly whether it has become customary international law. UNDRIP’s status is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation and will not be discussed here. However, it was acknowledged in Chapter Two that free, 
prior and informed consent, which UNDRIP protects, is the international standard for participation and consultation 
of Indigenous and local communities in extractive projects. As a state that voted in favour of the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution that passed UNDRIP, it can be argued that Botswana has, at the very least, recognized 
the importance of the rights enshrined in it.
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“good governance” institutions, Botswana was regarded as the “African miracle” amongst its 
continental counterparts. It is the one African country that comes closest to mirroring the East 
Asian developmental state paradigm described in Chapter Three, while the legal functionalities 
of its mining developmental state institutions can be explained using Trubek, Coutinho and 
Schapiro’s framework. What Botswana’s conformity with these paradigms means for deepening 
understanding of the mining developmental state, particularly in Africa, is explored further in 
Chapter Seven. 
 Often ignored in Botswana’s success story, however, was the price that came with its 
growth and socioeconomic development. Inequality remains high, which further exacerbates the 
wealth gaps generated by diamond mining. Moreover, the mistreatment of the Basarwa people 
illustrates how the absence of a rights-based approach to mining governance—one that embraces 
participation and consultation—problematizes Botswana’s mining developmental state and its 
title as the African success story.    
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5  Mining Governance in South Africa: For Whose Development? 
5.1. Introduction 
 Mining has been integral to South Africa’s economic development since diamonds and 
gold were discovered, respectively, at Kimberley in 1867 and the Witwatersrand in 1885.  Before 1
the end of the nineteenth century, mining was formational to the creation of new wealth and the 
consolidation of British and Dutch colonies into what became modern South Africa. The 
diamond mines at Kimberley, in particular, fortified British wealth in the region and gave rise to 
elite classes of wealthy businessmen, including Cecil Rhodes, and a burgeoning middle class of 
European expatriates.  As mining became further entrenched in South Africa’s economy, it also 2
became constitutive of the evolving racial hierarchy that engendered apartheid  and laid the 3
foundation for Black  social, political and economic disempowerment. Over nearly five decades 4
of white-minority rule, mining remained integral to South Africa’s economy and generated levels 
of growth and socioeconomic development that further buttressed racial inequities in the 
country.   5
 Bill Freund, Twentieth-Century South Africa: A Developmental History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1
2019) at 23 [Freund, 20th Century]. Kimberley is in modern day Northern Cape Province, located in central South 
Africa. At the time diamonds were discovered there, Kimberley was claimed by the British as part of its Cape 
Colony. The Witwatersrand gold discovery occurred near present-day Johannesburg.
 Nicoli Nattrass & Jeremy Seekings, “The economy and poverty in the twentieth century” in Robert Ross, Anne 2
Kelk Mager & Bill Nasson, eds, The Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2: 1885–1994 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 518 at 518 [Nattrass & Seekings, “Economy and poverty”].
 “Apartheid” was a system of institutionalized racism and segregation that existed in South Africa from 1948 to the 3
early 1990s. It came into being after the election of the National Party in 1948. Further details about this regime and 
its impact on mining governance and South Africa’s socioeconomic development are discussed in section 5.2.1.
 Racial classification has had a troubled history in South Africa tracing back to colonization. In 1950, the apartheid 4
government introduced a racial classification statute (the Population Registration Act No. 30) that divided South 
Africa into three main racial groups: Whites; Natives (Blacks); and Indians and Coloured people (those of mixed 
race). Today, the South African government continues to group the population in similar racial categories: Blacks; 
Whites; Coloured; and Asian (Deborah Posel, “Race as Common Sense: Racial Classification in Twentieth-Century 
South Africa” (2001) 44:2 African Studies Review 87). While South Africa’s Asian and Coloured populations also 
suffered under apartheid, the country’s Black population will be the focus of analysis due to post-apartheid efforts by 
the state to redress the disproportionate social, political and economic hardships experienced by this group.
 Deborah Posel, “The apartheid project, 1948–1970” in Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager & Bill Nasson, eds, The 5
Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2: 1885–1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 319 at 
319–320 [Posel, “Apartheid project”].
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 Reversing the deleterious effects of racist governance has been central to the political and 
developmental agenda of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) since it came to power in 
South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994.  The first ANC government under President 6
Nelson Mandela implemented several policies aimed at promoting Black economic 
empowerment generally, including the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR).  Correcting injustices in mining 7
governance has also been a core part of the ANC’s efforts to redress Black South Africans’ 
historical socioeconomic disadvantage. The recently concluded Mining Charter is one measure 
being implemented to create more employment and ownership opportunities for Black South 
Africans in the mining sector.  However, critics have argued that the ANC’s strategy has done 8
little to improve the economic circumstances of a broader segment of the Black population. 
Instead, the ANC maintained neoliberal policies that disproportionately benefitted a small elite 
class in the name of Black economic empowerment.  9
 As mining remains one of South Africa’s wealthiest industries, it offers many 
opportunities to promote meaningful socioeconomic development if a rights-based approach to 
mining governance is adopted. South Africa continues to be a world leader in the production of 
precious metals (including platinum group metals),  manganese, chrome, iron ore, diamonds 10
 Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Development: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2019) at 88.6
 Ibid.7
 Andrew Bowman, “Black economic empowerment policy and state–business relations in South Africa: the case of 8
mining” (2019) Review of African Political Economy 1 at 2.
 Gavin Capps, “A bourgeois reform with social justice? The contradictions of the Minerals Development Bill and 9
black economic empowerment in the South African platinum mining industry” (2012) 39:132 Review of African 
Political Economy 315 at 320 [Capps, “Bourgeois”]; Paul Sorenson, “Mining in South Africa: a Mature 
Industry?” (2011) 68:5 International Journal of Environmental Studies 625 at 643; Patrick Bond, “South Africa’s 
Resource Curses and Growing Social Resistance” (2014) 65:11 Monthly Review 1 at 12.
 “Platinum group metals” are six metals—iridium, osmium, palladium, platinum, rhodium and ruthenium—that are 10
chemically and physically similar. They naturally occur together and can be found in the same ore deposits (United 
States Geological Survey, “Platinum-Group Metals Statistics and Information”, online: USGS <https://
www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/platinum-group-metals-statistics-and-information>.)
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and gold.  The most recent estimate for the value of the country’s mineral reserves is USD $2.5 11
trillion, making South Africa the world’s richest country in terms of mineral wealth, ahead of 
Russia and Australia.  Although the industry contributed only 7.3 percent to South Africa’s 12
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018 (an estimated increase of 1.5 percent from 2017), it 
accounted for nearly a quarter of the country’s exports.  The value of the industry to South 13
Africa’s economy is undeniable; however, significant reform is needed for the population to 
equitably benefit from the nation’s vast mineral wealth. This raises the pivotal question central to 
South Africa’s current mining governance reforms: whose development agenda does it 
advance?  14
 To consider this question, this chapter limits its analysis of South Africa’s mining 
developmental state (MDS) to its post-apartheid iteration. Some scholars—notably Bill Freund, a 
leading development studies professor in South Africa—have argued that the apartheid 
government’s industrialization strategy was comparable to the developmental states of East Asia, 
and have thus characterized apartheid South Africa as a developmental state.  Although 15
apartheid South Africa’s state apparatus was similar to the East Asian developmental state model, 
this contention further illustrates the paradigm’s inability to interrogate structures that could 
promote economic growth and other positive indicators of economic development while also 
entrenching inequality and wealth disparities amongst the population. However, given the 
 Sorenson, supra note 9 at 629.11
 Paul Jourdan, “The optimization of the developmental impact of South Africa’s mineral assets for building a 12
democratic developmental state” (2014) 26 Mineral Economics 107 at 112.
 Minerals Council of South Africa, “Facts and Figures”, online: Minerals Council of South Africa <https://13
www.mineralscouncil.org.za/industry-news/publications/facts-and-figures>.
 Adapted from Bonnie Campbell et al, eds, Regulating Mining in Africa: For whose benefit? (Uppsala: Nordiska 14
Afrikainstitutet, 2004).
 See Freund, 20th Century, supra note 1.15
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inequitable distribution of wealth and the deliberate (and often violent) suppression of South 
Africa’s non-white populations, any apartheid-era developmental state will not be considered in 
this chapter.  Instead, efforts by South Africa’s post-apartheid government to dismantle that 16
racist state apparatus and create a new, redistributive developmental state will be examined. 
Section 5.2 provides historical context to South Africa’s mining industry and the country’s 
transition from disparate to redistributive developmentalism. South Africa’s post-apartheid 
developmental state is described and analyzed in section 5.3, which also provides an assessment 
of the country’s general developmental state structure and its mining developmental state 
institutions (MDSIs) and their functionalities. This chapter argues that despite best efforts, the 
mining developmental state has not been fully implemented in South Africa due to various 
endogenous and exogenous factors. Section 5.4 examines how South Africa’s potential mining 
developmental state could become more than an economic engine for growth and could 
effectively promote socioeconomic development through the implementation of a rights-based 
approach to mining governance that fully adopts principles of participation and consultation. 
Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2. Mining and disparate developmentalism in South Africa 
 South Africa’s history over the last 150 years has been deeply marked by racial division 
and inequality. Much has been written about apartheid: its emergence, the decades of oppression 
and violence, and its eventual demise.  Many books have also chronicled the resistance and 17
 For further discussion of this topic, see section 5.3.16
 See, for example, David M Gordon, Apartheid in South Africa: a brief history with documents (Boston: Bedford/17
St. Martin’s, 2017); Lindsay Michie Eades, The end of apartheid in South Africa (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 
Press, 1999); Saul Dubow, Racial segregation and the origins of apartheid in South Africa, 1919-1936 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Nancy L Clark & William H Worger, South Africa: the rise and fall of apartheid, 3rd ed 
(London: Routledge, 2016).
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fight for human rights during a time of gross injustice.  Discussion of this complex history in 18
this chapter is limited to the effects of institutionalized racism on mining governance and the 
implementation of socioeconomic development policies up until the end of apartheid in the early 
1990s (section 5.2.1). The focus then shifts to an examination of the ANC’s efforts to reverse this 
legacy (section 5.2.2) and a critical analysis of the challenges it presented (section 5.2.3). 
5.2.1. Racial inequality and mining: from conquest to the end of apartheid 
 South Africa’s Cape region was a strategic commercial route that connected Europe to 
Asia and drew European traders to the area centuries before formal colonization was established. 
In 1652, the Dutch East India Company took possession of the area (known as Cape Colony) that 
eventually became modern Cape Town. Over the next 150 years, the Dutch encroached further 
inland and took control over most of the southwestern tip of the region.  The eventual arrival 19
and conquest by British settlers in the Western Cape pushed the Dutch inland during the mid-
nineteenth century and led to the creation of two independent, self-governed Boer  Republics: 20
the Transvaal and Orange Free States.  The discovery of diamonds and gold in the second half 21
of the nineteenth century complicated peaceful relations between the British and Boers in the 
area. By the end of the century, the rival colonists were at war in what was a formative battle for 
economic control in the region and pivotal to the creation of modern South Africa.   22
 Nelson Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom: the autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston: Little Brown, 1994) is 18
perhaps the most well-known account of resistance over the horrors of apartheid.
 Freund, 20th Century, supra note 1 at 20.19
 “Boer(s)” refers to the Dutch and German settlers in South Africa who descended from the original group that 20
settled in the Cape Colony and then relocated to the Transvaal and Orange Free States. Their descendants are 
commonly referred to as Afrikaners (Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Boer: People”, online: Encyclopaedia Britannica 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boer-people>).
 Freund, 20th Century, supra note 1 at 21.21
 Shula Marks, “War and Union, 1899-1910)” in Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager & Bill Nasson, eds, The 22
Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2: 1885-1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 157 at 
157.
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 After three years of fierce fighting that also affected the African population, the war came 
to an end with the Boer Republic’s collapse and ceding of control to the British.  Over the 23
remainder of that decade, the British colonial authorities consolidated political and economic 
power, which proved advantageous to corporate mining interests that began monopolizing 
control over the industry in the decades since minerals were discovered.  In November 1910, the 24
Union of South Africa came into being and fortified Britain’s empire in Southern Africa.  At the 25
time of Union, South Africa produced a third of the world’s total gold output; two decades later, 
South Africa’s share of global gold production rose to more than 50 percent.  In the wake of the 26
war, Britain’s expansive colonial reach in the region provided the labour and physical resources 
to support the growth of South Africa’s mining industry. Disaffected European migrant labour 
was replaced with lower-paid workers from other British colonies, including Bechuanaland 
(colonial Botswana), Nyasaland (present-day Malawi), and Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
(colonial Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively).  Over the next 30 years, mining displaced 27
agriculture as the most important industry to South Africa’s economy. Even during the Great 
Depression, South African mining, particularly gold, lessened the impact of the global economic 
crisis.  28
 A combination of labour and land measures contributed to the entrenchment of Black 
economic disempowerment in the early part of the twentieth century. White labourers were 
 Ibid at 164.23
 Ibid at 167.24
 Bill Freund, “South Africa: The Union Years, 1910–1948 — Political and Economic Foundations” in Robert Ross, 25
Anne Kelk Mager & Bill Nasson, eds, The Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2: 1885-1994 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 211 at 211 [Freund, “Union Years”].
 Nattrass & Seekings, “Economy and poverty,” supra note 2 at 521.26
 Marks, supra note 22 at 168.27
 Freund, “Union Years,” supra note 25 at 219.28
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increasingly used to fill managerial and supervisory roles as the underground mining positions 
became restricted to African labour.  Cheaper African labour increased profitability, which 29
compounded mine owners’ desire to high more Black workers such that the ratio of Black to 
white workers stood at 10:1 in the 1920s.  The wage gap also reflected inequities in mining: a 30
Black labourer earned ten times less than a white employee for much of the first half of the 
twentieth century.  31
 African economic subjugation was further exacerbated through the passage of the 
discriminatory Natives Land Act of 1913.  As one of the first segregationist statutes, the Act 32
restricted Black land ownership to 7 percent of arable land while also prohibiting the sale of land 
between Blacks and whites.  The legislation also created “homelands”  where the Black 33 34
population was forced to live unless they provided proof that they were employed elsewhere. 
Blacks were also prohibited from sharecropping on white farms.  These measures, which were 35
supported by the mining industry, forced many young Black South Africans to work in low-
paying mining jobs. Without the ability to own or farm land, the majority of the Black working 
class lived outside of homelands by 1936, earning a living in the mines or the service industry.  36
 Ibid at 225.29
 Ibid.30
 Ibid at 226.31
 Posel, “Apartheid project,” supra note 5 at 338.32
 EM Letsoalo & MJJ Thupana, “The repeal of the land acts: the challenge of land reform policies in South 33
Africa” (2013) 39:2 Social Dynamics 298 at 299.
 “Homelands,” which were also called “Bantustans” during apartheid, were an administrative tool designed to 34
segregate the Black population physically while also forcing them to become migrant labourers by prohibiting 
sustainable economic opportunities in those areas. Ten homelands were created: Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, 
Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Transkei and Venda. Blacks were expected to 
self-govern in these territories, thus completely denying them any relationship with the South African state (Laura 
Evans, “South Africa’s Bantustans and the Dynamics of ‘Decolonisation’: Reflections on Writing Histories of the 
Homelands” (2012) 64:1 South African Historical Journal 117 at 119). 
 Freund, “Union Years,” supra note 25 at 220.35
 Ibid at 221.36
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 High rates of Black relocation to urban areas led the Union government to enforce 
segregation in new ways. In the decades leading up to the election of the National Party in 1948, 
which began the transition to apartheid, a series of segregationist bills were passed that included 
many similar elements designed to further restrict rural Black land ownership, suppress Black 
suffrage, control Black movement and employment in white areas, and similarly apply these 
measures to the Asian and Coloured populations.  When the National Party came to power in 37
1948, several components of the apartheid system were already in place. Many of these 
segregationist policies continued under apartheid, as did measures designed to maintain Black 
migrant labour needed to serve wealthy white employers.   One new facet of apartheid 38
economic deprivation was the “job reservation” policy introduced in the 1950s.  Under this 39
measure, specific jobs were designated for whites, which bolstered white working-class interests 
in the governing party. By the end of that decade, all Black, Asian and Coloured workers were 
banned from skilled work and were barred from serving in positions of authority over white 
employees.  40
 South Africa’s mineral property system also reformed during apartheid to further 
eliminate any prospect of Black economic development. Some of the country’s largest PGM 
reserves were contained in two homelands: Bophuthatswana and Lebowa, located in the 
northeastern part of the country.  To dispossess the Black population of ownership, a system of 41
mineral property rights was put in place that relied on three key legal distinctions: mineral rights 
 Ibid at 235.37
 Posel, “Apartheid project,” supra note 5 at 339.38
 Ibid.39
 Ibid.40
 Gavin Capps, “Victim of its own success? The platinum mining industry and the apartheid mineral property 41
system in South Africa's political transition” (2012) 39:131 Review of African Political Economy 63 at 69 [Capps, 
“Victim”].
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versus surface rights, private versus public ownership, and white versus Black.  The legal 42
distinction between mineral and surface rights emerged in South Africa as a result of different 
legislative and administrative reforms to the application of the common law principle that the 
surface land owner also owned the minerals underneath it.  Over time, conflicting interests 43
between the state and industry produced a mineral rights regime that varied across the country. 
Mineral property rights eventually became a tradable title that comprised the rights to “possess, 
sell, use and lease specified mineral[s].”  44
 The distinction between private and public ownership evolved alongside the mineral 
rights regime. Private ownership of minerals was recognized during colonization. After the 
Union came into being, the state gained ownership of more land and the minerals below it while 
continuing to recognize private mineral rights.  Thus, a dual system of public and private 45
mineral rights ownership existed throughout the apartheid era that provided revenue to the state 
through direct rights ownership and royalty and tax payments from private exploitation of 
minerals.  46
 The final legal distinction between whites and Blacks overlapped the other two. Blacks 
were prohibited from owning private mineral rights, which were under the exclusive domain of 
whites. Whites, whether they were minerals owners or surface owners and tenants, were 
extended additional benefits designed to encourage prospecting and mining. White surface 
owners were granted first rights to explore on their land and were guaranteed at least a 32 
percent share of any mines that were subsequently built on it. White mineral owners were 
 Ibid at 69–70.42





guaranteed leases that provided a 25 percent stake in the profits or royalties paid to the state from 
mining the minerals under their control.  Unlike whites, mineral rights in Black homelands were 47
held collectively in trust by the state, which denied them any access to the benefits commodified 
mineral rights offered.  48
 Apartheid in South Africa was not only designed to suppress the country’s non-white 
population; it was also deliberate in its efforts to create a prosperous white South Africa. Over 
the first 30 years of apartheid, South Africa’s economy grew at an average annual rate of around 
five percent.  The government’s economic policies during this period have often been compared 49
to those of the East Asian developmental states: interventionist (particularly in agriculture and to 
a lesser extent in mining), guided by an independent bureaucracy that sought to coordinate the 
production and fiscal performance of the elite business class.  This position restricts evaluations 50
of the developmental state to an economic assessment of institutions that disregards its effects on 
the unequal distribution of resources.   51
 State economic intervention in South Africa’s economy continued until the end of 
apartheid in the early 1990s. Notably, during negotiations to transition to democratic rule, the 
 Ibid at 70.47
 Ibid.48
 Terence Moll, “Did the Apartheid Economy ‘Fail’?” (1991) 17:2 Journal of Southern African Studies 271 at 275. 49
In this article, Moll contends there is consensus on the apartheid economy’s success, although it is attributed to 
different causes: state policies that supported white entrepreneurship and sound economic interventions versus a 
deliberate system of social control (at 272).
 Freund, 20th Century, supra note 1 at 68 and 71.50
 Although this section does not discuss the anti-apartheid movement, South Africans began the struggle against 51
oppression long before apartheid was introduced in 1948. In 1912, the predecessor to the ANC was formed. The 
South African Native National Congress (SANNC) sought to unite Africans against oppression and in the pursuit of 
socioeconomic and political advancement (William Beinart & Peter Delius, “The Historical Context and Legacy of 
the Natives Land Act of 1913” (2014) 40:4 Journal of Southern African Studies 667 at 671). In 1923, the SANNC 
was transformed into the ANC, and by the 1940s the organization was leading the opposition against segregation 
and disempowerment. Amongst one of its defining acts was the conclusion of the 1955 Freedom Charter, which 
outlined the ANC’s platform for a free and democratic South Africa (Sibonginkosi Mazibuko, “The Freedom 
Charter: the contested South African land issue” (2017) 38:2 Third World Quarterly 436 at 437).
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National Party attempted to protect white industrial interests against what was perceived as a 
radical ANC agenda that was first articulated in its Freedom Charter.  Passed at an ANC 52
meeting in 1955, the Charter outlined the organization’s position on mineral wealth and land 
distribution. These declarations became formative to the ANC’s post-apartheid developmental 
agenda: 
The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth! 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the 
people; 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to 
the ownership of the people as a whole; 
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people; 
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all 
trades, crafts and professions. 
The Land Shall Be Shared among Those Who Work It! 
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided 
amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger; 
… 
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose.  53
Due to the fear generated by the Charter, the outgoing National Party negotiated the inclusion of 
protected property rights in the Constitution  and attempted to convince the ANC to privatize 54
mineral rights ownership.  The new government disagreed and instead opted to nationalize all 55
mineral rights (but did not go as far as nationalizing the industry, which differed from the 
position articulated in the Freedom Charter).  This measure and others comprising the ANC’s 56
post-apartheid development agenda are described in the next section. 
 Capps, “Victim”, supra note 41 at 73.52
 Freedom Charter of South Africa (adopted at the Congress of the People at Kliptown, Johannesburg, June 25–26, 53
1955), online: University of the Witwatersrand <http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/
AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-jpeg.pdf>.
 Capps, “Victim”, supra note 41 at 73. See s. 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 54
[Constitution].
 Capps, “Victim”, supra note 41 at 74.55
 Paula Butler, Colonial extractions: race and Canadian mining in contemporary Africa (Toronto: University of 56
Toronto Press, 2015) at 256. See s. 3(1), Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 [MPRDA].
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5.2.2. Reorienting development in the new South Africa: 1994 to the present 
 A new era for South African politics and development began with the end of apartheid 
and the country’s first democratic election in 1994. Under the leadership of the country’s first 
Black president, Nelson Mandela, the ANC vowed to address social inequality and lift Black 
South Africans out of poverty.  Despite its good intentions, the ANC has struggled to fulfill this 57
commitment: severe economic disparities remain as the bulk of South Africa’s wealth continues 
to be held by white South Africans and a small group of non-white elites.  Effectively executing 58
its development agenda—including governing the mining sector’s role within it—has proved 
challenging for the ANC as it attempted to satisfy competing political and economic interests. On 
one side, industry and foreign investors opposed any potential government intervention in the 
economy and sought to maintain apartheid-era economic policies. On the other, Black activists 
(including many within the ANC) advocated for the full implementation of the ANC’s 1955 
Freedom Charter.  Key components of the ANC’s development agenda over the past 25 years—59
from the Constitution to the 2018 Mining Charter—are described in this section. Obstacles to its 
full implementation are also discussed. 
 The 1996 Constitution  formed the cornerstone of the “new South Africa.”  Comprised 60 61
of 243 provisions in 14 chapters, it is one of the most progressive and advanced constitutions 
promoting both socioeconomic rights and civil and political rights.  South Africa’s constitution 62
has received international acclaim from several jurists, including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of 
 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 289.57
 Bond, supra note 9 at 10, 12.58
 Butler, supra note 56 at 253–25459
 Constitution, supra note 54.60
 TK Pooe, “Law and Economic Development in South Africa: An Assessment through the General Theory of Law 61
and Development” (2019) 12:2 Law and Development Review 377 at 378.
 Lee, supra note 6 at 97.62
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the United States Supreme Court, who praised it as the model for new constitutions to follow.  63
Much like Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms,  South Africa’s new Bill of Rights  64 65
established a liberal human rights framework in the country that set it apart from other 
democracies, particularly in the developing world. The Bill of Rights clearly articulated the 
vision for an equitable South Africa built on the principles of “dignity, equality and freedom”  66
for all South Africans, regardless of race. Unique among progressive constitutions was the 
inclusion of distinct environmental and property rights that sought to balance individual and 
collective interests, while also redressing past economic injustices: 
24. Everyone has the right— 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that— 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
… 
(4) For the purposes of this section 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring 
about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources;  
(b) property is not limited to land.  
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.  
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.  
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.  
 Pooe, supra note 61 at 380.63
 Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11.64
 Constitution, supra note 54 at Chapter 2.65
 Ibid at section 7(1).66
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 In conjunction with the new Constitution, South Africa’s new government implemented a 
policy framework designed to improve the economic position of the country’s Black majority 
population. The ANC’s approach consisted of introducing various policies that attempted to 
respond to constituent concerns, yet often fell short, thus requiring that a new policy be 
developed. Central to many of the policies discussed in this chapter were three development 
objectives: economic empowerment, increased employment, and land rights. Many of the ANC’s 
policies, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), were broad and 
applied equally to all industries. Given the importance of mining to South Africa’s economy, the 
ANC also quickly introduced industry-specific measures designed to ensure the sector 
contributed to the party’s development objectives. These measures, along with the ANC’s general 
socioeconomic policy framework, are discussed further below. 
 The RDP, adopted in 1994, was the first articulation of the ANC’s development 
framework. At the heart of the Programme was the recognition that human development was 
directly connected to the ANC’s nation-building project. To that end, the RDP sought to 
implement the requisite social, political and economic infrastructure that would begin reversing 
the legacy of apartheid.  The ANC was bold in its plans for the RDP; as a government White 67
Paper, it outlined the state’s efforts to mobilize a citizenry that had been excluded from the 
country’s social, political and economic development for most of the past century. While 
achieving this task was momentous, the ANC was aware of the paradox the country faced: 
“poverty and degradation exist[ed] side by side with modern cities and a developed mining, 
 Guy Mhone, “Democratisation, Economic Liberalisation and the Quest for Sustainable Development in South 67
Africa” in Guy Mhone & Omano Edigheji, eds, Governance in the New South Africa: The Challenges of 
Globalisation (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2003) 18 at 21.
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industrial and commercial infrastructure.”  Central to the RDP’s mission was the goal of 68
completing the country’s transformation by bridging the gaps between the country’s economic 
and racial classes was central to the RDP’s mission. It identified five priority areas that were 
meant to drive the immediate post-apartheid development project: meeting basic needs, 
developing human resources, building the economy, democratizing the state and society, and 
implementation.  Based on these priority areas, it was evident the government sought to centre 69
state transformation and its new development project on the complementary objectives of human 
and economic development.  According to the RDP, sustainable structural transformation 70
required such things as the elimination of barriers to full participation in the economy (such as 
inadequate education and training programmes) and reversing systemic inequities that favoured a 
small group of elites. Despite its ambitious plan, however, the RDP set few concrete targets to 
meet its goals (two notable exceptions were its commitments to the construction of at least one 
million new homes and the redistribution of 30 percent of agricultural land within five years). 
Instead, the RDP was a visionary document that attempted to redress the development failings 
that millions of ANC’s suffered during the decades of apartheid.  71
 While observers applauded the RDP’s vision of “egalitarian development,”  critics 72
denounced the plan’s shortcomings on implementation, particularly its inattentiveness to the 
political manoeuvring that would be necessary to achieve its ambitious agenda.  Missing from 73
 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (Government Notice 1954 in Government Gazette 16085 of 15 68
November 1994) (RDP).
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 Mhone, supra note 67 at 21.70
 Nicoli Nattrass & Jeremy Seekings, “Democratic Institutions and Development in Post-apartheid South Africa” in 71
Mark Robinson & Gordon White, eds, The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 215 at 216 [Nattrass & Seekings, “Democratic Institutions”].
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the document was any mention of “redistribution”; instead, the state’s plan for implementation 
focused on “restructuring” and “redirecting” government funds, which suggested the plan would 
be implemented in its entirety and avoid any consideration of the inevitable bargaining—
between different interests, objectives and priority areas—that would be necessary to actualize 
the agenda.  Inevitably, the RDP vision was unsustainable without a meaningful strategy for 74
implementation. Both a dedicated office and inter-ministerial cooperation failed to enact the 
more ambitious elements of the RDP. Progress was piecemeal and limited to areas with pre-
existing capacity (such as healthcare and water provision).  Within two years of its proposal, the 75
RDP was quashed and abandoned in favour of a new development framework: the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme.  76
 GEAR was a macroeconomic policy, developed by the Ministry of Finance, which aimed 
to generate economic growth and create new jobs.  Unlike its predecessor, GEAR presented a 77
more conservative plan for economic transformation focused on traditional economic growth 
factors: growth and employment targets, export-oriented industrial development, increased 
competition supported by tax incentives, reduction of the exchange and inflation rates, the 
expansion of trade and investment flows, and fiscal conservatism.  Developed with the support 78
of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, GEAR was characterized as an endogenous 
structural adjustment programme.  By 2000, GEAR policies were to support the creation of 79
400,000 jobs and an economic growth target of six percent per year.  Like the RDP, GEAR did 80
 Ibid.74
 Beinart, supra note 57 at 316.75
 Ibid at 322.76
 Lee, supra note 6 at 93; Nattrass & Seekings, “Democratic Institutions”, supra note 71 at 221.77
 Lee, ibid; Mhone, supra note 67 at 23.78
 Mhone, ibid at 22.79
 Ibid at 24.80
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not receive the institutional support necessary to execute its objectives.  By 2005, GEAR was 81
replaced with the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa, which was 
eventually supplanted by the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP).  The NDP resurrected 82
the RDP’s vision for economic justice by outlining the same ambition to eliminate poverty and 
reduce inequality (this time with a specified deadline of 2030).  With the NDP, South Africa’s 83
post-apartheid development planning has come full circle. The ANC’s efforts to dismantle 
systemic inequality over the past 25 years have not yet yielded their desired results; economic 
and racial inequality continue to persist in South Africa. Development has not materialized for 
much of the country’s population.  
 In addition to the RDP, GEAR and NDP, the ANC introduced other development 
measures aimed at land reform and advancing Black economic empowerment.  Land reform 84
legislation, which was enacted soon after President Mandela took office in 1994, was passed to 
reverse discriminatory land laws in place since the Union of South Africa was established in 
1913. The Restitution of Land Rights Act  gave effect to sections 25(5)–(7) of the Constitution, 85
which established rights to equitable access to land, tenure security and land restitution for 
persons or communities dispossessed of property after June 19, 1913, due to discriminatory laws. 
 Nattrass & Seekings, “Democratic Institutions”, supra note 71 at 223.81
 Lee, supra note 6 at 94.82
 National Planning Commission, National Development Plan 2030: Our future – make it work (2011). A year 83
before the NDP was released, the Department of Economic Development issued a separate economic policy 
framework titled the New Growth Path (NGP). This policy focused more on job creation and macroeconomic 
reforms, which were incorporated into the NDP along with other development priorities. Due to the NGP’s limited 
focus, it is not discussed extensively here (Department of Economic Development, The New Growth Path: 
Framework).
 Black economic empowerment is a foundational redistributive principle of the ANC’s post-apartheid development 84
agenda that sought to alleviate the economic conditions of Black South Africans. It became institutionalized during 
President Thabo Mbeki’s tenure (Bowman, supra note 8 at 224).
 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.85
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To meet these objectives, the legislation created a Land Claims Commission and a Land Claims 
Court to resolve land disputes brought forward by claimants seeking restitution.   86
 Settling land claims during a volatile time limited the government’s ability to fully restore 
land to those who had been dispossessed. Instead, the government adopted a market-based 
approach premised on “willing-seller, willing-buyer”  agreements: the state would assist with 87
the purchase of land but would neither expropriate nor be the owner or buyer.  This approach 88
was a stark contrast to the constitutional provisions that sanctioned expropriation in the name of 
land reform.  To this day, land reform remains unresolved in South Africa. Since the ANC 89
adopted the “willing-seller, willing-buyer” land reform policy in 1997, only 10 percent of 
agricultural land has been redistributed to Black South Africans.  White South Africans continue 90
to own approximately 72 percent of agricultural land, despite only making up 10 percent of the 
population.  After years of criticism (and the rising popularity of the opposition Economic 91
Freedom Fighters party), the ANC changed its position and endorsed the concept of 
expropriation without compensation at its 54th annual conference in December 2017.  Despite 92
its new rhetoric, the government has yet to expropriate land in the name of redistribution and 
restitution for poor, dispossessed South Africans. Given the racial antagonism that continues to 
 Ibid.86
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surround the issue of land ownership in South Africa,  it is difficult to contemplate how the 93
ANC will redistribute land equitably while also maintaining the current semblance of peace and 
unity in the country. 
 Black economic empowerment was another key pillar of the ANC’s development agenda. 
At its core, Black economic empowerment sought to increase economic participation for the 
majority of the country’s population. It would reverse the apartheid legacy of Black economic 
disempowerment by expanding the Black middle class  via higher rates of Black business 94
ownership and the number of Black people in management positions, improving human 
resources and skills development among the Black majority, and investing in enterprises owned 
or managed by Black people.  Black economic empowerment was chiefly implemented via the 95
2003 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE),  which established a 96
legislative framework to advance Black economic empowerment objectives. The framework 
included the creation of a Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council that would advise 
the government on Black economic empowerment and review its progress,  issuing Ministerial 97
“codes of good practice” that bound state organs and other public entities,  create sector-specific 98
“transformation charters” that promoted Black economic empowerment within that industry 
 Expropriating land from white owners has galvanized white supremacist groups both within South Africa and 93
abroad, including Canada and the United States (Christopher Clark, “South Africa Confronts a Legacy of Apartheid” 
(May 3, 2019), online: The Atlantic <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/land-reform-south-
africa-election/586900/>).
 Anri Heyns & Hanri Mostert, “Three Mining Charters and a Draft: How the Politics and Rhetoric of Development 94
in the South African Mining Sector are Keeping Communities in Poverty” (2018) 11:2 Law and Development 
Review 801 at 821.
 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 at s. 1.95
 Ibid. For the purposes of this statute, “Black” is a generic term that includes “Africans, Coloureds and Indians” (s. 96
1).
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(mining was included; see further discussion below), and develop a government strategy for 
broad-based Black economic empowerment.  99
 Much like other facets of its development agenda, Black economic empowerment did not 
achieve the breadth of economic benefits envisaged by the ANC. Critics of its implementation 
contend that only an elite few (many affiliated with the ANC) benefitted from Black economic 
empowerment ownership deals.  In an effort to rectify this failing, the BBBEE was amended 100
ten years after it was passed because “it was deemed ineffectual in tackling broader issues 
affecting transformation within the country.”  The basic tenets of Black economic 101
empowerment (increased Black business ownership and skills development, and investment in 
Black-owned enterprises) remained intact.  Instead, the ANC sought to improve Black 102
economic empowerment’s transformative impact on the economy by introducing new 
compliance reporting obligations for all government entities, public companies and educational 
institutions.  To support this mandate, the BBBEE Amendment replaced the Black economic 103
empowerment Advisory Council with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission (B-BBEE Commission) and strengthened its authority to include enhanced 
implementation and enforcement powers.  
  Since its creation, the B-BBEE Commission has successfully collected and released 
relevant data about compliance reporting. Its most recent report summarizing these findings 
painted a dire picture of public and private sector commitment to Black economic empowerment. 
 Ibid at s. 11.99
 Heyns & Mostert, supra note 94 at 821.100
 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission, Strategy of the Broad-Based Black Economic 101
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According to the report, only 43 percent of publicly listed companies and 10 percent of 
government entities submitted compliance reports. Ownership figures reported by the private 
sector revealed Black ownership remained limited—only two percent of the reporting companies 
were completely Black-owned, while approximately 50 percent had less than 25 percent Black 
ownership. Management control also continued to be dominated by white South Africans.  104
Despite attempts to actualize Black economic empowerment, institutional capacity to affect or 
enforce change has been limited. 
 Within the mining sector, the first Black economic empowerment strategy was introduced 
in 2004. The Broad-Based Socioeconomic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry  (commonly referred to as the Mining Charter) was a component of the ANC’s new 105
mining governance framework in conjunction with the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA)  introduced two years earlier. The 2004 Mining Charter was 106
replaced with an amended charter in 2010, then again in 2016. In 2017, the government shocked 
the industry with another revised Charter that was strongly opposed, causing its implementation 
to be postponed until a court challenge to its validity was suspended in 2018.  With each 107
iteration, the Mining Charter specified ownership and employment targets for “historically 
disadvantaged South Africans” (which is partly defined in the MPRDA as “any person, category 
of persons or community, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution took 
 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission, National Status and Trends on Broad Based Black 104
Economic Empowerment Report (March 2019).
 Broad-Based Socioeconomic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry, GN 1639 GG 26661 105
(13 August 2004) [Mining Charter].
 MPRDA, supra note 56.106
 Heyns & Mostert, supra note 94 at 803-4. The Minerals Council of South Africa (an organization representing 107
industry) filed an application for judicial review of the 2018 Mining Charter in March 2019 to challenge certain 
requirements in the new charter (Felix Njini, “South African Mining Charter challenge dents Ramaphosa 
plans” (March 26, 2019), online: Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-27/south-african-
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effect”)  and equity benefits for mining communities.  Again, the Mining Charter and 108 109
MPRDA have yet to achieve expected results. Due to their significance as core institutions of 
South Africa’s MDS, both are examined further in section 5.3.2. 
 To the many South Africans hopeful that the end of apartheid would yield new 
opportunities, it failed to produce the anticipated transformative results. South Africa was one of 
the most unequal countries in the world when apartheid ended.  Democratic elections brought 110
to power a party that proclaimed its commitment to reversing inequality and actively 
redistributing state wealth to support disadvantaged populations.  Despite South Africa’s 111
consistent record of economic success (it remains a high middle-income country with stable 
growth in annual GDP and GDP per capita), inequality remains rampant—and has even 
increased—across multiple indicators. According to a 2018 World Bank report, high rates of 
unemployment, consumption inequality, and overall inequality of opportunity continue to be the 
reality in South Africa.  These shortcomings in the ANC’s development agenda over the past 25 112
years are indicative of the continued dominance of both global economic interests and domestic 
neoliberal influence to shaping the country’s economy, and the challenges of implementing 
 MPRDA, supra note 56 at s. 1. In addition to “(a) any person, category of persons or community, disadvantaged 108
by unfair discrimination before the Constitution took effect,” historically disadvantaged South Africans also includes 
“(b) any association, a majority of whose members are persons are persons contemplated in (a); [and] (c) any juristic 
person other than an association, in which persons contemplated in paragraph (a) own and control a majority of the 
issued capital or members’ interest and are able to control a majority of the members’ votes.” This definition 
captures all non-white South Africans, although Black South Africans have been the primary focus of the 
government’s broad-based socioeconomic empowerment plans.
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 Ibid at 3-4.111
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progressive socioeconomic reforms with political institutions not yet designed to do so. 
Dismantling the political and economic structures of apartheid proved difficult, especially when 
minor reforms tended to benefit elites in the ANC.  Surprisingly, the ANC’s record has not 113
prevented some commentators from describing South Africa as a “developmental state.”  While 114
this characterization is subject to debate, the ANC’s declaration at its 2007 National Conference 
that it was committed to constructing a developmental state may skew the conversation.  115
Section 5.3 examines this debate in greater detail. 
5.3. South Africa’s mining developmental state 
 Despite the introduction of multiple mining developmental state institutions in South 
Africa since the end of apartheid, its status as a developmental state—in line with the paradigm 
introduced in Chapter Three—is tenuous at best.  First, South Africa’s developmental state 116
lacks much of the institutional apparatus considered vital to the model’s success, namely 
development-oriented leadership, an autonomous and effective bureaucracy, performance-
oriented governance, and production coordination and conflict management. Second, South 
Africa’s economic development in the post-apartheid era has been stunted and uneven (although 
it is acknowledged that equitable development has never been an established criteria of the 
developmental state paradigm). Concluding South Africa is not a developmental state may 
 Bond, supra note 9 at 10.113
 Andrew Lawrence, “Neoliberalism, Mineral Governance and Developmental States: South Africa in Comparative 114
Perspective” in Jewellord Nem Singh and France Bourgouin, eds, Resource Governance and Developmental States 
in the Global South: Critical International Political Economy Perspectives (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) 40 at 40.
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(Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010) 1 at 1.
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inherently vindicate the descriptive value of the paradigm. However, a closer examination of 
factors that likely have contributed to the failings of South Africa’s mining developmental state
—the continued influence of corporate interests, corruption and state capture within certain ANC 
administrations, and strong resistance to state efforts to reform the industry—also illustrate the 
challenges that have hindered its full implementation. 
5.3.1. South Africa: an African developmental state? 
 The incongruity between South Africa’s developmental agenda and its institutions on the 
one hand and its poor record on the other fuels the debate about whether South Africa is a 
developmental state. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, several South African institutions 
illustrate the country’s promise as a developmental state: the Constitution; Ministry of Finance; 
the RDP, GEAR, and BBBEE; as well as the Mining Charter and MPRDA. The inability to 
effectively implement these institutions to produce desired development results prevented South 
Africa from constituting a successful developmental state (in line with the East Asian model). 
These shortcomings, which arose as a result of institutional gaps in South Africa’s efforts to 
constitute a developmental state, are examined further in the proceeding sections. 
a. Development-oriented political leadership 
 The ANC’s leaders have a mixed record of demonstrative development-oriented political 
leadership.  During apartheid, the party’s platform as anti-apartheid activists was rooted in the 117
struggle for greater equality and opportunity of socioeconomic development outcomes for South 
Africa’s racialized populations.  This legacy continued when the ANC officially formed 118
 This section provides an overview of the presidential terms of South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders. It is focused 117
on the socioeconomic development priorities of each and does not delve into the political intricacies of each 
presidents’ term in office.
 Beinart, supra note 57 at 155.118
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government in 1994, with Nelson Mandela as president. In the ensuing years, the ANC continued 
to demonstrate a strong commitment to development and redistribution. President Thabo Mbeki’s 
record as President Mandela’s successor was indicative of the party’s continued efforts to 
promote socioeconomic development among the country’s disadvantaged populations. 
Conversely, President Zuma’s term in office can be described as tenuous at best due to the 
personal wealth and benefits he gained while in office.  Meanwhile, the current president, Cyril 119
Ramaphosa is attempting to stimulate development by simultaneously listening to the needs of 
Black South Africans and entrenching foreign capital in mining.  120
 President Nelson Mandela symbolized the nation’s hopes when he was sworn into office 
in 1994. His 27 years in prison epitomized the struggle against apartheid and the undying quest 
for freedom. As South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, President Mandela was tasked with 
implementing the ANC’s development agenda while also helping the country move past 
apartheid’s racist legacy. At the time President Mandela took office, South Africa’s economy was 
in dire condition. Over 15 years of sanctions had crippled many of the country’s leading export 
sectors, including mining, which was also suffering from the fall in gold prices.  Inflation was 121
high (at 14 percent) and growth stagnant.  Armed with the dream outlined in the 1955 Freedom 122
Charter, President Mandela began implementing a robust development agenda. First, the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights ensured economic and social rights that had been previously 
 Bond, supra note 10 at 12.119
 Cyril Ramaphosa, “Land reform in South Africa is crucial for inclusive growth” (August 22, 2018), online: 120
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denied to the majority of the population. He also supported the creation of the RDP, one of the 
first components of the ANC’s development agenda.   123
 Despite these efforts, most of President Mandela’s term (and thus his legacy) was 
consumed by the reconciliation project. To help South Africa come to terms with its racist past 
and move forward as a unified country, President Mandela was instrumental in instituting the 
country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). South Africa’s TRC joined a brief 
history of truth and reconciliation commissions (the first having started in Argentina in 1973) 
that grappled with healing a nation through honest testimonies about past wrongs.  Like others 124
before it, South Africa’s commission was formative to the country’s peaceful democratic 
transition.  To a great extent, the TRC was successful in this regard: it staved off any violence 125
that many commentators feared would erupt in South Africa when apartheid came to an end.  126
President Mandela was lauded for the moral leadership he showed as an architect of the nation-
building project. Nonetheless, political reconciliation did not resolve the glaring economic 
disparities within South Africa’s population. Most notably, the economic fortunes of Black South 
Africans were dire when President Mandela left office in 1999, as both unemployment and 
income inequality remained high.   127
 President Mandela was undoubtedly an inspiring leader, which is precisely what South 
Africa needed at the time to bridge racial divides and unite the country. However, his focus on 
 Lee, supra note 6 at 107.123
 Deborah Posel, “History as Confession: The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 124
Commission” (2008) 20:1 Public Culture 119 at 120 [Posel, “History as Confession”]. The efficacy of truth and 
reconciliation commissions is contested, including that of South Africa’s (see Posel at 120). This debate is extensive 
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national reconciliation likely delayed the implementation of redistributive economic policies—
for example, meaningful land reform—that could have begun to support socioeconomic 
development for some of South Africa’s poorest populations. Additionally, the institutional 
reforms necessary to administer some of the ANC’s bold policy initiatives, such as the RDP, 
were not put in place. Instead, President Mandela’s leadership was best described as 
“reconciliation-oriented” rather than “development-oriented” since his Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki was responsible for much of the government’s economic agenda as he led national 
reconciliation efforts and also devoted his time to rebuilding South Africa’s international 
reputation.  128
 When President Mandela did not seek a second term in 1999, Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki succeeded him as party leader and president. His accession to the presidency maintained 
the development agenda started under President Mandela, which most recently saw the 
transformation of the RDP into GEAR. A few years after taking office, the TRC delivered its 
final report, which seemingly brought an end to the government’s official national reconciliation 
measure.  Consequently, more of the government’s resources and energy could be directed to 129
economic transformation. Much like President Mandela, however, President Mbeki’s economic 
agenda was concerned with allaying the fears of foreign investors who were hearing demands for 
Black economic empowerment strengthen in the ANC.  GEAR, which was meant to be a more 130
robust approach to redressing economic inequality in South Africa, failed to deliver as it lacked 
the necessary institutional backing and development vision to do so.  Even the ANC’s hallmark 131
 Ibid at 303–304.128
 Posel, “History as Confession”, supra note 124 at 129.129
 Alan Hirsch, Season of hope: economic reform under Mandela and Mbeki (Scottsville, South Africa: University 130
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005) at 68.
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initiative, BBBEE, was less effective due to the government’s trickle-down approach that saw 
Black elites benefit from the measure more than the larger poorer classes. A remark by President 
Mbeki to a meeting of Black business elites was revealing of the government’s position on Black 
economic empowerment; in comments about the role of the B-BBEE Commission, President 
Mbeki stated that their purpose was to consider “how do we promote the formation of a black 
bourgeoisie which will itself be committed and contribute to black economic empowerment?”  132
Central to this position was the belief a Black middle class would contribute to the 
“deracialization of the economy and society”  in South Africa. Although the creation of a Black 133
bourgeoisie was critical to dismantling parts of the apartheid-era economy, it led to the 
concentration of wealth amongst a small group of individuals at the expense of addressing 
poverty.  134
 Also, like his predecessor, President Mbeki was not exclusively focused on redressing 
economic inequality and advancing development for South Africa’s most disadvantaged 
populations. President Mbeki devoted part of his presidency to collaborating with African 
partners, both domestically and across the continent, to restore a positive sense of African 
identity and renewal—a development vision he described as an “African renaissance.”  135
Through continental partners such as the African Union (AU), its predecessor, the Organization 
of African Unity, and the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
 Thabo Mbeki, “Speech at the Annual National Conference of the Black Management Forum, Kempton Park - 132
1999/11/20” qtd in Hirsch, supra note 130 at 221; online: Thabo Mbeki Foundation <https://www.mbeki.org/
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President Mbeki advocated for a resurgence of African-driven development strategies.  His 136
leadership was divided among a range of priorities that included protecting South African 
economic interests by not frightening investors and promoting continental development 
cooperation through new agencies like the AU and NEPAD. 
 Additionally, significant reforms to mining governance that were completed during 
President Mbeki’s tenure fell short of having a transformative effect on development. As the 
discussion in section 5.3.1.c (below) contends, both the new Mining Charter and MPRDA did not 
fulfill the new government’s holistic approach to sustainable development encompassed in the 
Constitution.   137
 A power struggle in the ANC led to the demise of President Mbeki’s time in office in 
2008. After dismissing Jacob Zuma in 2004 from his role as Deputy President due to his 
implication in a corruption scandal, the party faithful replaced President Mbeki as leader of the 
ANC in 2007. When Zuma was cleared of all charges in 2008, President Mbeki was asked by the 
ANC National Executive Committee to resign, which he did on September 23, 2008. During the 
2009 elections, Jacob Zuma was elected president.  Like Presidents Mandela and Mbeki before 138
him, President Zuma was an ANC powerhouse who climbed the party ranks. Unlike his two 
predecessors, President Zuma’s mandate was more radical and marked a return to the ANC’s 
core principles around economic equality and the benefits of redistribution.  However, despite 139
President Zuma’s early embodiment as the people’s advocate and reformer who would reverse 
 Peter Vale & Georgina Barrett, “The curious career of an African modernizer: South Africa’s Thabo 136
Mbeki” (2009) 15:4 Contemporary Politics 445 at 454.
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the economic fortunes of many, he became embroiled in corruption scandals, oversaw the decline 
in South Africa’s economy, and failed to implement meaningful policy reforms indicative of the 
developmental state the ANC proclaimed in 2007. 
 President Zuma’s development legacy was complicated by two different factors: first, the 
2008 economic crisis and crash in commodities prices forced the ANC to reevaluate its 
development model as South Africa’s economy declined;  and second, his corruption and state 140
capture scandals  redirected state funds from development priorities. After the 2008 crash in 141
commodities prices, South Africa’s growth rate declined to 1.8 percent, then plunged to -6.4 
percent in the first quarter of 2009. South Africa was technically in recession as growth stood at 
-3.2 percent in the second quarter of 2009.  South Africa’s recession halted the expansion of 142
Black economic empowerment measures at many corporations that claimed the declining 
economy prevented compliance.   143
 President Zuma’s response to the economic crisis was to deepen the country’s reliance on 
mineral resources.  However, this policy direction benefited him personally as his business 144
dealings (and that of his son, Duduzane Zuma) with an elite family led by Ajay, Atul and Rajesh 
 Roger Southall, “The coming crisis of Zuma’s ANC: the party state confronts fiscal crisis” (2016) 43:147 Review 140
of African Political Economy 73 at 74 [Southall, “The coming crisis”].
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Gupta led to allegations of corruption and state capture. One of the scandals the Guptas were 
accused of perpetrating was bribing state actors, with the assistance of President Zuma, to 
approve the proposal for a nuclear power plant owned by Russian investors that would rely on 
uranium from a family-owned mine.  More generally, the family was accused of amassing 145
significant wealth from illegally procured government contracts and state-owned enterprises, 
including Eskom (the power utility) and Transnet (the rail and port operator).  Separately, 146
President Zuma was accused of personal corruption, such as when he used USD $18.4 million in 
public funds to upgrade his private home with “a visitor’s centre, swimming pool, amphitheatre 
and a chicken run.”  The gross corruption and state capture allegations under President Zuma’s 147
leadership led to the creation of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State 
Capture shortly after he resigned in February 2018.  148
 At the time President Zuma resigned, South Africa’s government had yet to deliver on 
many of its post-apartheid development promises. Although the country recovered from the 2008 
crisis, income inequality and unemployment remained high, and Black economic empowerment 
had not been fully implemented across a range of sectors. In mining, relations among workers, 
the state, and companies remained tense after the Marikana massacre in August 2012, in which 
34 miners were shot and killed by police while striking outside the Lonmin platinum mine.  149
 Roger Southall, “Family and favour at the court of Jacob Zuma” (2011) 38:130 Review of African Political 145
Economy 617 at 619 [Southall, “Family and favour”].
 Karl Z Meyer & John M Luiz, “Corruption and state capture in South Africa: will the institutions hold?” in 146
Barney Wharf, ed, Handbook on the Geographies of Corruption (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
2018) 247 at 253.
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President Zuma failed to advance the ANC’s development agenda as he prioritized his interests 
ahead of meaningful socioeconomic development. 
 President Zuma’s deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa, succeeded Zuma upon his resignation in 
2018. Like the presidents that came before him, President Ramaphosa was also a longstanding 
prominent figure in the ANC who ascended through party ranks after spending time in the 
private sector when he was not appointed President Mandela’s deputy.  The extensive wealth 150
he accumulated through his business interests (his net worth was recently estimated to be USD 
$450 million, which he generated through investments in industries ranging from fast food to 
mining, including as a Lonmin director at the time of the Marikana massacre)  was at odds with 151
his past role as a leader in the ANC and South Africa’s mining union movement. President 
Ramaphosa reentered politics in 2012 and became the deputy president in 2014.  152
  President Ramaphosa has been tasked with rectifying the ANC’s failed economic 
promises since he took office in 2018. Thus far, his most pronounced policy objectives in this 
regard have been land redistribution and concluding the Mining Charter. Land reform was 
already a contested political issue when President Ramaphosa acceded to the presidency in 
February 2018. The ANC had just adopted the “expropriation without compensation” approach at 
its December 2017 national convention.  Soon after taking office, President Ramaphosa 153
committed to implementing land reform, including possible expropriation without compensation. 
In an August 2018 opinion piece, President Ramaphosa declared that “land reform is crucial for 
inclusive growth”: 
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current distribution of land is the second-biggest constraint to poverty reduction and shared 
prosperity. In order for South Africa to secure the future, and to ensure equitable and just human 
development opportunities…reform of patterns of land ownership in South Africa is a critical 
issue.    154
To address this issue, President Ramaphosa began to undertake two objectives. First, his 
government “resolved to propose a constitutional amendment that would make explicit the 
conditions under which land could justifiably be expropriated without compensation.”  155
Although section 25 of South Africa’s Constitution already authorizes this measure, President 
Ramaphosa’s government sought to review the provision and clarify the mechanism for 
executing the measure.  The Parliament’s Constitutional Review Committee conducted public 156
hearings to review the proposed constitutional amendment and recommended in its final report 
issued in November 2018, that section 25 of the Constitution be amended to explicitly permit 
expropriation without compensation.  In October 2019, South Africa’s Parliament committed to 157
tabling a bill to amend the Constitution by December 2019, with the aim of passing the 
legislation by March 2020.   158
 Together with the proposed Constitutional Amendment, President Ramaphosa announced 
the formation of a Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture in September 
2018. The Panel—whose mandate was more expansive than the Parliamentary Constitutional 
Review Committee—concluded its review in May 2019 and recommended that government 
consider other measures in addition to constitutional reform (including immediate action like the 
allocation of already acquired land).  It is not yet known what measures President Ramaphosa’s 159
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government will put in place and what impact it will have on reducing poverty and promoting 
socioeconomic development. Since he took office, President Ramaphosa has yet to show 
meaningful development-oriented leadership. His leadership in this area has instead reacted to 
party priorities to appease dominant interests and the party’s base.    160
 Efforts to conclude the most iteration of the Mining Charter were undertaken for similar 
reasons. President Ramaphosa’s strong ties to industry were evident at the 2017 ANC national 
conference when his allies pushed the party to recommend that industry be consulted to ensure 
any changes to the Mining Charter did not detrimentally affect investment or employment in the 
sector.  This was something President Ramaphosa called for during his time as deputy 161
president when he encouraged government and industry to reenter negotiations for a new Mining 
Charter in 2017.  Changes to the latest iteration of the Mining Charter were not significant—162
new targets were introduced to better align the Charter with requirements in the BBBEE. An 
industry evaluation of the new Charter indicates the new compliance targets are less rigorous 
than previous draft Charters.  Like other initiatives before it, the Charter presents another 163
missed opportunity that South Africa’s leadership failed to capitalize on in order to advance an 
ambitious development agenda. Notwithstanding the legislative and policy measures enacted to 
eradicate poverty and promote socioeconomic development amongst South Africa’s most 
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disadvantaged populations, the implementation of this agenda has yet to have the meaningful 
effects the party has championed since 1994. 
b. Autonomous and effective bureaucracy 
 The second prong of the developmental state, an autonomous and effective bureaucracy, 
ensures a government’s development agenda can be successfully implemented with little political 
interference—only direction. Knowledge and skills were not hindrances in South Africa’s post-
apartheid civil service, compared to other African countries that were building new bureaucratic 
institutions after independence with a limited, educated workforce. Instead, South Africa’s civil 
service lacked the institutional infrastructure to enact a development agenda meant to uplift the 
country’s disadvantaged populations—apartheid-era ministries and government agencies were 
tasked with delivering services to the white minority.  Consequently, one of the ANC’s early 164
objectives was to create the necessary bureaucratic institutions to carry out its development 
agenda. 
 Reforming South Africa’s civil service was another priority for the ANC to solidify the 
transition from apartheid. The ANC sought to do this through more centralized government 
institutions that would permit the party to assert greater control over the implementation of its 
agenda.  According to South African political economists Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings, 165
two remnants of apartheid-era politics contributed to this approach. First, during the early years 
 Robert Cameron, “Public service reform in South Africa: from apartheid to new public management” in Andrew 164
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of the transition under the Government of National Unity,  a National Party affiliate was 166
appointed Minister of Finance in what Nattrass and Seekings contend was “an apparent effort to 
reassure local and international investors that there would be sound macro-economic 
management.”  Secondly, senior bureaucrats from the apartheid era were kept in their 167
positions. Although this continuity brought some stability to the transition, it could have hindered 
the ANC’s ability to govern if these senior bureaucrats attempted to derail the party’s agenda.  168
 To the ANC’s detriment, the institutions introduced to implement the RDP and GEAR 
were ineffective. The RDP Office could not effectively coordinate the government’s agenda 
across various departments. It was slow and inefficient, which reduced its credibility in the eyes 
of other ministries that were required to run some of their operations through the Office.  The 169
RDP Office’s inability to execute its mandate led to its closure and to restructured development 
planning under the GEAR. Various government ministries, including the Departments of 
Finance, Labour, Public Works, Housing, Education, Welfare, Trade and Industry, were 
responsible for implementing applicable elements of GEAR. This, too, was ineffective without a 
central institution in place to coordinate government policy across departments. As Nattrass and 
Seekings astutely observed, this “piecemeal” approach was an insufficient response to the major 
development challenges facing South Africa—“a much higher degree of institutional 
coordination [was] …necessary.”  170
 During South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democratic rule, a Government of National Unity was struck 166
to ensure a peaceful transition and to negotiate the desired changes to state institutions. An interim constitution was 
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 President Zuma attempted to reform the gap in South Africa’s bureaucratic institutions 
with the creation of the Department of Economic Development in 2009 and the National 
Planning Commission in 2010.  Soon after, each entity released separate national development 171
agendas: the New Growth Path issued by the Department of Economic Development; and the 
National Planning Commission’s National Development Plan 2030.  Although both proposals 172
endorsed the creation of a developmental state to carry out South Africa’s economic 
transformation, neither the Department nor the Commission possessed the status and authority to 
effectively implement either agenda.  Rather than streamline the developmental bureaucracy, 173
both the Department and the Commission are among a complex web of South African 
institutions that carry out development policies and programs, including 30 other national 
ministries and approximately 700 state-owned enterprises.  Despite the existence of these 174
institutions, South Africa’s bureaucratic institutions are not yet on par with those of established 
developmental states. 
c. Performance-oriented governance 
 To date, much of South Africa’s development agenda emerged as reactive measures to the 
demands of different constituencies, including the ANC’s base, foreign corporatists, and Black 
political elites. This occupation with appeasing political interests compromised the government’s 
ability to craft a development agenda focused on outcomes and delivery.  It also produced a 175
record of ad hoc proposals that hampered the creation of a holistic development plan that could 
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improve socioeconomic conditions for South Africa’s most disadvantaged populations.  In 176
addition to the evolving national development frameworks (from the RDP to GEAR to the NDP), 
reforms to the country’s mining regime exemplify the ANC’s lack of performance-oriented 
governance. 
 Developing new mining legislation was a priority for the ANC government after it came 
to power in 1994.  As the country’s economic engine, redistributing mining wealth and 177
enforcing minimal ownership requirements would improve Black economic conditions. This 
objective was first envisioned in the 1955 Freedom Charter, which called for restoring the 
country’s national wealth, including its minerals, to its people.  ANC nationalization of the 178
industry was investors’ greatest fear. The ANC abandoned this position articulated in the 
Freedom Charter and instead spent five years conducting consultations with the public, industry, 
mineworkers’ unions, and local governments to conclude a new mining and minerals policy.  179
The ANC’s dual vision for this policy was outlined in its 1998 Minerals and Mining Policy of 
South Africa: Green Paper,  which became official government policy when it was finalized in 180
October 1998 as the White Paper – A Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa.  The 181
government stated that making necessary changes to the industry required it to “[seek] changes 
and adjustments that are conducive to increased mineral investment and address past racial 
inequity without disturbing investor confidence.”  182
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 With these two objectives in mind, the government embarked on passing the MPRDA and 
its companion Mining Charter, which were both concluded by 2004. Despite efforts to assuage 
investors’ fears (through consultations with industry),  the MPRDA was called “the [ANC’s] 183
most interventionist legislation since 1994”  by Canada’s Export Development Agency when it 184
was first introduced in South Africa’s Parliament in June 2002.  The MPRDA overhauled South 185
Africa’s mining regime by eliminating dual ownership and vesting all mineral rights in the state. 
The responsible minister was also granted discretionary authority to grant, refuse, control and 
administer prospecting and mining, which investors argued created greater uncertainty.  186
Investors also criticized the Black economic empowerment requirements introduced in the 
MPRDA (and detailed in the Mining Charter) as being too onerous and a hindrance to market 
entry.  The requirements established in the Mining Charter included, inter alia, ownership 187
benchmarks for historically disadvantaged South Africans, expanded employment opportunities 
and skills training in mining communities, and promoted beneficiation of South Africa’s mineral 
commodities.  188
 In the five years after the MPRDA and Mining Charter were passed, neither proved 
successful in achieving the government’s stated dual objectives for the industry. Lost investment 
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was estimated to be between USD $0.7 billion and USD $1.4 billion a year by 2006,  despite 189
the global commodities boom at the time. A 2009 impact assessment of the Mining Charter 
showed the industry had not yet met the broad-based economic empowerment targets set out in 
2004, leading the report to conclude that  
the intended benefits flowing from the mining industry fall significantly below the expectations 
and aspirations of the majority of South Africans as intended by the Charter. To this extent, there is 
a degree of criticism levelled against the Mining Charter that in its current form, it is a blunt tool to 
address the broad based transformation agenda.  190
A year later, the government amended the Mining Charter. It was revised again in 2017 and 
concluded in 2018.  191
 The government’s inability to achieve desired outcomes through both the MPRDA and 
the Mining Charter is indicative of limitations performance-oriented governance presents when 
transforming a minerals regime to meet opposing objectives. First, both instruments were meant 
to alleviate racial disparities in the industry and thus ameliorate social and economic conditions 
among historically disadvantaged South Africans. Doing so inherently required the cooperation 
of corporations, several of which were foreign-owned and expressed concern with the 
government’s Black economic empowerment requirements. This revamped regulatory 
environment, however, was opposed by industry, which was dominated by foreign corporate 
interests. Thus the government’s second objective—to boost investment and productivity in the 
sector—was compromised. Consequently, for the South African government to satisfy this 
component of the developmental state, it must first ascertain which objective and subsequent 
performance targets are at the crux of its developmental agenda. Alternatively, it must determine 
how the two objectives can be reconciled.  
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d. Production coordination and conflict-management 
 Production coordination and conflict-management in the developmental state 
contemplates the efficacy of the state’s coordinative institutions. In South Africa, the state’s 
complex institutional framework limited the effective delivery of several development policies 
and the new mining governance regime. The country’s contentious post-apartheid development 
agenda also hindered the formulation of a cohesive approach that limited (or, at least, managed) 
conflict and ensured greater production coordination. 
 At the crux of this conflict was the conflict between a robust state-led approach to 
industrialization and mining, or sticking to the neoliberal economic path the ANC government 
adopted in 1994. South Africa’s multiple efforts to redirect its economic forces towards 
achieving developmental objectives–through the RDP, to GEAR, then the BBBEE—
demonstrated this tension and the government’s inability to effectively coordinate production and 
manage conflict. These policies relied on a strong private sector and the redistribution of some 
resources, which offered few opportunities for the state to play a more active role in making 
systemic changes to the economy.  Although it has adopted many features of a developmental 192
state, South Africa does not yet have the structures in place to effectively operate as one.  
5.3.2. South Africa’s mining developmental state institutions 
 The absence of a developmental state in South Africa did not prevent the ANC 
government from introducing several legal measures over the past 25 years that are equivalent to 
the MDSIs described in Chapter Three. Many of these initiatives were introduced via legislation 
that was intended to transform South Africa’s mining governance, including the MPRDA, the 
 Lee, supra note 6 at 94–95.192
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Mining Charter, and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act (MPRRA).  These 193
measures are discussed in this section using the criteria established in Chapter Three, followed 
by an examination of their functionalities in section 5.3.3. 
a. Enhancing local participation and content 
 Local participation and content in South Africa’s post-apartheid MDS has been primarily 
occupied with increasing the participation of historically disadvantaged South Africans, which 
includes individuals, associations and corporations.  White South Africans dominated 194
ownership and leadership positions in locally-owned mining companies that existed before the 
end of apartheid The Mining Charter is the primary statute used to advance local participation 
and content through a variety of different mechanisms: ownership, inclusive procurement, 
employee skills development, and employment equity.  Incorporating these different elements 195
into the Mining Charter has made South Africa’s local content and participation policies, one of 
the most robust components of its MDS. 
 All but one of the Charter’s elements is further subdivided into different categories. Table 
5.1  provides a summary of the key provisions: 196
 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, Act 28, 2008.193
 MPRDA, supra note 56 at s. 1.194
 Mining Charter, supra note 105 at sections 2.1–2.4.195
 Ibid. “Host community” is defined in the Charter as “a community within a local or metropolitan municipality 196
adjacent to the mining area.” According to the MPRDA, the “mining area” is the area for which the mining right or 
permit is granted.
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• Minimum 26 percent Black economic 
empowerment shareholding. 
• Renewal of an existing mining right shall be 




• Minimum 30 percent Black economic 
empowerment shareholding distributed in 
accordance with Mining Charter obligations, of 
which at least five percent must be bestowed to 
mining host communities.
Equity equivalent 
benefit for host 
communities
• The five percent shareholding benefit must be 
administered as a trust or a similar mechanism for 
the benefit of the host community. 
• Mining right holders must identify host 
community development needs in consultation 
with relevant municipalities, host communities, 
traditional authorities and affected stakeholders 








creating decent jobs  
Mining goods • A minimum of 70 percent of total mining goods 
procured must be South African manufactured 
goods. 
• Of that 70 percent, 21 percent must be spent on 
goods produced by companies owned and 
controlled by historically disadvantaged persons, 




market access to the 
country’s goods and 
services.”
Services • A minimum of 80 percent of the total services 
procured must be sourced from a South African 
based company. 
• Of that 80 percent, 50 percent must be spent on 
services supplied by companies owned and 
controlled by historically disadvantaged persons, 
and 10 percent by a Black economic 
empowerment compliant company.  




Mining rights holders must verify adherence to 
local content requirements by receiving certification 




• Enterprise and supplier development is intended 
to strengthen local procurement and enhance the 
competitiveness of South African goods and 
services. 
• Mining right holders may invest in supplier and 
enterprise development to offset up to 30 percent 
of its total procurement budget on mining goods, 
and 10 percent of services.
Human resource 
development: 
“…to produce a 
skilled, trained and 
diverse workforce…






None. • A mining right holder must invest a minimum of 
five percent on essential skills development in 
such areas as science, technology, engineering, 
research and development of solutions in 
exploration, mining, processing, and 
beneficiation. 





equity in the 
workplace.” 
Board • A minimum of 50 percent historically 
disadvantaged persons with exercisable voting 
rights, 20 percent of which must be women.
Executive 
management
• A minimum of 50 percent historically 
disadvantaged persons at the executive level, 20 
percent of which must be women.
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 The breadth and depth of local content and procurement obligations in the Mining 
Charter reflected the government’s acknowledgement of its importance, which went beyond 
simply procuring goods and services from local companies. Under the banner of Black economic 
empowerment, the South Africa government implemented a holistic approach to local content 
requirements that attempted to rectify historical racial injustice in the industry. Consequently, the 
obligations not only demanded that goods and services be procured locally, but that a certain 
percentage must also be sourced from companies owned and controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons. Additionally, further obligations were imposed that were directed at 
transforming mining corporations and communities. Representation of historically disadvantaged 
Senior and middle 
management
• A minimum of 60 percent historically 




• A minimum of 70 percent historically 
disadvantaged persons, 35 percent of which must 
be women.
Core and critical 
skills
• Mining rights holders must ensure that a 
minimum of 60 percent historically 
disadvantaged persons are represented in its core 
and critical skills, including science, technology, 
and engineering. 
• To achieve this obligation, a mining right holder 
must identify and implement its existing skills 




• A mining right holder must develop and 
implement a career progression plan consistent 
with the demographics of the country that 
includes individual development plans for 
employees, and a comprehensive plan with 
targets, timeframes and implementation 
framework.
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persons (including specific targets for women in some areas) must be increased at all levels of 
mining corporations, from ownership and human resource development to board makeup. Equity 
equivalent benefits for mining communities, which were designed to advance local community 
development interests, were also imposed. With these robust obligations, South Africa’s Mining 
Charter was designed to increase employment and advancement opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged South Africans. 
 Implementing these obligations, however, has proven difficult. The Mining Charter faced 
significant resistance and underwent several revisions since the first version was finalized in 
2004.  More recently, the Minerals Council South Africa (MCSA) launched a legal challenge in 197
response to the 2018 version of the Charter (parts of which are detailed above).  As the 198
organization representing mining interests in South Africa, the MCSA alleged that the Charter 
would discourage new investment in the industry. In its application for judicial review, the 
MCSA challenged the legality of the Charter, contending that the Charter is merely policy and 
not law, and that the Charter was not intended to be subordinate legislation of the MPRDA. The 
MCSA also challenged Charter provisions that imposed Black economic empowerment 
shareholding obligations on the ownership of new and existing mining rights.   199
 As the case makes its way through the courts, implementation of one of South Africa’s 
more robust MDSIs remains uncertain. Ongoing challenges and lack of industry buy-in suggests 
the Charter’s legal functionalities may be limiting its impact. These impediments are considered 
further in section 5.3.3. 
 Heyns & Mostert, supra note 94 at 803.197
 Njini, supra note 107.198
 Judicial Review of the Mining Charter (Founding Affidavit of the Applicant at para 48.3 and 50), online: 199
Minerals Council South Africa <https://www.mineralscouncil.org.za/special-features/724-court-documents>.
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b. Developing cross-sectoral linkages 
 Historically, upstream linkages to other South African industries have been more 
entrenched than downstream linkages, due to the enclave nature of South Africa’s mining 
industry. Access to construction materials, machinery, transport equipment, and engineering and 
financial services was well established in South Africa and contributed to the growth and 
dominance of its mining industry domestically.  In contrast, linkages to downstream industries, 200
particularly the beneficiation of minerals, were less constituted.  Raw minerals exports have 201
dominated South Africa’s mining industry over the past century.  Hence, beneficiation forms 202
the crux of the government’s current priorities in this component of its MDS. 
 Ministerial authority to promote mineral beneficiation is included in section 26 of the 
MPRDA. The mandate grants the Minister to “initiate or prescribe incentives to promote the 
beneficiation of minerals in the Republic.”  This geographical limitation is enforced in 203
subsection 3, which requires that “[a]ny person who intends to beneficiate any mineral mined in 
the Republic outside the Republic may only do so after written notice and in consultation with 
the Minister.”  In 2011, the South African government launched its mineral beneficiation 204
strategy. Recognizing the contributions beneficiation could make to advancing the country’s 
development goals, the policy includes strategies to promote downstream linkages in energy 
commodities (such as coal, uranium and thorium), iron and steel, titanium, and precious metals 
 Jourdan, supra note 12 at 111; Paseka Leeuw & Hudson Mtegha, “The significance of mining backward and 200
forward linkages in reskilling redundant mine workers in South Africa” (2018) 56 Resources Policy 31 at 35.
 The mining industry’s linkages to manufacturing are one exception. Recent figures estimate that mines sold USD 201
$24.8 billion to the manufacturing sector, compared to USD $6 billion to other sectors (Leeuw & Mtegha, ibid).
 Department of Mineral Resources, A Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa (June 2011) 202
at iii [Beneficiation Strategy].
 MPRDA, supra note 6 at s. 26(1).203
 Ibid at s. 26(3).204
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(gold, platinum, and diamond) value chains.  Each strategy contemplates government 205
interventions necessary for effective implementation. For example, the precious metals strategy 
includes establishing schemes to ensure access to minerals, creating a structured training 
programme to ensure sustained beneficiation, promoting increased investment in the jewelry 
sector, and providing continuous support to private sector initiatives, such as the Kgabane 
Jewellery Programme, that manufacture jewelry locally.  206
 Critics of South Africa’s current push for increased minerals beneficiation contend that it 
detracts resources and investment from upstream linkages that could boost mining, especially 
infrastructure development around mines, including roads, railways, and power lines.  This 207
critique, however, treats mining as a zero-sum development strategy rather than one that is multi-
tiered and offers multiple developmental avenues. Minerals beneficiation is not the panacea that 
will solve all of South Africa’s development challenges. Nonetheless, it offers an additional 
strategic tool in the government’s mining developmentalism toolbox. Moving forward, the South 
African government should prioritize the proper legal functionality of this strategy to ensure its 
success. 
c. Broader resource nationalism 
  The MPRDA was derided by industry and foreign governments as being interventionist 
and nationalistic when it was concluded in 2002.  Fundamentally, the MPRDA was used to 208
overhaul an industry that promoted the interests of a small elite and entrenched racial and 
 Beneficiation Strategy, supra note 202 at 13–18.205
 Ibid at 19.206
 South African Institute of Race Relations, “Multipliers from Mining: Upstream Development as an Alternative to 207
Beneficiation Policy in South Africa” (February 2019), online: <https://irr.org.za/reports/atLiberty/files/
liberty_2014_issue-40_2014_multipliers-from-mining-04-03-2019.pdf> at 1.
 Butler, supra note 56 at 256.208
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economic injustice in the country for nearly a century. South Africa’s post-apartheid leadership 
recognized that drastic reformation was the only way this could be achieved. Many of the 
MPRDA provisions that can be described as broader resource nationalism, as explained in 
Chapter Three, brought South Africa in line with its counterparts across the region, including 
Botswana and Zambia. Additionally, the MPRRA was another instrument that instituted broader 
resource nationalism in the industry. 
 State custodianship of minerals was a significant component of South Africa’s MDS. 
Articulated in sections 2(a), (b) and 3, the MPRDA implemented the internationally accepted 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in South Africa for the first time. As 
discussed previously, minerals were privately owned in the country in accordance with British 
common law. The MPRDA overhauled that system of ownership and declared that “[m]ineral…
resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the custodian 
thereof for the benefit of all South Africans.”  In addition to state custodianship, the MPRDA 209
introduced greater ministerial discretion to “grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and 
manage”  mining rights. This authority increased the state’s power and control over the mining 210
industry, such that it could be directed towards meeting several objectives, such as ensuring the 
sustainable development of South Africa’s minerals, promoting equitable access to mineral 
resources, and directing mining rights holders to contribute to the socioeconomic development of 
the areas in which they operate.  211
 MPRDA, supra note 56 at s. 3.1.209
 Ibid at s. 3.2(a)210
 Ibid at s. 2.211
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 The MPRRA implemented the government’s new royalty regime under the MPRDA. Due 
to the new system of state ownership, royalties were to be applied universally and not in the 
fragmented way it had been before 1994.  After years of consultations and various drafts, the 212
new royalty regime promulgated in the MPRRA imposed a rate that was calculated by 
multiplying the gross sales of the extractor in a given year by a percentage formula based on 
whether the minerals were refined or unrefined. Regardless of which formula was used, the rate 
was capped at five percent.  According to F.T. Cawood, a South African mining engineering 213
professor and expert on royalty rates, the MPRRA regime was comparable to others 
internationally. Average rates under the scheme did not exceed three percent, which fell within 
the international range.   214
 Although South Africa’s new state custodianship and royalty regimes ushered in a new 
era for the industry, they were not as extreme expressions of resource nationalism as critics made 
them seem. Certainly, the reforms overhauled the status quo and altered laws and legal 
institutions that had been in place for decades. However, the new system introduced changes that 
were aligned with international norms meant to ensure widespread benefits were derived from 
the country’s mineral resources. 
5.3.3. Assessing legal functionalities in South Africa’s mining developmental state 
 The precarity of South Africa’s MDSIs reveals much about their legal functionalities. The 
longterm sustainability of some, notably the Mining Charter and the minerals beneficiation 
 Although mineral rights were historically tied to land ownership, some ad hoc royalty schemes emerged in 212
response to significant mining developments, including the early twentieth century gold mines in Witwatersrand (FT 
Cawood, “The South African mineral and petroleum resources royalty act—Background and fundamental 
principles” (2010) 35 Resources Policy 199 at 201.
 MPRRA, supra note 193 at s. 2-4.213
 Cawood, supra note 212 at 207.214
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strategy, suggests new challenges for law in South Africa’s MDS. The following sections use 
Trubek, Countinho, and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework to assess South Africa’s 
MDSIs. 
a. Safeguarding flexibility and framing synergy 
 Law-making related to mining governance has been a contentious endeavour in post-
apartheid South Africa. Redressing historical economic and racial injustice in the mining 
industry was an early priority for the ANC government. Such an undertaking necessitated 
legislation that proposed drastic reforms to the status quo and threatened elite interests. Despite 
the potential for South Africa’s MDSIs to dramatically transform the mining industry to promote 
widespread socioeconomic development, few advancements have been made. These prongs of 
Trubeck, Coutinho, and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework implies a cooperative and 
collaborative relationship between the state and the private sector. South Africa’s recent history 
has shown this could be disadvantageous to the country’s most marginalized people. 
Additionally, the framework does not offer clarity regarding the balance between the two actors, 
and which actor could, or should, compromise its interests in the name of development. The 
state’s experience with the Mining Charter has been a great example of this conundrum. 
 The industry’s ongoing objection to the Mining Charter has hindered South Africa’s 
attempts to implement its developmental agenda. Despite the industry’s lack of cooperation, the 
ANC government instituted measures to respond to some of the industry’s concerns. However, 
reform efforts also contemplated the interests of the government’s base—the mostly poor, 
disadvantaged South Africans who have not yet benefited from changes imposed on the industry. 
Moving forward, striving for greater flexibility and synergy within state-industry relations could 
242
likely enhance the developmental prospects of mining in South Africa, as this element of Trubek, 
Coutinho, and Schapiro’s framework suggests. However, this should not be undertaken at the 
expense of implementing developmental objectives that go beyond the minimum requirements to 
which industry would agree. 
b. Stimulating orchestration 
 Institutional coordination was one of the early hurdles affecting South Africa’s new post-
apartheid government. The proliferation of relevant ministries and departments hindered the 
creation of cohesive policies designed to implement the government’s early developmental 
agenda. Over time, entities responsible for mining began to engage more meaningfully across 
government departments, from senior leadership to various ministries. Insufficient levels of 
vertical coordination with industry have remained a significant obstacle, particularly as the 
private sector continues to oppose the Mining Charter. Vertical coordination with labour unions 
has been one of the stronger relationships the ANC government has maintained, with labour 
regularly consulted as the Mining Charter was being drafted.  Government coordination with 215
labour remains vital, however, to ensure violence against mineworkers—like the massacre at 
Marikana—does not occur again. 
 Mining-affected communities (or their representatives) were a constituency that 
government neglected to formally consult during the development of the Mining Charter. 
Community organizations sought judicial review of an earlier draft of the Charter as a result. 
Their challenge was successful, as the government was ordered to expand consultations to 
include mining communities. Unfortunately, the government failed to act; community concerns 
 Centre for Applied Legal Studies, “Mining Charter”, online: University of the Witwatersrand <https://215
www.wits.ac.za/cals/our-programmes/environmental-justice/mining-charter/>.
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were only communicated during the obligatory public consultation process.  This lack of 216
proper consultation with mining-affected communities has limited the effective implementation 
of South Africa’s MDSIs. 
c. Ensuring legitimacy 
 The ongoing contestations among various actors—local communities, historically 
disadvantaged populations, and industry—affected by mining in South Africa inhibit the 
government’s ability to ensure legitimacy. Although the ANC has enjoyed widespread electoral 
support, it has waned over the years. The government’s position on several mining matters has 
also faced resistance from industry, labour, civil society, the general public, and mining-affected 
communities. This raises the question: what should legitimacy look like in South Africa? Trubek, 
Coutinho, and Schapiro suggest this requires government’s ensure adequate participation in the 
development of new state activism. This could entail public and corporate participation, which 
would depend on the interventions being contemplated by the state. In South Africa’s case, the 
resistance corporations have mounted to its developmental agenda have proven to be one of the 
greatest obstacles to its full implementation. Therefore, ensuring the state garners and balances 
legitimacy from the mining industry with that of local communities may be critical to the success 
of South Africa’s mining developmental state. 
 However, balancing these disparate interests will likely be challenging for the state. 
Perhaps providing the opportunity for public consultation and engagement has been sufficient 
while the government continues to work with industry to implement the Mining Charter. 
Nonetheless, given the state has equated its developmental agenda to transforming the mining 
 Ibid.216
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industry and making it work for all South Africans, demonstrable concern for the stakeholders 
with the most at stake—labour (both current and future) and mining-affected communities—
should be the paramount for ensuring legitimacy in South Africa’s mining developmental state. 
5.4. From economic engine to driving development: realizing a rights-based 
approach to mining governance in South Africa 
 Despite its emphasis on “economic empowerment,” South Africa’s mining developmental 
state includes few mechanisms that promulgate the rights-based approach to mining governance 
by mandating the participation, consultation or consent of mining-affected communities. Thus 
far, reversing the negative legacy of apartheid in this area has proven to be slow. As previously 
discussed, land dispossession was a critical component of apartheid governance. Restoring these 
rights, mandating consultation, and directing mining rights holders to promote mine community 
development have been the key tenets of South Africa’s rights-based approach to mining 
governance, with varying levels of successful implementation. Although the state has yet to fully 
implement certain measures, the fundamental nature of these rights has been adopted in recent 
jurisprudence, which has advanced community interests beyond the legal minimum in some 
instances. 
 South Africa’s early rights-based approach to mining governance was grounded in its 
Constitution and the 1996 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA).  Where 217
the Constitution entrenched environmental and property rights for all, the IPILRA was introduced 
to address a gap in the restoration and protection of dispossessed South Africans’ land rights. 
 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, Act 31 of 1996. “Informal right to land” was defined in section 1 217
of the IPILRA as land used or occupied in accordance with “any tribal, customary or indigenous law or practice of a 
tribe” or land deprived through specific government action, including the Bantustans.
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Although “interim” was included in the title of the legislation, it remains in force today.  The 218
IPILRA restored community rights to land, and mandated that “no person may be deprived of any 
informal right to land without his or her consent.”  Additionally, any communities that held 219
land communally were granted the right to use customary law when during decision-making 
processes regarding their land, regardless of the powers held by any traditional leaders.  220
Despite the potential for the IPILRA to advance state enforcement of community rights, the state 
neglected to implement it fully, nor did it promulgate any regulations. Instead, South African 
courts have shown a greater willingness to use the statute to uphold and recognize informal land 
rights, most recently in Maledu and Others v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited 
and Another  and Baleni and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources.  Both cases, discussed 221 222
in greater detail later in this section, challenged mining rights that had been granted without 
appropriate consultation. 
 Parts of the MPRDA also contribute to South Africa’s rights-based approach to mining 
governance. A state obligation to consult “with interested and affected parties” is included in 
section 10(1) of the Act, which requires the state (through the office of the appropriate Regional 
Manager, the government’s representative in a given region) to consult with the parties within 14 
days of receiving an application for a prospecting right, mining right, or mining permit.  223
Section 3 of the MPRDA Regulations  details the government’s consultation requirement, 224
 Oxfam & Legal Resources Centre, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industries in Southern 218
Africa: An Analysis of Legislation and their Implementation in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia” (3 October 2018), online: <https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/publications/free-prior-and-informed-
consent-in-the-extractive-industries-in-southern-africa/> at 55.
 IPILRA, supra note 217 at 2.1.219
 Oxfam & LRC, supra note 218 at 56.220
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which amounts to a 30-days comments submission process open to all members of the public. In 
addition to section 10, the environmental assessment provisions of the MPRDA also include 
mandatory engagement requirements with interested and affected persons during assessment. 
The details must be included in the mining applicant’s final environmental impact assessment 
report.  Private actor duties to consult are included in sections 16(4) and 22(4) of the MPRDA. 225
Both sections impose obligations for prospecting right and mining right applicants, respectively, 
to consult with affected persons once the Regional Manager accepts the application. 
 The concurrent consultation obligations in the IPILRA and the MPRDA have not been 
applied as such by the South African government; rather, the requirements in the MPRDA have, 
in effect, displaced the rights enacted in the IPILRA. Recent jurisprudence, however, has clarified 
this relationship. In both Maledu and Baleni, South African courts clarified the application of 
IPILRA rights when in conflict with the MPRDA. Maledu concerned a community’s challenge of 
a mining right issued over land they claimed ownership because it had belonged to their 
ancestors before they were evicted in the early 1900s. The Constitutional Court held that despite 
the government properly granting the respondent’s mining rights in accordance with the 
MPRDA, the applicant’s rights under the IPILRA were not complied with.  Essentially, the 226
Constitutional Court found that the MPRDA must be read in congruence with the IPILRA.  227
Following Maledu, the High Court of Pretoria heard Baleni, a case that involved the 
Umgungundlovu community’s challenge of a mining right granted in their ancestral lands in 
Xolobeni, Eastern Cape. Applying the holding in Maledu, the High Court concluded that not 
 Ibid at s. 50(f).225
 Maledu, supra note 221 at para 105.226
 Ibid at para 106.227
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only must the MPRDA and IPILRA be read together, but that the consent obligation in the 
IPILRA requires the “free, prior and informed consent” of the affected community in accordance 
with several international legal obligations, including the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights.  228
 Affirmation of the right to free, prior and informed consent in Baleni is a positive step 
towards implementing a robust rights-based approach to mining governance in South Africa. 
The court did not, however, problematize community representation in the community despite 
concerns with the authority of traditional leaders and their close connections with the mining 
company.  Since the case was decided in 2018, government willingness to legislate FPIC and 229
adequately address any deficiencies in its meaningful implementation remains unclear. Proposed 
amendments to the MPRDA Regulations would add “meaningful consultation” to its definitions, 
which would oblige that the  
applicant, has in good faith engaged the landowner, lawful occupier or interested and affected 
party in respect of the land subject to the application about the impact the prospecting or mining 
activities would have to his right of use of the land by availing all the information pertaining to the 
proposed activities enabling these parties to make an informed decision regarding the impact of the 
proposed activities.   230
Additionally, the definition of “interested and affected persons” would be expanded to include 
host communities, landowners (traditional and title deed owners), and holders of informal rights. 
However, the proposal for “meaningful consultation” with interested and affected persons is not 
contemplated anywhere in the rest of the draft amendments. Realizing a rights-based approach to 
mining governance in South Africa could require further judicial intervention if the state remains 
unwilling to give effect to free, prior and informed consent in future legislation.  
 Baleni, supra note 222 at para 82.228
 Daniel Huizenga, “Governing territory in conditions of legal pluralism: Living law and free, prior, and informed 229
consent (FPIC) in Xolobeni, South Africa” (2019) 6:3 The Extractive Industries and Society 711 at 716.
 Draft Amendments to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations, 2019 No. R. 1554 at 230
section 1(c) (emphasis added). 
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 Moreover, legislating free, prior and informed consent would require that the state 
address any potential implementation challenges. First, the definition of “interested and affected 
persons” should be revised to ensure that any qualifying parties actually represent community 
interests and affected rights-holders, and would not only take into account the interests of self-
declared spokespersons. This would require the Ministry clearly identify community leaders and 
empower local decision-making.    231
5.5. Conclusion 
 South Africa’s post-apartheid experience offers many insights into the efficacy of the 
developmental state paradigm to govern mining. Unlike Botswana’s experience, in which 
corporate partnerships proved beneficial to some successful elements of the country’s mining 
developmental state, corporate interests have hindered the successful implementation of the 
paradigm in South Africa. This is not to suggest that the model could not operate in the South 
African context; rather, it is indicative of some obstacles that obstruct full implementation of the 
paradigm within some mining-dependent countries.  
 Additionally, South Africa’s experience illustrates the important role that courts may play 
in realizing a rights-based approach to governing mining developmentalism. The South African 
state has adopted the requisite legislative and policy instruments that could contribute to a robust 
mining developmental state; however, the state has lacked the requisite institutional apparatus to 
fully implement it. Overcoming decades of racial and economic injustice surely cannot be done 
quickly; and until the concerns of the most vulnerable stakeholders—namely mining-affected 
 Oxfam & LRC, supra note 218 at 62.231
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communities—are prioritized, implementing the rights-based mining developmental state will 
only take longer. 
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6  Reversing the Neoliberal Legacy? Mining Developmentalism in 
Zambia  1
6.1. Introduction 
 Of the three case studies, Zambia epitomizes the “paradox of plenty”  crisis that has 2
afflicted resource-rich African states. At independence, Zambia was blessed with an established 
mining industry and was described as a nation “born with a copper spoon in its mouth.”  Despite 3
its good fortune, Zambia has yet to fully realize the benefits of its mineral wealth. Zambia’s 
failed attempts can be attributed to the “resource curse” —its over-reliance on mining made the 4
country vulnerable to volatile copper prices over the past 40 years as it neglected to diversify its 
economy away from mining or to expand opportunities within the industry by promoting sectoral 
linkages.  Zambia’s economy continued to depend on mining: as Africa’s largest producer of 5
copper and cobalt, mining accounts for 12 percent of Zambia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
70 percent of its total export value and 62 percent of all foreign direct investment in the country.  6
However, as much as Zambia’s mining-led development failings can be attributed to the resource 
curse, it could also be due to poor timing and bad luck.  7
 Most of this chapter was adapted from a chapter on mining land conflict in Zambia published during my doctoral 1
studies: “Can free, prior and informed consent help combat mining land use conflicts in Zambia?” in Amissi 
Manirabona & Yenny Vega Cárdenas, eds, Extractive Industries and Human Rights in an Era of Global Justice: New 
Ways of Resolving and Preventing Conflicts (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2019) 313. It is reprinted here with the 
publisher’s permission.
 Francis B Nyamnjoh & Ignasio M Jimu, “Success or Failure of Developmental States in Africa: Exploration of the 2
Development Experiences in a Global Context” in Pamela Mbabazi & Ian Taylor, eds, The Potentiality of 
‘Developmental States’ in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005) 16 at 18.
 Christopher S Adam & Anthony M Simpasa, “The Economics of the Copper Price Boom in Zambia” in Alastair 3
Fraser & Miles Larmer, eds, Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized Copperbelt 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 59 at 85.
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 The success of Zambia’s copper industry—before and after independence—was directly 
linked to the global economy and its effect on the price of copper. The Great Depression of 1929 
began just after the opening of Zambia’s copper mines, decimating commodity prices.  In the 8
early 1970s, after Zambia’s first independent government under President Kenneth Kaunda 
decided to nationalize the mines and ensure greater benefits for the state from a burgeoning 
industry, copper prices declined and remained low for nearly 30 years as the country dealt with 
neoliberal structural adjustment programmes that privatized the national mining company. At the 
turn of the century, as prices experienced a boost, the Zambian government implemented a 
windfall tax to again ensure the state benefitted from revenue generation from copper mining.  9
Copper prices declined in response, forcing the government to reverse its stance even as prices 
recovered. The country continues to search for ways to govern the sector and promote mining-led 
development.   10
 As Zambia continues to find ways to ensure meaningful economic benefits from mining, 
it is simultaneously attempting to reconstruct its human rights regime by contemplating the 
adoption of the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) obligation on mining companies. In 
February 2018, the Government of Zambia concluded consultations on its Draft National Land 
Policy, the first policy of its kind in Zambia since the country gained independence from Great 
Britain in 1964.  The policy aims to grant equal access to land for all Zambians and to 11
implement an efficient land administration and management system that supports sustainable 
 Ibid at 2.8
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 Chris Phiri, “Enough is Enough, Lungu Tells Mines” (May 17, 2019), online: Zambia Reports <https://10
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development.  Wide-ranging in its scope, the policy addresses pressing issues related to rural 12
settlements, agricultural land, housing, and mining land. Within its proposed changes to mining 
land administration is “Objective 34: To ensure that mining developers adopt principles of Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent of local people for decisions that may affect them.”  The proposed 13
obligation is twofold, requiring mining developers to “conclude agreements that recognize the 
land rights of local communities” and “develop specific policies to address involuntary 
displacement in line with international best practice.”  14
 Due to Zambia’s continued reliance on mining, its historically complex land tenure 
system, and its troubled experience with neoliberal policy incursions in its mining sector, 
adoption of the FPIC standard offers local communities the means to protect their rights and 
interests  and help redirect the country towards a rights-based approach to mining governance. 15
This chapter will explore how FPIC, as it is envisioned in the Draft National Land Policy, could 
contribute to a rights-based approach to mining governance in Zambia. Before completing that 
analysis in section 6.4, section 6.2 first provides a historical overview of mining and 
development in Zambia, from colonialism to the present. Section 6.3 then examines Zambia’s 
aspiring mining developmental state, considers how and why it does fit the model and concludes 
by applying Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework to Zambia’s 
attempted mining developmental state institutions. Section 6.4 discusses Zambia’s efforts to 
redirect its mining governance towards a rights-based approach by examining the Draft National 
Land Policy’s FPIC requirement and specific implementation challenges. The section concludes 
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with a consideration of specific recommendations that contemplate adopting the obligation in 
accordance with a rights-based approach to mining governance. Section 6.5 concludes the 
chapter with a brief discussion of factors that have impeded Zambia’s implementation of a 
successful mining developmental state, which will be examined further in Chapter 7. 
6.2. Mining and development in Zambia: from colonialism to the present 
 The management and administration of mining and land have been contentious issues in 
Zambia. Much of the foundation for Zambia’s contemporary challenges can be traced to the 
colonial period when the British colonial administration  first enacted Zambia’s mining regime 
and land tenure system.  In addition to laying the foundation for most of Zambia’s post-colonial 16
mining governance, British colonial rule was also instrumental in crafting the country’s 
development priorities through its ties to private sector investment in the industry. Zambian 
historians split the country’s colonial era into two distinct periods: the first, from 1890-1923 
when the colony was administered by the British South Africa Company (BSAC); and second, 
from 1924 until independence in 1964 when the colonial administration was under the control of 
Britain’s Colonial Office.  Both periods, and their contributions to Zambia’s mining and 17
development trajectory, are discussed in the following section before Zambia’s turn to 
neoliberalism and its attempts at reversing Washington Consensus policies are examined. 
 John Kangwa, “Zambia: ‘Having a Place of Your Own’ in Kitwe’ in Robert Home & Hilary Lam, eds, 16
Demystifying the Mystery of Capital: Land Tenure and Poverty in Africa and the Caribbean (Portland: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2004) 121 at 125.
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6.2.1. Settlers and local resistance during the colonial and early post-colonial periods 
 British incursion into what is now Zambia began during the scramble for Africa in the 
late eighteenth century. Like the Bechuanaland Protectorate (colonial Botswana), colonial 
Zambia was part of Cecil Rhodes’ expansion of British holdings in Cape Colony. Through a 
series of treaties negotiated with local rulers in Barotseland (what is now western Zambia), 
Rhodes’ BSAC established Northern Rhodesia and administered the territory on behalf of the 
British Crown.  In its early years, the BSAC saw little benefit in Northern Rhodesia—the 18
colony became expensive to administer, and no exploitable natural resources were immediately 
evident.  To manage the high costs of administration, the BSAC undertook two measures to help 19
raise revenue: the settlement of European farmers and the implementation of a “hut tax” on local 
Zambian houses.  With the rise in the white settler population, Rhodes’ vision for the colony 20
morphed into one “ruled by whites, developed by Indians and worked by Africans.”  This 21
position, and the implementation of the hut tax, led many Zambians to work in Southern 
Rhodesian and South African mines.  Zambians became a labour source as settlers and the 22
colonial administration accumulated wealth. To maintain this system and combat Zambian 
resistance, the BSAC leaned heavily on the local authority of chiefs to collect taxes.  With 23
BSAC’s dominance and the growing settler population, this was likely the only instance in which 
colonial rulers utilized and integrated local institutions into its administration. Although local 
 Ibid. Northern Rhodesia was officially created in 1911, after the BSAC amalgamated Northeastern and 18
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systems of authority were maintained, their diminished role in colonial administration could have 
limited their influence on post-colonial institutions and governance.    24
 By the mid-1920s, BSAC could no longer operate Northern Rhodesia profitably. Control 
was relinquished to the British Colonial Office, which moved to strengthen settler influence in 
the colony by increasing their numbers through land grants.  Before BSAC’s administration 25
ended, copper deposits were discovered in the area that became known as the Copperbelt, home 
to the majority of Zambia’s mines. Despite ending its administration of the colony, BSAC 
retained the mineral rights and entered into agreements with two mining companies—the Roan 
Selection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation—to begin commercial mining at the Roan 
Antelope Mine located near Luanshya.  With the opportunities quickly generated by the 26
Copperbelt, “mining became the backbone of Northern Rhodesia’s social, economic and political 
development.”  Racial employment inequities were further entrenched as white semi-skilled 27
settlers migrated to the region to take up new jobs at the mines. Zambian labour was also 
attracted to the mines, which saw many Zambians leave their communities to earn wages that 
could pay the tax.  28
 British laws also became the law of Northern Rhodesia when the colony was created in 
1911.  Britain’s land law was adopted and coexisted alongside a conventional system of 29
landholding. In 1928, the British colonial administration entrenched the dual land title system 
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through the Northern Rhodesia (Crown Land and Native Reserves) Order that restricted Crown 
land to European settlers and “native reserves … ‘for the sole and exclusive use of the natives of 
Northern Rhodesia.’”  Like other dual land title colonial systems, potentially profitable mining 30
land was vested in the Crown.  Black Zambians were further dispossessed of land ownership 31
through the implementation of policies prohibiting the formation of permanent settlements for 
Black Zambians on Crown land in the Copperbelt. Zambians who relocated to the mines for 
work were housed in accommodations provided by the mines, leading to the creation of informal 
settlements in the Copperbelt.  32
 Reclaiming economic and political power from the white settler population launched 
Zambia’s long march to independence during the last decade of colonial rule. The settler 
population strengthened its political power from 1924 to 1954 as the British Colonial Office 
sought to placate the group’s political demands and prioritized its interests over Zambians.  In 33
an effort to consolidate European influence in Southern Africa, white settlers campaigned for the 
amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) 
in a new Central Africa Federation.  Elevating white minority rule was the Federation’s top 34
priority. However, the group acknowledged this was not sustainable without the allyship of local 
African elites from the business and working class. Despite the group’s efforts to create a 
multiracial society, African elites opposed the Federation and formed political parties to fight for 
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independence.  The Zambia African National Congress and its successor, the United National 35
Independence Party (UNIP), adopted a populist approach to African nationalism that sought to 
wrestle political power away from the settler minority and reclaim Africa for the Africans. Under 
the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, gaining control over Zambia’s political institutions would 
ultimately lead to control over state revenue, which would then allow them to dictate the course 
of economic development in the country.   36
 After the defeat of the proposed Federation, settlers and the British Colonial Office 
continued to push for a multiracial government that some Zambian leaders felt left the door open 
to majority rule.  UNIP, however, continued to resist until majority rule could be achieved. In 37
January 1964, UNIP’s plan came closer to fruition as it won Zambia’s legislative elections and 
formed a cabinet, with Kenneth Kaunda as Prime Minister. Five months later, constitutional talks 
were held with the aim of pressuring Britain to grant independence. UNIP succeeded—the talks 
concluded with a plan to grant colonial Zambia independence on October 24, 1964.  President 38
Kaunda became Zambia’s first President and remained in power until 1991.  
 Zambia’s economic prospects at independence were positive. During colonial rule, 
Zambia’s mining industry acquired the necessary capital and infrastructure to compete.  At 39
independence, the UNIP government successfully negotiated the transfer of mining royalties, 
which were still being paid to BSAC, to the Zambian state.  Copper mining remained 40
 Ibid at 102.35
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prosperous and propelled Zambia to the status of a middle-income country, with one of the 
highest per capita GDPs in Africa and higher than Brazil, Malaysia and South Korea, some of 
the world’s leading economies today.  To remain competitive, Zambia required the necessary 41
foreign investment to compensate for its limited domestic financial resources and sustain its 
capital intensive industry. As a land-locked country with underground mines in a complex 
geographical region, Zambia’s industry needed foreign investors willing to front the high costs of 
production and the provision of “complementary inputs” —such as transport, power and 42
communication networks—to sustain its growth.  43
 Land ownership in Zambia drastically changed at independence, but the new tenure 
system failed to resolve the legal issue surrounding informal settlements in the Copperbelt.  44
Under Zambia’s new constitution, all former Crown land was vested in the president and 
converted to state-owned land.  Customary land title, as it was recognized under colonial rule, 45
remained and was constitutionally protected in independent Zambia. Further complicating the 
issue of access to land for native Zambians was the ownership of Zambia’s mines, which 
remained under the control of foreign corporations when the country gained its independence in 
1964. Access to land was not an immediate concern for the UNIP. Instead, high copper prices 
buttressed President Kaunda’s economic development plans, allowing the new independence 
government to focus its efforts on matters of immediate concern, including the promotion of 
wide-scale industrialization that would shed remnants of the colonial economy and alleviate 
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poverty.  Driven by his policy of “Zambian humanism,”  President Kaunda sought to improve 46 47
the wellbeing of Zambia’s population through five-year National Development Plans that would 
direct government revenue from copper mining to fulfil his social development agenda: building 
schools and hospitals, and subsidizing state-owned manufacturing companies.  Zambia’s first 48
development plan, the 1964 Seers Report, confirmed the need to attract foreign investment and 
create an environment attractive to such investment.  49
 However, the global pricing system for copper—which saw prices set on the world 
market and the mineral sold on the London Metal Exchange—meant foreign mining companies 
repatriated profits outside of Zambia and offered few benefits to the state beyond royalties.  50
Soon after independence, President Kaunda attempted to reverse this inequity in partnership with 
other leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement seeking a New International Economic Order at the 
United Nations. President Kaunda’s idea was a “price- and quota-fixing copper cartel”  (similar 51
to the oil cartel OPEC) that was comprised of the world’s leading copper-exporting countries: 
Chile, Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo), Peru, and Zambia.  The group, which called 52
itself the Intergovernmental Conference of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), failed to 
achieve OPEC’s level of influence: it controlled less than 60 percent of global copper trade; it did 
not count major producers, such as Canada, amongst its members; and it failed to reach 
consensus on key long-term strategic issues, including the management of copper supplies.  53
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 Despite its economic success, the UNIP government remained concerned with the 
country’s disadvantaged position globally and in relation to its copper investors. Additionally, the 
limited participation of local Zambians in the mining sector hindered UNIP’s development 
plans.  To promote mining-led development, the government set its sights on an ownership stake 54
in the mines. The Seers Report made this policy recommendation,—and mining companies 
anticipated and even welcoming its implementation, given the security that state compensation 
would mean for their investments.  Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UNIP 55
government embarked on a series of reforms that eventually paved the way for complete 
nationalization of the copper mines. Through the Matero reforms of 1969, the Zambian 
government obtained a 51 percent ownership stake in Roan Selection Trust and the Anglo-
American Corporation and subsequently created the Mining Development Corporation to 
manage its shares.  The mining companies were also restructured: Roan Selection Trust was 56
rebranded Roan Consolidated Copper Mines (RCCM) and oversaw six mines in Chibuluma, 
Chambishi, Kalengwa, Luanshya, Mufulira and Ndola; Anglo-American Corporation was 
renamed Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and was responsible for the mines in 
Konkola, Nchanga and Rhokana.  Along with receiving 51 percent ownership stakes, the 57
Zambian government introduced a constitutional amendment that vested the rights of all mineral 
ownership in the state and granted exclusive rights to the state for prospecting and mining 
licences.  By 1982, RCCM and NCCM were merged to form the Zambia Consolidated Copper 58
 J Sikamo, A Mwanza & C Mweemba, “Copper mining in Zambia – history and future” (2016) The Journal of the 54
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Mines (ZCCM).  ZCCM was treated as a means to support the implementation of the state’s 59
development plan. Like its predecessors, it continued to provide housing to its employees, and 
supplemented this service with a ‘“cradle to the grave’ welfare policy”  that offered basic 60
provisions to its staff and members of the local community, including food, electricity, water, and 
health care.   61
 President Kaunda eventually applied his “Zambian humanism” principles of economic 
socialism and development to the country’s land tenure system in the decade following 
independence. Freehold tenure was abolished and converted to statutory leasehold in 1975 
through the passage of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act.  Previous land interests entrenched 62
under colonial rule were reformed through this legislation, which eliminated the private market 
for land and centralized all leasehold land transfers within the national government. Land, which 
President Kaunda declared a gift from God in accordance with African tradition,  was stripped 63
of its inherent value—only structures built on land, such as buildings, were available for 
purchase.  Critics contend these reforms offered little security to Zambians, and instead 64
entrenched land inaccessibility for most of the population.  65
 The decline in copper prices starting in the mid-1970s began the decline of President 
Kaunda’s “Zambian humanism” policies and, ultimately, his administration. Zambia borrowed 
heavily from foreign debtors after the price of copper collapsed following the two oil crises in 
 Ibid.59
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1974 and 1979.  From 1970 to 1980, Zambia’s external debt nearly quadrupled from USD $814 66
million to USD $3.2 billion.  To offset its declining revenues, the Zambian government 67
exhausted all available ZCCM resources without making the necessary investments to support 
exploration and improve mining facilities.  The decline in production and copper revenues led 68
to widespread poverty across Zambia and shrunk the country’s GDP per capita to USD $232 in 
1986, the lowest it had been since independence in 1964.  Zambia’s ballooning debt soon 69
ushered in the era of economic liberalization as the country accepted debt assistance from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country’s economic policies were 
greatly scrutinized as it entered its first World Bank structural adjustment programme in 1983.  70
6.2.2. The neoliberal turn and its aftermath: the 1980s and 1990s 
 Structural adjustment in Zambia from 1983–1987 comprised a mix of fiscal, monetary 
and privatization policies aimed at reducing the state’s participatory role in the economy and 
confining it to a regulator. One IMF priority critical to achieving these objectives was reducing 
government deficit.  To accomplish this, the government was ordered to: reduce subsidies; 71
eliminate price controls on several consumer goods, including maize, petrol and fertilizer; 
increase non-tax revenues (through measures like user fees for government services); reduce the 
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size of state-owned enterprises, including the ZCCM; and implement a freeze on public sector 
hiring in order to cut the size of the civil service.  72
 By 1987, President Kaunda’s government resisted full implementation of the first 
structural adjustment programme due to growing opposition to the proposed austerity 
measures.  The government’s inability to fully adhere to the program and pay its arrears led the 73
World Bank and IMF to discontinue its lending in 1987.  With limited means to promote 74
economic growth and development, President Kaunda’s government gradually lost support and 
legitimacy. In 1991, President Kaunda and UNIP were resoundingly defeated by Frederick 
Chiluba and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which campaigned on a platform 
of wide-ranging free-market reforms, including a market-based land policy and privatization.    75
 With the election of the new MMD government, the World Bank and IMF were invited 
back to assist Zambia with restructuring its foreign debt. Many of the promises central to the 
MMD platform were premised on neoliberal principles promoted by the World Bank and IMF. 
Foreign donors were also keen to provide aid and support the MMD’s liberalization agenda.  In 76
the years after the MMD’s election, foreign aid ballooned to more than 40 percent of the state’s 
budget.  As a condition of renewed aid, President Chiluba’s government was required to 77
implement a new series of reforms. Two mandatory reforms that significantly shaped the nexus 
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between mining, land and development were the privatization of ZCCM and the transformation 
of the land title system under the 1995 Lands Act.  78
   ZCCM’s privatization was a cautious undertaking for the Zambian government. The 
company was the largest state-owned enterprise and generated most of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings.  The company’s importance to the nation’s economy was often expressed 79
through the phrase ‘“ZCCM is Zambia, Zambia is ZCCM.”’  Consequently, the government 80
considered a number of different options for privatizing ZCCM over four years. In 1996, the 
government approved unbundling the company and selling its various mines to multiple 
investors while retaining minority interest through a remodelled ZCCM: ZCCM Investment 
Holdings (ZCCM-IH).  From 1997 to 2000, ZCCM was divided into seven different units and 81
sold to seven transnational mining companies: 1) Mopani Copper Mines Plc, a joint venture of 
Glencore International AG and First Quantum Minerals; 2) Konkola Copper Mines, purchased 
by Anglo-American Corporation; 3) Roan Antelope Mining Corporation of Zambia Plc, owned 
by Binani Group of India; 4) Chambishi Metals Plc., acquired by Anglovaal Mining Limited; 5) 
NFCA Africa Mining Plc., owned by China Non-ferrous Metals Company Limited; 6) Cyprus 
Amax Kanshansi Mining Plc, a subsidiary of Cyprus Amax Minerals Company; and 7) 
Chibuluma Mines Plc, operated by a consortium consisting of Crew Development Corporation, 
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Meterorex Maranda Mines and Genbel Securities.  The Government of Zambia’s minority 82
interests in each company did not exceed 20 percent.   83
 Critics of privatization argued that President Chiluba’s administration failed to negotiate 
fair-market value for the sale of ZCCM for two key reasons. First, the government’s negotiating 
position was weakened due to the low price of copper and ZCCM’s year-over-year losses.  84
Second, the government wished to create a favourable investment environment to attract foreign 
investors. This included implementing a favourable mining code via standard development 
agreements entered into with each company that could also have offered incentives more 
favourable than those included in statute, the revised Mines and Minerals Act of 1995.  The 85
standard terms included in each Agreement were: 
• 25 percent corporate income tax collected on taxable profits; 
• 3 percent cap on royalty rates (although rates in practice were typically only 0.6 
percent); 
• Interest costs and repatriated dividend income were fully tax-deductible; 
• Capital expenditure could be expensed in the year in which it was incurred; 
• Loss carry-forward provisions were extended up to 15–20 years. 
• Relief from assuming any of ZCCM’s financial or environmental liabilities; 
• Stability clauses of 15–20 years, thus guaranteeing the terms for that period.  86
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 The new companies took advantage of Zambia’s desperation to secure new investment 
and exploited its weak bargaining position. Zambia’s desire to keep the companies happy also 
compounded its inability to regulate them effectively, leading to lax health, safety, labour and 
environmental enforcement at the mines.  Only Zambia’s donors, including the Bretton Woods 87
Institutions, praised its privatization program and continued to offer support through aid. The 
World Bank, in particular, applauded Zambia’s program and called it the “most successful 
program”  in Africa. The Bank commended the government’s commitment to privatizing, as 88
evidenced by the legislative (passage of the Privatization Act) and institutional (creation of a 
government agency, the Zambia Privatization Agency, and the lead role granted to the private 
sector) structure put in place to complete privatization in the 1990s.  89
  The MMD government also liberalized Zambia’s land tenure system while it privatized 
ZCCM. Three key reforms were adopted with the passage of the 1995 Lands Act. First, the 1975 
Land (Conversion of Titles) Act was repealed and private property rights were introduced for 
those holding title on state land, making it possible for land to be bought and sold once again.  90
Freehold tenure was not reinstated, as land remained vested in the President.  Second, the Act 91
created the Lands Tribunal to protect leaseholders and customary rights holders. The Tribunal 
was established to hear land disputes expeditiously and reduce congestion in the Zambian High 
Court. It was also intended as an accessible and low-cost option for rural Zambians.  Third, the 92
Act recognized existing rights to customary land and created a mechanism, available to both 
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local Zambians and foreign investors, to convert customary title to private title if the land’s 
proposed use was deemed to be of “national interest.”  The government’s rationale for this 93
reform was to make customary land tenure more secure. However, the Act instead made 
customary land—which is approximately 94 percent of all land in Zambia—available to foreign 
investors.  94
 The privatization of ZCCM and the 1995 land reforms converted institutions managed by 
the state for the benefit of all Zambians into commodities meant to open Zambia for business and 
attract foreign investment. Additionally, both the privatization process and the new land 
governance system created significant discretionary power in the hands of a small elite.  MMD 95
leaders and foreign investors were accused of looting ZCCM during privatization by using their 
influential positions to gain ZCCM assets at favourable prices, despite the regulation of political 
involvement in ZCCM’s privatization.  Similarly, the 1995 Lands Act created a land-purchase 96
system that introduced consultation with local chiefs yet removed local communities from the 
process.  Through ZCCM’s privatization and the Lands Act, local communities were 97
disenfranchised from political processes that significantly affected their access to land and 
altered their developmental prospects. 
 The land insecurity created by ZCCM’s privatization also made local Zambians living in 
informal settlements near mines vulnerable to eviction. Neither the Lands Act nor the 
privatization process itself envisaged protections for vulnerable communities. Even the World 
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Bank did not invoke, or recommend, its resettlement policy during its involvement in 
privatization, despite its past acknowledgement of the negative consequences large-scale projects 
can have on local communities.  The guidelines were broad and thorough in their scope, and 98
included the following objectives: 
(a) Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized, exploring all 
viable alternative project designs.  
(b) Where displacement is unavoidable, resettlement plans should be developed. All 
involuntary resettlement should be conceived and executed as development programs, 
with resettlers provided sufficient investment resources and opportunities to share in 
project benefits. Displaced persons should be (i) compensated for their losses at full 
replacement cost before the actual move; (ii) assisted with the move and supported 
during the transition period in the resettlement site; and (iii) assisted in their efforts to 
improve their former living standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, 
or at least to restore them. Particular attention should be paid to the needs of the poorest 
groups to be resettled.  
(c) Community participation in planning and implementing resettlement should be 
encouraged. Appropriate patterns of social organization should be established, and 
existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their hosts should be supported 
and used to the greatest extent possible.  
(d) Resettlers should be integrated socially and economically into host communities so that 
adverse impacts on host communities are minimized… 
(e) Land, housing, infrastructure, and other compensation should be provided to the 
adversely affected population, indigenous groups, ethnic minorities, and pastoralists 
who may have usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the 
project. The absence of legal title to land by such groups should not be a bar to 
compensation.  99
If these principles were adopted at the time, they might have mitigated the harmful impact of 
ZCCM’s privatization on local communities. Instead, communities were displaced without a 
resettlement plan or adequate compensation. 
 The evictions by Mopani Copper Mines at its site in Mufulira were one of the worst land 
displacements in post-privatization Zambia. The evictions were the foundation of a complaint 
lodged by two non-governmental organizations (NGO), Oxfam-Canada and the Zambian 
Development Education Community Project, against the company under the Organisation for 
 Feeney, supra note 74 at 345.98
 World Bank, “Operational Directive 4.30,” online: <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/99
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Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  Three 100
violations formed the basis of the complaint: (1) the evictions breached the human rights of local 
Zambians, contrary to Policy II(2); (2) the company failed to “foster a relationship of confidence 
and mutual trust” with the local community, contrary to Policy II(7); and (3) the company failed 
to “engage in adequate and timely communication and consultation with the communities 
directly affected by [its] environmental, health and safety policies.”  Because Mopani was co-101
owned by the Canadian company First Quantum Minerals, the complaint was heard by Canada’s 
OECD National Contact Point, whose role was to facilitate dialogue between the mine and the 
complainant NGOs. The initial results of these negotiations yielded positive results. The 
company agreed to three conditions: first, to stop the evictions; second, to resettle the local 
community in conjunction with the local government and NGO; and third, ensure continued 
dialogue with the NGO and the state.  102
 The hopes for an amicable resolution were dashed in the years following the initial 
agreement when Mopani’s lack of commitment became evident. Without any enforcement 
mechanism, the OECD Guidelines proved ineffectual in preventing continued evictions.  By 103
2006, Mopani confirmed evictions were ongoing as it undertook construction to reopen a mine 
shaft and install another.  To offset some of the concerns raised in the original OECD 104
Guidelines complaint, Mopani began issuing annual licences permitting local residents to farm 
on mining land.  The Umuchinshi Initiative (a former International Human Rights Program 105
 Umuchinshi, supra note 32 at 7.100
 Umuchinshi, ibid; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines for 101
Multinational Enterprises (2008), online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/1922428.pdf>. 
 Umuchinshi, supra note 32 at 7.102




Working Group based at the University of Toronto) found this arrangement entrenched land 
insecurity and breached both international human rights standards and the OECD Guidelines.  106
6.2.3. Zambia’s post-neoliberal recovery and current development challenges 
 In the twenty years since ZCCM’s privatization, Zambia has yet to fully recover from the 
devastation it wrought on its economy and local communities. Soon after privatization was 
completed, Zambia qualified for the Heavily-Indebted Poor Country Initiative, the World Bank 
designed program intended to relieve extremely poor countries from the stranglehold of massive 
debt.  In 2000, Zambia’s United Nations Human Development Index was barely higher than its 107
1990 figure. Some indices actually declined, including both life expectancy (from 45 years to 
44.7) and Gross National Income per capita (USD $2,076 to $2,012).  Since 2000, Zambia has 108
seen an upward trend in all of its indices, although it continues to rank low globally: 144 out of 
189 countries in the 2018 Index.  109
 Privatization and Zambia’s neoliberal turn also had a political toll that left the country in 
search of true multiparty democracy. After attempting to change the democratic reforms his own 
government introduced so that he could remain in office for a third term, President Chiluba stood 
down and helped his chosen successor, Levy Mwanawasa, secure victory in 2001.  Although 110
President Mwanawasa came to power with a weak mandate—he only garnered 29 percent of the 
vote—the MMD remained a dominant political force, benefiting from rising copper prices and 
 Ibid at 10-13.106
 Fraser, supra note 5 at 12.107
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growing investment during the early 2000s.  The MMD remained in power following the 111
election held after President Mwanawasa’s death in June 2008. President Rupiah Banda, who 
was acting president during Mwanawasa’s illness, was not his appointed successor; instead, his 
rise to power benefitted from the influence he consolidated during his acting role.  It was not 112
until the decline in copper prices and the Zambian population’s subsequent frustration with its 
government’s handling of the post-privatization mining sector that the MMD fell to its main 
opposition, the Patriotic Front. Michael Sata became Zambia’s third president in three years 
when he won election over President Banda in 2011.  Zambia’s current president, Edward 113
Lungu, was sworn into office in January 2015 following President Sata’s death in October 2014. 
 Zambia’s efforts to recover from privatization and neoliberal policies began in 2008when 
it started the process of reforming its mineral tax regime. High copper prices saw private mining 
companies repatriate considerable profits while Zambia was bound by the terms of the 
development agreements entered into during privatization. One study conducted in 2012 by 
Global Financial Integrity, a Washington, DC–based think tank specializing in illicit financial 
flow reporting, estimated that Zambia lost approximately USD $5 billion in revenue because of 
transfer pricing schemes mining companies exploited during the 2004–2008 commodities 
supercycle.  Facing pressure from political opposition and civil society, President Mwanawasa 114
 Jonathan DiJohn, “State Resilience Against the Odds: An Analytical Narrative on the Construction and 111
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unilaterally announced the imposition of new windfall taxes in January 2008 to the dismay of 
mining companies and Zambia’s foreign donors.  The state’s ongoing tax policy battle with 115
mining companies continues to the present, as two of Zambia’s largest foreign investors, First 
Quantum Minerals (owners of the Kansanshi and Sentinel mines) and Vedanta Resources 
(operators of Konkola Copper Mines) were hit with USD $8 billion and USD $18 million tax 
bills, respectively, over the past two years.  President Lungu’s administration has taken 116
additional measures to ensure Zambia secures a greater share of its mineral wealth by launching 
proceedings in June 2019 to liquidate Konkola Copper Mines, in which Zambia holds a 20 
percent stake.  The dispute remains unresolved after Vedanta launched a lawsuit against the 117
Zambian government in South Africa in July 2019.  These actions, along with other measures 118
Zambia has taken to secure a great share of its mineral wealth, are examined further in section 
6.3.2. 
 Zambia’s historically poor economic performance and mismanagement of its mining 
sector led donors to intervene after privatization and to pressure Zambia into joining and 
implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  In 2007, at the request 119
of the Zambian government, the World Bank completed a scoping study to assess whether the 
country should subscribe to the EITI. The final report recommended Zambia join the EITI. It 
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concluded that tensions between the state, mining companies, and civil society could be resolved 
if greater knowledge and information were shared among the three parties.  Two years later, 120
Zambia became an EITI candidate country; in September 2012, Zambia became fully compliant 
with the EITI Standard. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Zambia continues to make “meaningful 
progress” towards implementing the 2016 EITI Standard.  Unlike other EITI members (such as 121
Ghana and Nigeria),  Zambia has yet to propose or introduce specific implementation 122
legislation; instead, the 2015 Mines and Minerals Development Act (2015 MMDA) (and its 2016 
amendment)  governs all aspects of EITI implementation in addition to the Zambia EITI 123
Strategic Plan (2016-2020).   124
 EITI’s 2016 assessment of Zambia’s legal framework identified procedural gaps in 
licence allocation that had not yet been included in the 2015 MMDA.  Zambia’s EITI Council 125
responded to these concerns in its 2017 Annual Report, stating that the Zambia Mining Cadastre 
Portal could be used to address this gap.  No reports were filed in 2018; therefore, it is unclear 126
if the EITI’s concern has been fully addressed through the Cadastre. Nonetheless, Zambia was 
recently recognized for its transparency and accountability efforts at EITI’s 2019 Global 
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Conference, where it received one of the EITI Chair’s Award.  As Zambia continues to meet its 127
EITI requirements, it also appears to utilize its membership in the transnational body for its own 
purposes too. Zambia is currently in the midst of reforming its mineral tax regime. The 
institutions it has implemented through the EITI have not merely promoted the body’s 
transparency and accountability in the country, but also have given Zambia the data and financial 
disclosures that it could use in its reform process.  128
 Like the EITI, Zambian post-privatization mining governance received mixed reviews by 
the Resource Governance Index (RGI). In its 2017 ranking, Zambia's composite score was 
50/100, which was an 11 point decline from its 2013 assessment.  RGI’s components differ 129
significantly from its 2013 and 2017 indices; therefore, the cause of Zambia’s lower score cannot 
be concretely identified. Zambia’s lower subcomponent scores in the 2017 index fell under 
Revenue Management and Open Data, which did not have equivalent categories in 2013. 
Zambia’s low Revenue Management score was due to the lack of an online data portal, non-
existent fiscal rules, and poor fiscal rule practice.   130
 Additionally, Zambia scored a failing grade in RGI’s Open Data category, which was an 
amalgam of its ranking in the Open Data Inventory and the Global Open Data Index.  The RGI 131
ranked Zambia’s ZCCM governance high (69/100), along with its company payment disclosure 
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process (83/100), and publication of its taxation rules (88/100).  Even with Zambia’s changing 132
tax policy landscape, the RGI scored its recent iteration positively. However, the Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, the think tank that produced the RGI, published a report in 
November 2017 that critically examined proposed changes to Zambia’s mining tax policy and 
encouraged the government to revisit its reforms to ensure the regime delivers the revenues 
Zambia requires.  These contrasting positions further illustrate the RGI’s formalist limitations 133
in assessing mining governance. 
 While Zambia’s post-neoliberal recovery garnered mixed governance reviews, the 
reviews failed to account the mining sector’s post-privatization human rights abuses. Copperbelt 
evictions continued after 2006 in northern Zambia’s Luapula Province,  and threats of evictions 134
near the Kansanshi mine in Solwezi were reported as recently as March 2018.  No complaints 135
were filed, either under the OECD Guidelines or through another international mechanism, in 
response to these reported evictions, nor were disputes resolved locally. One domestic forum that 
was available to resolve disputes, Zambia’s Lands Tribunal, has been under-utilized since its 
implementation in 1996 after the passage of the Lands Act.  In 2010, the Lands Tribunal was 136
granted the authority to hear both statutory and customary land disputes in accordance with the 
2010 Lands Tribunal Act.  A recent study of the conflicts brought before the Tribunal indicates 137
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that it was not adjudicating complaints against mining companies—instead, the Tribunal was 
primarily hearing cases between private citizens and complaints against state entities.  Anthony 138
Mushinge, the study’s author, argued the Tribunal’s meagre funding limited its ability to hear 
complaints, particularly outside the capital, Lusaka.  Additionally, Mushinge found that there 139
was a lack of public awareness of the Tribunal and its work.  The combination of these factors 140
undermined the Tribunal’s competence to hear land disputes against mining companies. The lack 
of effective domestic or international options to settle land disputes and to protect the rights of 
local communities suggests it is opportune for the Zambian government to rethink community-
mining relations. How the Draft National Land Policy, via its implementation of FPIC, can do 
this will be discussed further in section 6.4.  
6.3. Zambia’s quest for a mining developmental state 
 Development was never far from the political considerations of Zambia’s ruling parties. 
Beginning with President Kaunda’s “Zambian humanism” to President Lungu’s current tax 
battles with mining companies, the socioeconomic development of Zambia has been a priority of 
its various governments since independence. Even when decisions were made that turned out to 
do more harm than good for Zambia’s economy, they appeared to be a result of economic 
misfortune and the external influence of the global economy, foreign donors and investors. 
Nonetheless, Chapter Three illustrated how developmental aspirations alone do not sustain a 
developmental state nor a mining developmental state. Section 6.3.1 compares Zambia’s aspiring 





why it has yet to come to fruition. Although it is not a developmental state, Zambia has 
introduced a number of mining developmental state institutions, which are discussed further in 
section 6.3.2. These measures are then evaluated in section 6.3.3 using Trubek, Coutinho and 
Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework. 
6.3.1. Zambia’s aspiring developmental state 
 Whether or not a country is a developmental state has been determined by its institutional 
framework and developmental success (both economic and social, though economic has proven 
more persuasive in the African context).  Development in the East Asian Tigers, Botswana and, 141
to some extent, South Africa has been attributed to each state’s institutional design and 
prioritization of economic growth and development. Zambia has not yet attained the levels of 
socioeconomic development as these developmental states—although it boasts strong annual 
growth rates in recent years (4.1 percent), its GDP per capita and several social development 
indicators (like life expectancy, education and poverty rate) are worse than the consensus 
developmental states.   142
 This section will assess Zambia’s aspiring developmental state using the criteria provided 
in Chapter Three. While this framework helps explain why Zambia has yet to attain 
developmental state status, it does not account for the overwhelming influence of external forces
—notably the global economy, foreign donors and investors—that hindered Zambia’s 
developmental institutions and prospects. To illustrate, Figure 6.1 (taken from David Manley,  143
a Senior Economic Analyst at the Natural Resource Governance Institute and former senior 
 For example, as it was explained in Chapter 4, Botswana’s characterization as a developmental state was due to 141
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economist in the Zambia Revenue Authority) demonstrates past Zambian governments’ 
misfortunate timing of state ownership in relation to fluctuating copper prices: 
Figure 6.1 – Zambian state ownership of copper mines and historical price fluctuations 
   
 
(Manley, “Short- and long-term fluctuations in the real copper price [base year = 2015]). 
Zambia’s copper mines were never owned by the state when copper prices were at its peak. The 
country’s developmental state and mining developmental state institutions were greatly affected 
by this reality.  
a. Development-oriented political leadership 
 Development was an identifiable priority for all of Zambia’s administrations since 
independence. President Kaunda’s leadership in the years leading up to independence was 
shaped by his “Zambian humanism” philosophy. His party’s push for political power over white 
minority rule was meant to ensure political, economic, and development opportunities for Black 
Zambians.  President Kaunda and UNIP did not believe multiracialism in Zambia would 144
 Fraser & Lungu, supra note 47 at 7.144
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benefit black Zambians. Britain’s colonial record proved his position: little effort was made by 
the British to develop Zambia’s health and education systems (only 0.5 percent of Black 
Zambians were estimated to have a primary education at independence, while only 107 were 
university graduates).  Soon after independence, President Kaunda launched Zambia’s first 145
National Development Plan based on the recommendations included in the Seers Report. 
Securing increased benefits from mining was one of the priorities outlined in the Plan.  146
 President Kaunda attempted to generate economic benefits by leveraging Zambian copper 
both locally and internationally. His international efforts through the Intergovernmental 
Conference of Copper Exporting Countries were explained above in section 6.2.1. Despite its 
failure, President Kaunda’s efforts were driven by the desire to establish greater control over the 
global value of a commodity critical to its national economy and government revenue.  147
Domestically, President Kaunda began the process of acquiring shares in the mining companies, 
gradually expanding the state’s stake until it held 100 percent ownership in all of Zambia’s 
copper mines. These measures were also driven by his desire to secure a greater share of the 
country’s mineral wealth. 
 Unfortunately, President Kaunda’s plan quickly changed Zambia’s developmental 
prospects when the price of copper drastically declined in the mid-1970s. Within a decade of 
independence, Zambia’s development trajectory was no longer positive. During that time, 
President Kaunda based all of his growth and development plans on copper; once the state 
controlled the mines, however, Zambia did not have sufficient resources to manage the 
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unexpected turn in global events. Zambia could neither diversify the industry and establish more 
downstream production linkages nor invest in cross-sectoral linkages that may have reduced the 
country’s reliance on copper. The little revenue generated through ZCCM was used to support 
the provision of other services; necessary investments were not made to sustain the mines and 
construct infrastructure that could support future exploration and extraction when prices 
recovered.  The country plunged into debt and turned to international donors to sustain its 148
economy. Doing so set Zambia on the course of conditioned loans and structural adjustment. 
 Zambia’s economic liberalization in the 1980s was not a crisis of development-oriented 
political leadership. With the country’s economy in the hands of foreign donors, President 
Kaunda had little choice but to accept conditioned loans and implement neoliberal economic 
policies. The results were devastating: cuts to state subsidies raised the cost of living, layoffs in 
the civil service increased unemployment, and increased donor involvement in the Zambian 
economy reduced the mining unions’ influence on industry-related decisions.  President 149
Kaunda’s and UNIP’s political downfall were equally due to the country’s discontent with his 
party’s structural adjustment failures and the opposition MMD’s belief that it could restore 
Zambian development through privatization.  150
 President Chiluba and the MMD’s election was due to the overwhelming support of the 
mining unions in their plans to privatize the sector and attract new investment.  Nationalization 151
under UNIP proved to be a failure; under President Chiluba’s leadership, Zambia’s economy and 
development prospects would be restored through foreign investment. Buoyed by MMD’s 
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privatization plan, foreign donors provided the aid necessary to sustain government services 
while ZCCM’s assets were sold. Like President Kaunda’s development-oriented leadership 
during nationalization, President Chiluba’s similar aims directed the state’s privatization efforts. 
In both instances, both presidents’ intentions to secure the best possible deal for Zambia’s 
development were thwarted by the country’s weak economy and desperate negotiation position. 
President Kaunda overpaid to nationalize the mining companies, and President Chiluba 
undersold the mines at a steep price that affected his successors’ development-oriented 
leadership.  152
 When copper prices rebounded in the early 2000s, Zambia’s political leadership once 
again considered policy reforms to benefit from the commodities boom. President Mwanawasa’s 
administration began the process for reforming the mining sector by eliminating all development 
agreements and replacing them with the new fiscal regime defined in the 2008 Mines and 
Minerals Development Act (2008 MMDA).  The new regime included a heavily disputed 153
windfall tax that operated similarly to a variable royalty rate.  Although the mining companies 154
did not launch investment disputes against Zambia,  the new mining tax regime faced so much 155
opposition that it was abandoned a year later. President Banda’s government oversaw the 
amendments to the 2008 MMDA, which included the abolition of the windfall tax.  156
 President Mwanawasa’s government also wished to foster Zambia’s mineral wealth into 
greater development opportunities by establishing a new partnership with China, which was 
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expanding into African extractive markets. In 2007, President Mwanawasa agreed to the creation 
of the Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), China’s first economic and trade co-operation 
zone in Africa.  The zone created near the Chambishi copper mine was intended to create 157
industrial facilities for copper processing and supporting facilities in Zambia.  Although the 158
intention to establish ZCCZ was to maximize the benefits of Chinese interest in Zambian copper, 
the Chambishi ZCCZ has yielded mixed results since its launch in 2007. These outcomes are 
discussed further below in section 6.3.2. 
 After President Banda’s defeat in 2011, President Sata and his successor President Lungu 
have both attempted to reform Zambia’s mining governance to secure better developmental 
outcomes for the country. Like their predecessors, both experienced challenges to the successful 
implementation of their mining reforms. President Lungu’s ongoing attempts to capitalize on 
mining benefits, which were described briefly in section 6.2.3, are examined further in section 
6.3.2. The challenges Zambia’s post-colonial political leadership faced illustrate the limits of 
development-oriented governance to advancing socioeconomic development—a developmental 
vision is not enough to secure its reality. Other developmental state institutional arrangements 
must also be effective, as the next section contends. 
b. The missing elements in Zambia’s developmental state 
  As the Botswana and South Africa case studies revealed, an autonomous and effective 
bureaucracy, performance-oriented governance, and production coordination and conflict 
management are critical developmental state institutions. Zambia has lacked all three. 
 Ana Cristina Alves, “The Zambia-China Cooperation Zone at a Crossroads: What Now?” (December 2011), 157




 An autonomous and effective bureaucracy never emerged in Zambia in the decades 
following independence. The country had a small, educated non-settler population and opted to 
rely on expatriates in the same manner as Botswana. Unlike its neighbour, however, President 
Kaunda’s government quickly embarked on “Zambianizing” the civil service, replacing settler 
bureaucrats, who dominated senior positions in the bureaucracy, with Zambians.  Doing so was 159
essential to the realization of self-determination that independence brought to bear, particularly 
in a country with a politically and economically powerful white settler population. Recruiting 
more Zambian civil servants was also conducive to President Kaunda’s socioeconomic 
development goals. Despite these efforts, Zambian bureaucratic capacity in mining was slow to 
change.  Due to this knowledge deficit, much of Zambia’s early economic policy was 160
implemented top-down from the highest levels of government rather than researched and 
interrogated in the bureaucracy before reaching the upper echelons for approval. Additionally, 
Zambia’s civil service shrunk considerably during structural adjustment, further inhibiting the 
development of an autonomous and effective bureaucracy.  
 Zambia’s shifting mining policy positions since independence also point to the state’s 
deficient performance-oriented governance. Instead, Zambia’s approach could be better 
described as goal-oriented: its mining governance typically reacted to changes in the global 
market rather than proactively sought opportunities based on evident trends that could have 
better managed the boom and bust commodities cycles. Both the nationalization and the 
privatization of Zambia’s mining companies were donor-influenced responses to the global 
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market that neglected to consider the mid- to long-term implications of such policies. In more 
recent years, however, Zambian governments have shown less consideration for the concerns of 
these external actors and instead have implemented institutions aimed at maximizing the state’s 
benefits from mining.   
6.3.2. Zambia’s mining developmental state institutions 
 Despite the country’s weak developmental state institutions, various Zambian 
governments have attempted to reverse the toll of neoliberal privatization on its mining sector. 
Over the past decade, the state has enacted mining developmental state institutions (MDSIs) 
focused on promoting Zambian participation in the mining sector, developing cross-sectoral 
linkages and increasing tax revenue. This section examines Zambia’s recent MDSIs in these 
three areas. 
a. Enhancing local participation and content 
 Privatization did not yield many of the presumed benefits for the local economy:  many 
local suppliers that had previously conducted business with ZCCM lost out on new opportunities 
as foreign investors procured materials from suppliers and manufacturers outside Zambia.  161
Paradoxically, this occurred even though the Government of Zambia negotiated local 
procurement provisions into the development agreements that finalized privatization.  Failure 162
to enforce the local procurement provisions was partly due to the state’s efforts to recapitalize the 
mines, which neglected local private sector development.  Nonetheless, the Zambian 163
government soon undertook two policy measures aimed at enhancing local participation and 
 Fraser, supra note 5 at 15.161
 Judith Fessehaie, The Dynamics of Zambia’s Copper Value Chain (PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town School 162
of Economics, 2012) at 178 [unpublished].
 Ibid at 179.163
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content in the country’s mining sector. First, the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act (CEEA)  164
was passed in 2006. Second, the unilateral cancellation of the DAs under the 2008 MMDA 
ushered in new and more robust indigenization obligations. 
 The 2006 CEEA introduced broad-based economic empowerment provisions that were 
applicable across Zambia’s economy. The Act aimed to promote the participation of specific 
groups in Zambian society:  
• “Targeted citizens,” which were defined as marginalized or disadvantaged citizens 
whose access to economic resources were constrained by such factors as race, sex, 
education and disability; 
• “Citizens empowerment companies,” which were companies where 25-50 percent of 
its equity was owned by citizens; 
• “Citizen influenced companies,” which were defined as companies that had 5-25 
percent of its equity owned by citizens, and in which citizens maintained significant 
control of the management of the company; and 
• “Citizen owned companies,” which referred to companies in which at least 51 percent 
of its equity was owned by citizens and citizens maintained significant control of the 
management of the company.  165
 Provisions specific to the mining industry were not included in the Act. However, s. 21 
outlined obligations that extended to all investors: 
21(1) Notwithstanding any other law, after the commencement of this Act, the Ministry 
responsible for commerce, trade and industry shall reserve, as prescribed by the President, specific 
areas of commerce, trade and industry for targeted citizens, citizen empowerment companies, 
citizen influenced companies and citizen owned companies. 
 Citizens Economic Empowerment Act, No. 9 of 2006.164
 Ibid at s. 3.165
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(2) Notwithstanding any other law, after the commencement of this Act - 
… 
(b) licences to foreign investors to engage in specific businesses, as prescribed by the 
President, shall be granted on the basis of joint ventures and partnerships with citizens and 
citizen empowered companies; 
… 
(d) priority for concessions, licences and incentives given under any law shall be granted to 
companies that are implementing broad based economic empowerment programmes under 
this Act. 
 More robust local content and procurement provisions were included in the 2008 MMDA 
and were strengthened in the 2015 MMDA update.  Four distinct areas related to enhancing 166
local content were contained in the 2015 MMDA: holders of certain mining rights, training and 
employment of Zambians, procurement of Zambian goods and services, and enforcement.  167
Section 13(3) of the 2015 MMDA limited mining rights to certain Zambian companies: 
13(3) A mining right [an exploration licence and a mining licence] over an area between a 
minimum of two cadastre units and a maximum of one hundred and twenty cadastre units in extent 
shall only be granted to the following companies: 
(a) citizen-influenced company; 
(b) citizen-empowered company; and  
(c) citizen-owned company. 
Definitions for the three types of companies were adopted from the 2006 CEEA. 
 Obligations to train and employ Zambians and procure local goods and services were 
outlined in s. 20 of the 2015 MMDA: 
20(1) A holder of a mining right or a mineral processing licence shall, in the conduct of mining 
operations or mineral processing operations and in the purchase, construction, installation and 
decommissioning of facilities, give preference to the — 
(a) materials and products made in Zambia; and 
(b) contractors, suppliers and service agencies located in Zambia and owned by citizens or 
citizen-owned companies. 
(2) A holder of a mining right or mineral processing licence shall, in the course of operations— 
(a) give preference in employment to citizens with relevant qualifications or skills; and 
(b) conduct training programmes for the transfer of technical and managerial skills to 
Zambians. 
  
 All mining licence applications must include plans to satisfy the above requirements: 
32(2) There shall be attached to a mining licence as part of the conditions of the licence 
… 
 Only the 2015 MMDA provisions are discussed here to limit the analysis to current law.166
 Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, “Local Content – Zambia Mining,” online: Columbia Center on 167
Sustainable Investment <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Zambia-CCSI-December-2014-.pdf>.
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(b) the applicant’s undertaking for the employment and training of citizens; 
(c) the applicant’s undertaking for the promotion of local business development; 
… 
  
 Mining licence holders are obligated to carry out the local procurement and employment 
and training programs in accordance with the plan included in their application: 
35(1) A holder of a mining licence shall— 
… 
(d) for large-scale mining— 
(i) implement the local business development undertaking attached to the mining licence; and 
(ii) employ and train citizens of Zambia in accordance with the proposal for employment and 
training attached to the licence; 
 Violating these provisions subjected the rights holder to fines. This enforcement 
provision was outlined in s. 20(3) of the 2015 MMDA: 
20(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) is liable to pay a fine of five hundred 
thousand penalty units and an additional fine of twenty thousand penalty units for each day during 
which the default continues. 
 Extensive data illustrating the impact of these local participation and content obligations 
has not been published. The only research that appears to be available—included in a 2014 
study   of four copper mines by the Zambian Chamber of Mines and the International Council 168
on Mining and Metals—suggested differing effects on local employment and procurement. 
According to the report, direct employment at the mines increased after 2008, and expatriates 
only represented 1–2 percent of all employees in 2013.  This could suggest that Zambians 169
comprised the majority of new hires as a result. Local businesses also dominated local 
procurement. However, while all goods and services were procured from local businesses, 
Zambian-produced goods made up only five percent of all goods procured in 2012, compared to 
almost 100 percent of services.  Such a conclusion suggests that opportunities remain to 170
 Zambia Chamber of Mines & the International Council on Mining & Metals, “Enhancing mining’s contribution 168
to the Zambian economy and society,” online: ICMM <https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/mining-
parterships-for-development/enhancing-minings-contribution-to-the-zambian-economy-and-society>.
 Ibid at 63169
 Ibid at 66.170
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develop sectoral linkages through the increased local production of mining inputs. However, 
more research needs to be conducted in this area, as no official statistics were available to 
support the study’s conclusions. 
b. Developing sectoral linkages 
 Zambia has implemented few MDSIs aimed at developing cross-sectoral linkages in its 
post-neoliberal era. While the state was focused on perfecting its mineral tax regime (see the 
section below), modest commitments to developing linkages were included in two new policy 
instruments: the 2013 Mineral Resources Development Policy  and the Seventh National 171
Development Plan (2017–2021).  Although neither policy has the force of law, both outline the 172
state’s commitments to developing linkages with the aim of integrating mining into Zambia’s 
economy and reducing poverty.  
 Three distinct efforts to promote sectoral linkages were included the Mineral Resources 
Development Policy: 
7.8 Integrating the mining sector in the domestic economy 
To enhance the contribution of mining to the national economy, Government will: 
a) Encourage mining cluster development to link the mining sector to the broader economy; 
b) Promote linkages between mining and agriculture, mining and tourism, and mining for the 
value-adding processing industries;  
… 
7.10 Value addition 
Government will promote and facilitate the development of downstream processing capacities 
for minerals by 
a) Providing an appropriate legal and fiscal regime; 
b) Exploring opportunities to expand the local metallurgical plant capacity in the country; and 
c) Identifying market potential for national and regional consumption of value added 
products. 
7.11 Marketing of Gemstones 
To ensure realisation of the full value of gemstones, Government will devise mechanisms of 
auctioning gemstones within the country. 
 Mineral Resources Development Policy (July 2013).171
 Seventh National Development Plan (2017–2021) – Accelerating Development Efforts towards Vision 2030 172




 Similar commitments to developing linkages were identified in the Seventh National 
Development Plan: 
7.5 Development Outcome 2: Diversified and Export-Oriented Mining Sector 
… Under this Plan, emphasis will be on broadening the range of minerals to cover non-
traditional mining of gemstones, gold and industrial minerals as well as promotion of value 
addition to mining products and include energy and material efficiency strategies to increase 
productivity and reduce environmental pollution. 
… 
7.5.1 Strategy 1: Promote exploitation of gemstones and industrial minerals 
Focus will be on increasing exploration, mining, processing and promoting use of industrial 




b) Mineral processing technology development; 
… 
e) Market linkages development. 
… 
7.5.2 Strategy 2: Promote local and foreign participation in mining value chains and 
industrialisation 
This strategy is aimed at enhancing capacities to participate in mining value chains that have 
the highest potential to impact economic growth and poverty reduction. Further, efforts will be 
made to facilitate mining-based value addition and industrialisation by supporting the 
development of manufacturing industries to produce inputs for other sectors, to contribute to 
the growth of other sectors. 
Programmes: 
a) Capacity development; 
b) Policy and regulatory framework review and enhancement; 
c) Access to finance promotion; 
d) Mining value-chain development; 
e) Research, innovation and technology promotion; and 
f) Investment Promotion. 
 Abundant downstream linkages in minerals processing and beneficiation, particularly of 
copper, exist in Zambia. Refined copper, for example, accounted for 27 percent of all Zambian 
exports in 2017 compared to raw copper at 47 percent.  However, the development of sectoral 173
linkages beyond this minimal-level beneficiation appears to be negligible. Other than the 
Chinese-led Chambishi ZCCZ, no meaningful investments have been made in activities that can 
further integrate mining into Zambia’s economy. Additionally, infrastructure challenges are 
limiting the economic impact of the Chambishi ZCCZ. The transportation network near the 
 The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Zambia,” online: OEC <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/zmb/>.173
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ZCCZ is poor and restricts the distribution of both supplies and products.  Furthermore, local 174
industry has yet to be fully integrated into the ZCCZ due to the lax enforcement of local content 
regulations.   175
 The limited expansion of sectoral linkages in Zambia over the past decade, as well as the 
Chambishi ZCCZ’s challenges, highlight the difficulties with developing sectoral linkages in an 
ineffective mining developmental state. Zambia’s inability to sensibly conclude its mining tax 
reforms also demonstrates the constraints of implementing MDSIs without securing institutions 
that promote effective legal functionalities. Before assessing Zambia’s mining developmental 
state using Trubek, Coutinho, and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework, the next section 
describes Zambia’s primary MDSIs focus: broader resource nationalism via mining tax reform 
and restructured ownership stakes in mining companies. 
c. Broader resource nationalism 
 Zambia has been impacted by commodity price volatility throughout its post-colonial 
history. As Figure 6.1 above illustrates, copper prices have risen and tumbled unpredictably over 
the past century. State ownership in the industry since independence reacted to these changes. 
Mining tax rates have similarly risen and fallen post-privatization:  
 Alves, supra note 157 at 4.174
 Ibid.175
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Figure 6.2 – Zambian tax reforms and the price of copper 
  
 
(Manley, “Copper price and tax reforms measured by the average effective tax rate for each).  176
 Since 2001, Zambia has undertaken the following changes to its mineral tax regime:  177
Table 6.1 – Zambia’s mining tax reforms since 2001 
Year Summary of mining tax reform
2001 Development agreements instituted: 
• 25 percent corporate income tax;  
• 0.6 percent royalty rate; and   
• Stabilization clauses locked in the terms of the agreement for 15-20 years.
2008 Development agreements were cancelled and new regime implemented: 
• 30 percent corporate income tax;  
• 3 percent royalty rate; and 
• Windfall tax calculated from monthly gross sales revenue.
 Manley, supra note 133 at 3.176
 An Act to amend the Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015, No. 14 of 2016; Taonga Clifford Mistiming & 177
Matthew Hill, “Zambia to Raise Mine Royalty in 10th Tax Change in 16 Years” (September 28, 2018), online: 
Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-28/zambia-to-raise-mine-royalties-in-bid-to-trim-
budget-shortfall>; Adam & Simpasa, supra note 3 at 67-68; Manley, supra note 133 at 4; Manley, “Guide”, supra 
note 154.
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 The multiple changes to Zambia’s mineral taxes over a short period exemplify the 
country’s arduous balance between industry and development. Multiple foreign investors 
expressed opposition to various iterations of Zambia’s tax regime, including against the most 
recent change that resulted in high tax bills for Vedanta Resources and First Quantum Minerals. 
Despite investor opposition, the Zambian government has shown that it is not reluctant to use the 
MDSIs at its disposal to ensure an equitable return for the state. The state’s position was made 
clear in comments made by Zambia’s Minister of Finance, Margaret Mwanakatwe, soon after the 
latest change: “As mineral resources are a depleting resource, it is vital to structure an effective 
fiscal regime for the mining sector to ensure that Zambians benefit from the mineral wealth our 
country is blessed with.”  178
 Zambia’s state-owned investment holdings firm, ZCCM-IH, has been Zambia’s other 
main resource-nationalist MDSIs since privatization. Although created to hold the state’s equity 
participation in the newly-privatized mines, ZCCM-IH’s shares have not exceeded 20 percent, 
despite multiple announcements by the state over the past ten years of its intention to increase its 
2009 After industry pressure, the state abandoned the windfall tax; all other rates 
remained the same.
2012 Royalty rate increased to 6 percent.
2015 Royalty rate increased to 9 percent after the state considered a 20 percent rate for 
open-pit mines.
2016 Royalty rate decreased to 4 percent.
2018 Royalty rate increased again to 6 percent.
 Mistiming & Hill, ibid.178
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stake.  Like the changes to the mining tax regime, the government’s pronouncements of the 179
desire to increase ZCCM-IH’s stake in the mines were reactions to higher copper prices.  180
However, unlike mining tax reform, Zambia has yet to act on this desire. 
6.3.3. Assessing legal functionalities in Zambia’s mining developmental state 
 Zambia’s mining developmental state and its institutions embarked on an ambitious legal 
and policy agenda aimed at maximizing the state’s benefits from mining and promoting 
socioeconomic development. Despite these intentions, Zambia’s MDSIs have proven to be 
ineffective. Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework offers an 
explanation for why this was the case. 
a. Flexibility, synergy and orchestration were missing   
 For state activism to succeed, Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro argued that the legal 
system governing state action should safeguard flexibility, frame synergy and stimulate 
orchestration.  Zambia’s MDSIs failed to perform any of these functions well. The state’s 181
reactionary approach to implementing its MDSIs, particularly its tax reforms, was not 
coordinative, nor did it effectively frame state-investor relations. Additionally, several of 
Zambia’s weak MDSIs, notably in the area of enhancing local participation, lacked the flexibility 
to allow for experimentation and promote innovation because they did not encourage 
collaboration or ensure the sustainability of local businesses. 
 Andrew Topf, “Zambian gov’t to increase mines ownership to 35%” (February 1, 2012), online: MINING.COM 179
<https://www.mining.com/zambian-govt-to-increase-mines-ownership-to-35/33/>; Zandi Shabalala, “Zambia’s 




 David Trubek, Diogo Coutinho & Mario Shapiro, “New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Law” in 181
David M Trubek et al, eds, Law and the New Developmental State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
28 at 55.
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b. The absence of legitimacy 
 The implementation of many of Zambia’s recent MDSIs was also a response to changing 
popular opinion and the demands of the general public, mining labour and local communities.  182
One constituency the state increasingly ignored—potentially to the detriment of the MDSIs’ 
effectiveness—was the private sector. However, the state often took action unilaterally and failed 
to engage in consultative and participatory processes that included civil society and the general 
population in policy formation.  Zambia’s Draft National Land Policy may be an attempt to 183
reverse this practice. The next section considers its efficacy. 
6.4. Going beyond revenues: constructing a rights-based approach to mining 
governance in Zambia 
 The state’s vision for its mining sector was outlined in a set of general principles adopted 
in the 2015 MMDA: 
4. The following principles shall apply to the mining and development of minerals— 
(a) mineral resources are a non-renewable resource and shall be conserved, developed and used 
prudently, taking into account the needs of the present and future generations; 
(b) mineral resources shall be explored and developed in a manner that promotes and 
contributes to socioeconomic development and in accordance with international conventions to 
which Zambia is a party; 
… 
(e) citizens shall have equitable access to mineral resources and benefit from mineral resources 
development; and 
(f) development of local communities in areas surrounding the mining area based on 
prioritisation of community needs, health and safety. 
 
Objective 34 of Zambia’s Draft National Land Policy fits squarely within the commitments 
articulated in s. 4 of the 2015 MMDA. 
 Mandatory consultation and consent as currently conceived in the Draft National Land 
Policy would be the first time the principle is adopted in Zambia and applied to all land occupied 
 Larmer, supra note 36 at 42.182
 Manley, supra note 133 at 17.183
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by a local community, regardless of tenure. The lack of consultation and participation in 
Zambian mining governance is presumably a concern that the Draft National Land Policy aims to 
redress by empowering local communities through the FPIC principle. Since ZCCM was 
privatized in the late 1990s, several local communities have been either evicted or threatened 
with eviction in the Copperbelt region of the country, home of many of the country’s mines.  184
 If implemented in its current form, Objective 34 of Zambia’s Draft National Land Policy 
would require “that mining developers adopt principles of Free, Prior and Informed Consent of 
local people for decisions that may affect them.” This twofold obligation would mandate (1) 
“that developers and communities conclude agreements that recognize the land rights of local 
communities” and (2) that mining companies “develop specific policies to address involuntary 
displacement in line with international best practice.”  What would this obligation entail if the 185
draft policy is approved by parliament? This section will analyze its specific components and 
will consider certain questions the Zambian government should resolve before implementation. 
a. What does FPIC encompass? 
 FPIC was not defined in the Draft National Land Policy. Instead, its language suggests 
the government of Zambia recognized FPIC as a single right enjoyed by Indigenous peoples. By 
describing FPIC as “principles,” rather than a single obligation, the Zambian government could 
be conceding that the requirement does not yet extend to non-Indigenous peoples under 
international law. Regardless of how it is interpreted, the obligation to adhere to “principles of 
FPIC” risks limiting the protections local communities could enjoy under this policy. Although 
 Examples include the evictions in Mufulira by Mopani Copper Mines, and alleged threats of evictions in Solwezi 184
by Kansanshi Mining Plc (Umuchinshi, supra note 32; Lusaka Times, supra note 135).  
 Draft National Land Policy (2018), supra note 12.185
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international best practices regarding FPIC are lacking,  it has been understood that the 186
obligation goes beyond principles of consultation and participation, and that it encompasses the 
right of peoples to “be informed about projects that may affect their land, resource and other 
rights in a timely manner, free of coercion and manipulation, and have the opportunity to 
approve or reject a project prior to the commencement of all activities.”  The Draft National 187
Land Policy is potentially calling for these principles to be treated as separate obligations without 
specifying which ones are required by mining developers.  
 Additionally, the two measures included in Objective 34 do not offer any clarification. 
Concluding an agreement recognizing the land rights of local communities does not equate to 
consent. The land rights could be recognized in an agreement, but the mining developer could 
still proceed with a project if FPIC is treated as distinct principles. Nor does the second measure
—to develop specific policies to address involuntary displacement—indicate that the Zambian 
government is imposing an obligation for mining companies to obtain the full FPIC of a local 
community before operating. Without further clarification of what this objective entails, the 
Zambian government risks weakening this obligation. 
b. Who holds the community mandate? 
 Determining who represents the local community during the FPIC process and can 
ultimately provide consent is an important consideration for the Draft National Land Policy to 
succeed. In its current form, Objective 34 applies to all local people that may be affected by a 
 Ricarda Roesch, “The story of a legal transplant: The right to free, prior and informed consent in sub-Saharan 186
Africa” (2016) AHRLJ 505 at 507.
 Oxfam & Legal Resources Centre, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industries in Southern 187
Africa: An Analysis of Legislation and their Implementation in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia” (3 October 2018), online: <https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/publications/free-prior-and-informed-
consent-in-the-extractive-industries-in-southern-africa/> at 9.
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decision made by a mining developer. Without specifying how a local community participates in 
the FPIC process, the Zambian government risks emboldening powerful community members, 
such as local chiefs, to speak for the entire community.  Chiefs could potentially play a 188
dangerous gatekeeping role and could make harmful decisions for the community while 
personally benefiting from their leadership role.  Finding consensus among a community could 189
be challenging, as members may not all be from a single ethnic group and could hold differing 
views on the mining project’s impact on their individual socioeconomic circumstances. 
Balancing individual rights with collective rights requires a robust legal definition of the peoples 
benefiting from the FPIC obligation.  190
c. What is the role for Zambia’s government? 
 Clearly defining the government’s role is vital to identifying the rights holders and their 
representatives. Unlike in other jurisdictions where the duty to consult is required of government, 
Objective 34 imposes the obligation to obtain FPIC directly on mining developers. Does the 
Zambian government envision acting as an intermediary to bring local communities and the 
mining companies together, and to outline what the FPIC process involves in one community 
versus another? Whatever role the government decides to play, it is crucial that it remains a 
neutral and unbiased party that is not unduly influenced by the desire to attract foreign 
investment.   191
 Ibid at 70.188
 Ibid.189
 Manirakiza, supra note 15 at 5; Roesch, supra note 186 at 518.190
 Gavin Hilson, “An overview of land use conflicts in mining communities” (2002) Land Use Policy 65 at 65; 191
Oxfam & LRC, supra note 186 at 70.
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d. What does community consent/agreement look like? 
 Additionally, what community consent/agreement includes must be clarified for FPIC 
implementation in Zambia to be effective. Objective 34 envisions an agreement including, at a 
minimum, recognition of land rights and potentially some measures to address involuntary 
displacement. Based on available international examples, the community agreement could 
encompass more. Substantive rights of access to land and benefit-sharing could be included.  192
Such measures should consistently recognize customary land tenure and customary law. 
Principles of customary law could help better understand the nature of the community mandate, 
and the relationship of each community to their land.   193
 Furthermore, FPIC should be conceived as an ongoing right that does not end when an 
agreement is concluded between the company and the community. Communities should be 
granted the right to later challenge or change agreements depending on how the mining project 
progresses and community expectations evolve.  194
 Lastly, the different FPIC principles envisioned by the Zambian government should not 
be conflated with consent and used as a way to legitimize the mining project and land 
alienation.  Ultimately, “local communities should meaningfully and effectively participate [in 195
the FPIC process] in a way that they can substantially influence the decisions…a mere 
formalistic attempt to consult does not constitute consultation”  nor consent. 196
 Roesch, supra note 186 at 525.192
 Oxfam & LRC, supra note 187 at 71.193
 Charis Kamphuis, “Contesting Indigenous-Industry Agreements in Latin America” in Dwight Newman & 194
Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, eds, The Law and Politics of Indigenous-Industry Agreements (Routledge, forthcoming), 
online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215369> at 11.
 George C Schoneveld, “Governing large-scale farmland investments in sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and ways 195
forward” (May 2014), online: CIFOR <http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/infobrief/4560-infobrief.pdf>.
 Manirakiza, supra note 5 at 6.196
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6.5. Conclusion 
 Mining governance in Zambia has been affected by its political and economic history, 
which was often shaped by external actors and forces. The price of copper influenced 
government intervention in the mining industry, turning the newly independent state into an 
owner in the early 1970s; then a seller in the 1990s at the behest of foreign donors, and then once 
again a minority owner in the 2000s as it grappled with structuring the mineral tax regime to 
maximize full benefits from mining. Local communities remained vulnerable to these changes, 
particularly over the past 30 years, as the state retreated from its development role in the wake of 
neoliberal policy proposals imposed by foreign lenders and donors.  
 Despite strong development-oriented political leadership, Zambia’s mining 
developmental state and its institutions faltered under the weight of various external and internal 
forces: commodity price fluctuations, neoliberal structural adjustment conditionalities, foreign 
investor interests, and weak legal functionalities. Additionally, the state’s focus on maximizing 
the economic benefits of mining delayed the adoption of a robust rights-based to mining 
governance for development that prioritized human rights and the rights of local communities in 
addition to implementing economically driven MDSIs. Zambia’s mining developmental state 
offers lessons for understandings of transnational mining governance, law and development that 
are considered further in Chapter Seven, the conclusion. 
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7  Re-visiting the ‘Resource Curse’: Findings and Conclusion 
“We have to change the landscape of the mining industry on our continent… 
It is not only about growth. It is about development.” 
-Mrs. Graça Machel    1
7.1. Introduction 
 I began my doctoral program near the end of the last commodities supercycle in 2014. 
The wealth generated during the boom had changed coverage of Southern Africa, as well as other 
parts of Africa, in the Western press—stories of despair and extreme poverty were no longer the 
dominant headlines. Instead, narratives of “Africa rising” and “the hopeful continent” were 
emerging and transforming perceptions of the continent’s economic potential.  All of my 2
knowledge about Southern Africa—both as an aspiring academic and a member of the African 
diaspora—made me sceptical. Was the “resource curse” no longer a concern? Had “good 
governance” principles successfully transformed mining governance across Southern Africa? 
Curious about what was transpiring across the region, I learned that Southern African 
governments were, contrary to many good governance tenets, attempting to capitalize on the 
wealth potential of the new minerals rush by reinserting themselves in the mining sector and 
creating more policy space for development-driven state activism. Wishing to situate myself in 
law and development scholarship, I decided to interrogate this conflict using an emerging theory
—the developmental state—that had not yet been used to examine mining developmentalism or 
the potential for long-term socioeconomic development in the Southern African context.  
 Comments by Ms. Graça Machel at the Alternative Mining Indaba (February 12, 2015) in “Official Report of the 1
2015 Alternative Mining Indaba”, online: Alternative Mining Indaba <http://altminingindaba.co.za/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/AMI-2015-Final-Report.pdf>.
 “Africa rising–the hopeful continent” (December 3, 2011), online: The Economist <https://www.economist.com/2
leaders/2011/12/03/africa-rising>.
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 Over the course of my studies I began to better understand the limitations of orthodox 
law and development theories, and gradually, my conceptualization of mining developmentalism 
and the myriad policy frameworks conceived to sustain it (mainly good governance principles 
that were grounded in neoliberal notions of the state) embraced a model for mining governance 
that mirrors the above quote from Mrs. Graça Machel. Speaking at the 2015 meeting of the 
Alternative Mining Indaba,  Mrs. Machel spoke of the urgent need to restructure mining, not just 3
for growth but for development. Notwithstanding the debate over what development entails, her 
comments reflected my concerns with the limitations of the mining developmental state (MDS): 
without being framed using a rights-based approach to mining governance, economic growth 
would continue to dominate its developmental agenda with little to no consideration for the 
communities and populations directly affected by mining.  
 Accordingly, this dissertation reflects the arc of my doctoral studies. It began with a 
critique of the resource curse and the transnational good governance norms that have dominated 
policy responses to it. Then, this dissertation transitioned to its examination of the developmental 
state. Using literature from other social science disciplines—namely political science and 
development studies—I proposed a developmental state framework that was based on 
“successful" East Asian models. Since resource extraction was not a component of these models, 
I then proposed the MDS to account for recent interventions of mining-dependent Southern 
African states. However, this framework suffered from the same faults as the conventional 
developmental state: it centred economic development (represented in such indicators as 
 Over the past 11 years, civil society organizations in Southern Africa have gathered in Cape Town, South Africa to 3
hold the Alternative Mining Indaba alongside the annual investment conference. The alternative gathering seeks to 
provide mining-affected communities from across Africa a forum to discuss and seek solutions to their concerns 
with industry (Alternative Mining Indaba, online: <http://altminingindaba.co.za>).
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economic growth and Gross Domestic Product per capita) and neglected to consider the social 
impacts of the primary economic activity propelling the developmental state. Given the 
significant effects of mining on communities, the MDS proposed in this dissertation could not be 
isolated from these considerations. Consequently, this dissertation proposed and evaluated a 
rights-based approach to governance in the MDS with a focus on components of both economic 
and social development of the state and local communities. Along with examining state 
interventions in mining, assessing state implementation of community participation, consultation 
and consent using the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) was a central tenet of 
the proposed MDS. 
 Using the case studies of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, the research has confirmed 
the importance of a rights-based approach to mining developmentalism. First, while good 
governance has dominated mainstream approaches to mining for over 30 years, it has proven to 
be an insufficient policy response to the resource curse and sustainable development needs. The 
developmental state model potentially offers ways to better promote developmental goals. 
However, there are a number of shortcomings in a purely economic MDS (which will be 
discussed in greater detail below): the domination of foreign capital, the emphasis on achieving 
traditional economic metrics of development, and the neglect of mining-affected communities. 
The research showed the continued deployment of mining developmental state institutions 
(MDSIs) as Southern African states attempt to expand their developmental strategies in this 
direction.  
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 Looking at my research collectively, Figure 7.1 captures the proposed framework and the 
opportunities to expand the rights-based approach to mining governance in the mining 
developmental state: 
Figure 7.1 – The rights-based approach to mining governance in the MDS 
 
7.2. Re-visiting the “resource curse” and transnational “good governance” 
norms 
 There is no doubt that the importance of mining developmentalism and the subsequent 
rise of transnational good governance norms have affected state practice in Africa since 
neoliberal economic intervention across the continent began in the early 1980s. Although the 
effects on state practice were more obvious where direct intervention by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) occurred, such as Zambia, the influence of transnational good governance 
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reforms was evident in various aspects of international relations (trade and aid negotiations) and 
global economic movement.  In addition to shaping relations in the global political economy, the 4
intersection of state formation and mining developmentalism remains a subject of interest among 
academicians across disciplines. From the origins of the resource curse thesis to contemporary 
studies examining the efficacy of the developmental state (including this one), the prospects for 
mining-led development and its governance challenges have presented complicated questions 
that will continue to occupy scholars’ attention. 
 This dissertation has traced the emergence of contemporary transnational good 
governance norms as a response to the perceived failures in Africa’s post-colonial minerals 
management. From the World Bank’s early interventions via its Strategy for African Mining 
through to the current Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, these norms have all asserted a 
neoliberal role for the state in mining that lacks any critical assessment of foreign corporate 
interests and the state of the global political economy in shaping mining developmentalism. By 
critically dissecting this arc, and then conducting a parallel examination using the developmental 
state paradigm, this dissertation has confirmed particular shortcomings in good governance 
discourse that limit the efficacy of its tenets to resolving the resource curse and promoting 
mining developmentalism. These shortcomings stem from the discourse’s unbridled critique of 
 Jon Schubert, Ulf Engel & Elísio Macamo, “Introduction: Boom and bust: extractive industries and African states 4
in the twenty-first century” in Jon Schubert, Ulf Engel & Elísio Macamo, eds, Extractive Industries and Changing 
State Dynamics in Africa: Beyond the Resource Curse (New York: Routledge, 2018) 1 at 2 .
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the African state,  which critics have argued produces “one-size-fits-all” outcomes.  This study 5 6
further presented factors that support this critique, and the contention that the discourse de-
historicizes and de-politicizes mining across Africa.   7
 First, good governance discourse neglects to account for the state’s position at 
independence, and its subsequent effects on the state’s developmental agenda. The case studies 
have illustrated how this can affect state capacity over the course of the post-colonial period. 
Botswana, having experienced less intrusive colonial intervention than South Africa and Zambia, 
was in the more politically advantageous position at independence. With fewer colonial 
institutions to dismantle and the retention of some traditional forms of governance, Botswana 
was well-suited to strategically retain those that were beneficial to advancing its development 
objectives at the time, which aided the creation of its early post-colonial developmental state and 
mining developmental state institutions. When diamonds were discovered in the country in 
1968, Botswana’s government, under the leadership of President Seretse Khama, was free to 
implement economically beneficial institutions that were not hindered by foreign corporate or 
political interests. 
 Pablo Idahosa, “Good Governance, Corruption and the Resource Boom: Africa and Canada in the Global Order” in 5
David Leadbeater, ed, Resources, Empire and Labour: Crises, Lessons and alternatives (Black Point, Nova Scotia: 
Fernwood Publishing, 2014) 200 at 203; J Andrew Grant et al, “‘New’ Approaches to the Governance of Africa’s 
Natural Resources” in J Andrew Grant, WR Nadège Compaoré & Matthew I Mitchell, eds, New Approaches to the 
Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015) 3 at 5.
 Mari-Lise du Preez, “Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’: Rethinking Natural Resource Governance 6
Theory and Practice in Africa” in J Andrew Grant, WR Nadège Compaoré & Matthew I Mitchell, eds, New 
Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 25 at 39.
 Jewellord Nem Singh & France Bourgouin, “Introduction: Resource Governance at a Time of Plenty” in Jewellord 7
Nem Singh & France Bourgouin, eds,  Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South: 
Critical International Political Economy Perspectives (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2013) 1 at 10.
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 Comparatively, colonial institutions were deeply embedded in South African and 
Zambian governance. In South Africa, the end of colonial rule gave way to an apartheid regime 
that established brutally invasive institutions that created a two-tier system of economic, social, 
and political rights. Although South Africa’s mining industry became a global leader, it 
exacerbated societal inequities by entrenching wealth and economic power amongst an elite few 
while confining the country’s non-white population to low-wage, unskilled jobs. Reforming 
these institutions has been a significant challenge for the African National Congress (ANC), 
South Africa’s only post-apartheid governing party. Similarly in Zambia, the discovery of copper 
and other minerals during colonialism placed the country in a disadvantageous position at 
independence. Unlike Botswana, Zambia did not have a “clean-slate” where it could freely 
establish its developmental state and mining developmental state institutions. The post-colonial 
Zambian government under President Kenneth Kaunda also faced significant opposition to 
reform efforts from foreign corporate interests. Since these were less entrenched than in South 
Africa, Zambia’s political leadership was better able to complete some reforms, although the 
country continues to deal with the legacy of neoliberal intervention today. 
 Along with a state’s position at independence, this dissertation also confirmed the 
influence of the global political economy and minerals prices on mining governance, which are 
important considerations good governance discourse has yet to adequately account for. The 
volatility of Zambia’s mining industry—in contrast to the relative stability of Botswana’s and 
South Africa’s industries—illustrates this contention. Over the past 50 years, the prices of 
diamonds, gold and platinum group metals (the minerals which dominate production in 
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Botswana and South African) experienced less fluctuation than the prices of copper and zinc,  8
which are the main minerals mined in Zambia. The volatility of copper prices reduced the ability 
of Zambian governments to create sustainable MDSIs. Income generated from copper was 
reduced significantly when prices collapsed in the 1980s. Consequent constraints on the state’s 
budget led the government to seek assistance from BWIs that subsequently attached conditions 
on Zambian mining governance that further restricted the state’s ability to implement MDSIs and 
meet its developmental objectives in the ensuing decades. This was not a challenge the 
Botswanan and South African governments experienced, given the relative stability of diamond, 
gold, and platinum prices. 
 Lastly, good governance discourse misconstrues the relationship between states and 
mining companies. It requires that states unilaterally implement norms (transparency, 
accountability, and the rule of law), without any view to the state’s capacity and its unequal 
power relations with transnational corporations. In some instances, state and corporate interests 
have aligned, with beneficial results for the state’s developmental agenda. Botswana’s 
longstanding partnership with De Beers supports this contention. However, it is more often the 
case, especially in countries with large corporate entities, that governments are in disadvantaged 
positions where they might be forced to concede to private interests over state interests. South 
Africa’s recent difficulties implementing the Mining Charter illustrate the extent to which 
corporate power can hamper development goals. Additionally, Zambia’s experience with 
inequitable mining contracts and community evictions further demonstrate the challenges states 
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The 8
International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
2011) at 34-35.
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must contend with when attempting to implement their development agendas. Good governance 
discourse fails to account for these dynamics when it suggests states are the only actors that 
should abide by its prescribed norms.  
 Consequently, good governance discourse continues to treat Southern African mining 
governance and its developmental impacts as if it operates beyond the reach of external forces, 
such as foreign corporate interests and the effects of the global political economy.  Framing 9
minerals management in this way not only hinders state practice, it also constrains the role for 
law in transformational mining developmentalism that attempts to redistribute power within 
state-corporate relations. 
 Despite these shortcomings, good governance norms can serve a purpose in the rights-
based approach to mining developmentalism. As it is currently conceptualized, good governance 
discourse prioritizes its norms as the end or objective that states must achieve to realize 
development. As this dissertation has shown, this approach is unlikely to meet these aims 
because of the way the role for law is conceptualized—laws should not merely be enacted to 
ensure good governance norms are adopted in statute. Instead, transparency, accountability, and 
the rule of law should be regarded as means of facilitating the rights-based approach to mining 
governance.  These norms can aid in concretizing the rights-based approach in order to 10
legitimize governance,  because what is most lacking from the discourse are meaningful 11
 Alastair Fraser, “Introduction: Boom and Bust on the Zambian Copperbelt” in Alastair Fraser & Miles Larmer, eds, 9
Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized Copperbelt (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010) 1 at 7.
 Patrícia Galvão Ferreira, Breaking the Weak Governance Curse: Global Regulation and Governance Reform in 10
Resource-Rich Developing Countries (SJD Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2012) at 260 
[unpublished].
 Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Legitimate Governance in Africa – International and 11
Domestic Legal Perspectives: An Introduction” in Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor, eds, 
Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) 3 at 5.
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enforcement and accountability mechanisms that ensure mining developmentalism is practiced 
for the benefit of communities, not merely state economic growth. This dissertation interrogated 
these lessons from Botswana, South Africa and Zambia as each state has attempted to implement, 
or entrench, MDSIs in its minerals governance. 
7.3. Insights from Botswana, South Africa and Zambia 
  Attempts by Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia to implement developmental state and 
mining developmental state institutions offer reflections on the paradigms described in Chapter 
Three and further explored in the case study chapters. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the 
developmental state paradigm emerged from an inductive analytical process that identified 
successful criteria from case studies—namely the East Asian Tigers—that limited its 
applicability to other countries. Nonetheless, scholars have advocated for the replicability of the 
developmental state model in Africa. Motivated by this academic endeavour, this dissertation 
also examined recent state practice in mining-dependent countries to identify additional 
characteristics of the mining developmental state. Recognizing that the function of these 
institutions would be critical to the favourable outcome of the mining developmental state—and 
would distinguish the paradigm from good governance norms—this dissertation also adopted 
Trubek, Coutinho, and Schaprio’s framework to assess their legal functionalities. However, it is 
acknowledged that both paradigms—the mainstream developmental state and the proposed 
mining developmental state variation—were insufficient to account for the concerns of 
communities directly impacted by mining. Therefore, it was stipulated that the rights-based 
approach to development that considers both the human and economic development of 
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communities should frame governance in the mining developmental state. Conducting this three-
tiered analysis—mainstream developmental state, mining developmental state, and the rights-
based approach—of mining governance in the three case studies contributed to expansive 
understandings of the framework proposed in this dissertation. 
 Due to its theoretical origins, the developmental state paradigm had never contemplated 
the effects of natural resources on the institutions that became synonymous with its success. In 
fact, the absence of natural resources from the commonly accepted developmental states—Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—led proponents to conclude that the model could not be 
replicated in resource-dependent countries. The resource curse has also contributed to this 
contention, with Botswana regarded as an exception to the rule. More recently, as African states 
have turned away from neoliberal economic policies and revitalized interventionist institutions, 
some scholars argue that resource-dependent African states are implementing developmental 
states.  This dissertation also seeks to contribute to this scholarship by further examining the 12
limitations of the developmental state paradigm in mining-dependent Southern Africa. 
 Each case study explored in this dissertation illustrated three key ways in which 
successful implementation of the mining developmental state would necessarily diverge from the 
mainstream model. First, the model would need to account for the state’s relationship with 
mining capital.  Botswana revealed one relationship that proved beneficial to the state’s 13
longterm economic growth and development, although structural inequities were exacerbated 
 See Jesse Salah Ovadia & Christina Wolf, “Studying the developmental state: theory and method in research on 12
industrial policy and state-led development in Africa” (2018) 39:6 Third World Quarterly 1056; Richard Saunders & 
Alexander Caramento, “An extractive developmental state in Southern Africa? The cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe” 
(2018) 39:6 Third World Quarterly 1166; Chilenye Nwapi & Nathan Andrews, “A ‘New’ Developmental State in 
Africa? Evaluating Recent State Interventions vis-a-vis Resource Extraction in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Rwanda” (2017) 13:2 McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law 225.
 Saunders & Caramento, supra note 12 at 1172.13
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and local communities have been disadvantaged. Alternatively, South Africa and Zambia have 
both had problematic relationships with mining capital. While the MDSIs being implemented in 
both countries have attempted to reshape this relationship, mining capital has strongly resisted 
these efforts and has blocked these initiatives through court action (the judicial review of the 
South Africa’s Mining Charter, and threats of legal action and eventual lawsuits opposing 
Zambia’s tax reforms).  
 Second, the developmental state paradigm would need to consider the effects of the 
commodities price cycle. Both Botswana and South Africa have benefitted from more stable 
commodities prices (diamond, and gold and platinum metal group minerals, respectively). In 
Botswana’s case, stable diamond prices have contributed to the longterm sustainability of its 
mining developmental state. South Africa, meanwhile, has been able to link its developmental 
agenda to its mining industry due to the sector’s viability, which stable prices provide. In contrast 
to the relative stability in Botswana and South Africa, severe fluctuations in copper prices over 
the past 40 years have impaired Zambia’s ability to fully implement a sustained mining 
developmental state. Instead, Zambia’s inability to effectively manage copper price volatility in 
the 1980s led the state to seek debt assistance from the World Bank. By the time prices recovered 
in the 1990s–early 2000s, most of the industry had already been privatized, which instilled more 
power in mining capital and made it difficult for the state to reverse course and introduce 
interventionist policies in subsequent years. 
 Connected to the preceding two considerations is the legacy of neoliberal interventions. 
Botswana was spared from foreign intervention, although its economic positions have entrenched 
structural inequalities in the country. Of the three case studies, the presence of foreign neoliberal 
312
interventions was most pronounced in Zambia, which undertook a mandatory World Bank 
structural adjustment programme in exchange for debt relief in the 1980s. That intervention had a 
longterm effect on the state’s ability to constitute mining developmental state institutions, as the 
reforms expanded and strengthened the role of private capital in the industry. Similarly in South 
Africa (although it was not subject to structural adjustment), neoliberal interests that were 
entrenched during apartheid proved difficult to reverse in the early post-apartheid period. In an 
effort to maintain national unity and peace, these interests remained untouched. The state’s 
unwillingness to confront these interests ensured they remained in place as various 
administrations subsequently tried to introduce redistributive mining developmental state 
institutions, with little success. 
 The varied replicability of the developmental state and mining developmental state model 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zambia also raises the question of how the paradigm’s success 
should be measured. This dissertation measured success, to some degree, by assessing to which 
extent each case study mirrored the established paradigm. Additionally, this dissertation also 
used Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro’s legal functionalities framework to measure the efficacy of 
the various mining developmental state institutions that have been introduced in each case study. 
The results revealed the limitations of this approach, particularly since the paradigm does not 
account for the concerns of affected communities. Nor does the framework interrogate a state’s 
ability to integrate their mining developmental agendas into the global economy. This remains a 
critical consideration given the ongoing influence and interest of foreign capital in Southern 
313
African mining, as well as the lingering uncertainty that arises from the ongoing cycle of boom 
and bust commodities prices.   14
7.4. Conclusion and areas for future research 
  Recognizing the shortcomings of the above paradigms, this dissertation proposed the 
adoption of a rights-based mining developmental state that incorporated institutions that 
advanced both human and economic development. Of course, it is acknowledged that the 
institutions this framework could encompass are likely not confined to the ones explored in this 
dissertation. For example, labour and environmental policies were not considered. Neither did it 
consider the rights of women and girls in mining, or the growing move to formalize artisanal and 
small-scale mining. Due to the exclusive focus on studying the developmental state framework, 
which does not account for these issues, they were not included in the analysis undertaken in this 
dissertation. Instead, the proposed rights-based approach accounts for a significant human right 
in relation to mining—free, prior and informed consent of affected communities and Indigenous 
peoples. While this approach helps expand conceptions of the developmental state paradigm, it is 
acknowledged that it may still not account for the concerns of extractivist critics with the harm 
that can arise from the close relationship between the state and industry.  15
 This dissertation has attempted to revisit the resource curse and good governance 
paradigm by examining its limitations and considering developmental state theoretical 
framework as an alternative governance model for Southern African states attempting to leverage 
mineral wealth to promote developmentalism, in clear conflict with traditional good governance 
 Schubert, Engel & Macamo, supra note 4 at 4.14
 Jide James-Eluyode, “The blurred lines: analysing the dynamics of states’ duty and corporate responsibility to 15
consult in developing countries” (2015) 23:3 Afr J Int’l & Comp L 405 at 431.
314
norms that seek to limit the role for the state in mining. Mining governance in Botswana, South 
Africa and Zambia illustrates this conflict, and has revealed shortcomings of the traditional good 
governance approach—namely, that it neglects the structural inequities embedded in the 
paradigm. Thus, as part of its contribution to the field of law and development, this dissertation 
has sought to offer an expansive view of the mining developmental state that entrenches a human 
rights approach to mining governance. As a governance framework, the developmental state on 
its own embeds the interests of powerful local elites who often collaborate closely with foreign 
capital. While this model may yield significant economic outcomes for the state, it overlooks the 
harmful effects of these structures and the ways in which they exacerbates economic, social and 
political inequalities.  
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